For thinkers, the core activity is thinking. For politicians, it is making policy. At times, however, thinkers engage in politics and politicians think. The results of intellectual work often take the form of presentations, analyses, and reports. Two years ago, several useful reports appeared from the perspective of Europe and its defense capabilities.

These included a report by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta on the European single market, which also addressed the defense industry. Another was the report by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on the need for reforms in the European Union. In the autumn, a report by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö on Europe's civilian and military preparedness was published. Of these, Draghi's report has probably attracted the most attention. It has had some impact, though seemingly not enough.

It is worth reading Draghi's later remarks alongside that report — for instance, his speech in May this year when accepting the Charlemagne Prize. In light of the war in Ukraine and the turbulence spreading from across the Atlantic, it is worth recalling Draghi's warning that one of Europe's major vulnerabilities is its strategic dependence. He also strongly emphasized the need for pragmatic federalism in Europe.

All of this applies to defense as well. In fact, it forms a strategic bundle in which security, technology — the key issue of today and the near future — trade, energy, and much more are intertwined.

In May this year, another report bearing Niinistö's name was published, this time addressing more concrete ways to strengthen European security. Niinistö chaired the working group that produced this joint publication by several think tanks. In total, 23 participants contributed, with three to four acting as primary authors, along with observers. The report was formally presented by Steven Blockmans. But that concerns form rather than substance. Compared to Niinistö's earlier report, this one is far more focused and provides material for further development. Hopefully, it will not remain merely a theoretical exercise.

The title makes its general direction clear: "More Europe in Defense." In an interview with Finland's Yleisradio, Niinistö noted that he had already explained the idea of a more European NATO to Donald Trump during his first presidency. But one can explain many things to Trump — it is unlikely to have lasting impact. Niinistö describes this latest report as the first constructive European vision on the topic.

The publication proposes three paths for developing Europe's defense capabilities in a scenario where U.S. involvement declines or even disappears.

The first path is strengthening the European pillar of NATO — a more European alliance. This is also the working group's preferred option.

The goal would be to preserve U.S. involvement in the most critical areas while building a more European structure. This would also mean "Europeanizing" NATO's command structure. While the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe would likely remain with an American, at least initially, several one- to three-star general positions should go to Europeans, particularly in intelligence, operations, and planning.

The NATO Eurogroup, which existed from 1968 to 1993, should be restored. Military deployment should be organized based on regional groupings among European member states, such as the eastern flank, the Arctic, and the Mediterranean region.

Command centers need to be moved closer to potential areas of operation. This would mean, for example, strengthening the army headquarters in Mikkeli, Finland, and transferring the role of the joint command responsible for the eastern flank from Brunssum in the Netherlands to a new land command in Poland. This command would be led by a senior officer from an Eastern European country. Meanwhile, Brunssum would become NATO's European joint headquarters, responsible for planning and leading NATO operations carried out in Europe.

Strengthening cooperation between NATO and the European Union would be essential. NATO's role would primarily involve coordination and standard-setting, as its shared funding is relatively limited. The EU, in turn, would help translate agreed goals into concrete investments and military capabilities.

The second proposed path is a new European multilateralism. This would require mapping existing capabilities and preparing contingency plans for scenarios in which the United States or another member state renders NATO inoperable. It would also involve forming a core group of capable, determined, and reliable European countries.

Additionally, the report proposes establishing a European Security Council that would not depend on consensus within the North Atlantic Council. This council would be supported by its own command structure, a dedicated military budget, and multinational defense forces. This would likely entail "coalitions of the willing," or minilateralism, where existing groupings — such as the France-Germany-United Kingdom trio or the Nordic group — would expand.

A so-called layered strategy is suggested. Bilateral partnerships would form one layer, regional groupings another, and NATO a third layer, with the European Union involved across all layers.

The third path is EU-led defense cooperation, which would mean making the EU's mutual defense clause a reality. EU defense cooperation should serve shared strategic interests. Existing projects — such as monitoring the eastern flank, drone initiatives, air defense ("air shield"), and space defense ("space shield") — should be supplemented with enhanced long-range strike capabilities and cloud computing to speed up data exchange among European militaries. EU capability packages would also need further development.

Finally, unified political leadership is required to build a genuine European defense union with armed forces capable of carrying out tasks based on a single security concept.

Although the working group prefers the first path, it appears to see it as the first step toward the second and third levels. Combined with pragmatic federalism, this suggests that in the near term the focus should be on coalitions of the willing, as well as extending majority voting within the European Union.

One could envision a region stretching from the Arctic through the Nordic countries and the Bucharest Nine — either all or part of them — down to the Adriatic and the Black Sea. In the future, this would undoubtedly also include Ukraine, currently probably the most battle-hardened military force in Europe.

To conclude, two key terms once again: pragmatic federalism and minilateralism. Perhaps they will influence the European Union's new security strategy. In any case, the matter appears urgent, and hopefully it will gain traction in the minds of policymakers.

Reading recommendations

• TF-Report-More-Europe-in-defence-formatted.pdf
• 2026 Mario Draghi English.pdf
• Sauli Niinistöllä on visio, josta puhuu koko Eurooppa: "Ennen vanhaan minulle naurettiin" | Ulkomaat | Yle

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