Finland's future policy think tank Sitra recently published a memorandum on the ongoing transformation in global politics. Here are a few key points from it.

It is widely acknowledged that we are living through a period of profound change. One conclusion of the Sitra memo is that under such conditions, Finland and other small states must move from merely following rules to actively defending and helping to build the world order.

The new world order has not yet emerged. It will be shaped by the nature of the end of the war in Ukraine, new dynamics in the Middle East, responses by other actors to China's rising influence, and domestic developments in the United States. In place of the old normal, what has so far taken shape is a vague, transactional reality marked by geopolitical competition.

The memo identifies two main pathways to building a better future. One would see the European Union transform its economic strength into strategic influence by strengthening its technology and industrial policy, ensuring funding, and increasing its decision-making capacity — for example, by forming coalitions of the willing. The other option is to rely more on enhancing the role of middle-sized countries, which has been discussed before.

The current ideological shift is made more serious by the merging of the climate crisis — shaking the global order — with the finite nature of the planet's resources. Among rising powers, China's aim is not to export its political system but to expand its influence vis-à-vis its main competitors. Asia, the Gulf region, and Africa want to bring their own interests to the forefront, and as the existing world order fragments, they have increasing opportunities to do so.

The European Union and Europe as a whole must find new ways to act in this upheaval, and it will be crucial what form the EU's strategic capacity ultimately takes.

Both globally and domestically, there is an ongoing struggle between liberal and illiberal values. Religion has re-entered geopolitics in a new way, providing meaning where secular ideology and liberal rationalism have faltered — examples include the United States and India. The U.S. itself has also shifted from being a defender of democracy to a more self-interested user of power. Middle and small states are therefore forced to adopt realism, where values remain a compass, but decisions are made under conditions shaped by power politics and economic interests.

In brief, the transformations of this upheaval converge around four areas: the replacement of global economic integration with fragmentation; the shift from competing ideological camps to transactionalism and the dominance of stronger power; the replacement of proactivity with an emphasis on sustainability, where reducing dependencies becomes a growing trend; and the substitution of openness with strategic concealment.

Within NATO, a process of "Europeanization" is underway, which in the long term will strengthen the alliance. However, it is necessary to consider not only military capabilities but also issues of political and military leadership — who decides, sets priorities, and directs operations.

Nuclear deterrence remains an especially complex issue, alongside internal divisions within Europe itself. Regarding transatlantic relations, four possible scenarios can be outlined depending on the role of the United States.

First is indifference, where both investment and oversight are low — meaning the U.S. leaves the Old World to manage on its own. Second is the partner model, involving high investment and limited control — the U.S. remains tied to NATO but treats Europe pragmatically, expecting it to manage security in its immediate neighborhood.

Third is the vassal model: low investment but strong control, where the U.S. compels Europe to follow its lead in trade and energy purchases. Fourth is the bloc logic scenario, with both high investment and high control, resembling the Cold War, but with U.S. security guarantees subordinated to competition with China, and Europe expected to show full loyalty.

For Europe, the first two scenarios would likely be preferable, but they would require increased defense capabilities and preparation for conditions without U.S. support. For Europe, key dependencies include U.S. technology and military equipment, as well as Chinese minerals and the logistics chains for renewable energy.

Europe's security system will be determined primarily by the war in Ukraine and its potential outcome. If Russia's sphere-of-influence policy fails, it would strengthen Europe's global standing. However, Europe should be more decisive, as it currently appears that both Ukraine and its allies are preparing to concede parts of Donbas, while demands to hold Russia accountable have weakened and discussions about the need for dialogue are resurfacing.

EU policy needs a clear direction so as not to dissolve into compromises. The memo recalls Mario Draghi's idea of pragmatic federalism — an approach in which integration is deepened where it brings clear added value, without requiring all member states to participate. In other words, coalitions of the willing on issues where unanimity is lacking.

It would also be worthwhile to consider flexible partnerships with countries that share common interests. A country would not need to be a full EU member but could participate selectively in the single market, research programs, defense industry, and standard-setting. Alternatively, strategic clubs could be created in which the EU and selected partners develop cooperation in specific areas. This could lead to the formation of an expanded European community around the EU, with tiered, sector-based membership, while traditional enlargement — especially in Europe's neighborhood — remains strategically unavoidable.

To cope with the upheaval in the world order, the memo proposes five measures. First, material capacity and defense — meaning defense spending and, in Finland's case, Nordic cooperation. Second, geoeconomic autonomy — ensuring logistics and technological sovereignty. Third, strategic navigation, network-based sovereignty, and flexible partnerships. Fourth, maintaining social cohesion and trust within society even under difficult economic conditions. And fifth, the ability to anticipate and address complex issues that arise in times of upheaval, requiring new strategic approaches.

Finally, the memo also presents four tables on future developments and three scenarios for the year 2032, but those are left for interested readers to explore in the original source.

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