On April 7, 2018, it emerged that the Syrian government had killed numerous civilians in the city of Douma with a chemical attack. A brutal war crime. A week later, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom carried out a massive retaliatory action, striking Syrian military and political targets with bombs and missiles.

In March 2022, the brutal murder of civilians in the small Ukrainian town of Bucha by Russian forces shocked the entire world. This, too, is a war crime. And Russia bombs residential buildings in Ukraine every day, killing peaceful Ukrainian citizens with impunity for a fifth year now. Yet no international punitive strikes follow. Why?

Europe is providing massive support to Ukraine, which has been fighting Russian aggression for five years — money, weapons, medical aid. But we are not intervening militarily to defend Ukraine. There would be more than enough justification: to stop the killing of civilians and to protect Ukraine, whose people have chosen our path — the European path.

On December 14, 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Yugoslav wars, was ceremonially signed at the Élysée Palace in Paris. In attendance were the American president, the Russian prime minister, and all the leaders of the European Union. Estonia's foreign minister was also present in the hall — the glamour and pomp of the era of Napoleon III. But it was embarrassing.

It is widely acknowledged that Europe's foreign and security policy failed; Europe was unable to prevent the mass murder of innocent civilians. The war was ultimately ended by the United States with its bombers. This fact continued to strain EU–US relations afterward.

We are proud of our European values, centered on the individual, their freedom, the rule of law, security, and well-being. We are admired and envied. At the same time, we are incapable of defending people by force against brutal aggressors. This is the greatest damage to Europe's reputation. Building a common and sufficient military capability is a matter of our prestige and survival. If we cannot defend Ukraine, can we defend our own member states?

Directly as a consequence of the Yugoslav war, French President Jacques Chirac and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair drafted the so-called Saint-Malo Declaration, proposing the creation of a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force.

At the end of 2000, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen threatened to dissolve NATO if Europe created independent rapid reaction units. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also opposed an independent European defense policy in 1998. Following American opposition, the Saint-Malo initiative collapsed.

In 2021, the American think tank CAP (Center for American Progress) published a longer essay calling U.S. opposition to an independent European defense policy a strategic mistake.

In 1952, six European countries — Germany, France, the Benelux countries, and Italy — came close to forming an independent European Defense Community (Communauté européenne de défense). The idea failed in the French parliament (notably, the treaty establishing it was never annulled — only postponed pending further development).

France has repeatedly attempted to revive and advance a European defense policy: the Fouchet' Plan in 1961 and the initiatives of President Emmanuel Macron.

The need for an independent European defense has been on the agenda alongside the development of the European Economic Community. Ahead of the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, Eurobarometer surveyed Europeans' sense of security.

The perceived sense of security was surprisingly high. Most European citizens hope that the European Union will help strengthen defense and security. Expectations are high in Estonia and Lithuania, and lowest in France and Greece.

What do we need to defend together militarily?

First, of course, we must defend member states and neighboring countries from external aggression — primarily Russia. In 1867, Nikolai Danilevsky published "Russia and Europe", arguing that Europe is Russia's essential enemy. This mindset shapes Russian policy now and will continue to do so. We should not forget ISIS and other terrorist groups.

Second, we must protect global trade routes and ensure free and secure international trade.

Third, we must defend European society from illegal immigration.

Fourth, we must be ready everywhere in the world to intervene to protect human rights.

Why was the European community created? To secure free trade among countries. Thus, protecting free, fair, rules-based global trade is Europe's strategic interest. The struggle over trade routes is as old as humanity. In the 19th century, it was controlled by Britain. Suez, Malacca, Hormuz, the Bosporus — these are vital and highly vulnerable maritime routes for Europe.

There is no need to look far for sensitive sea routes. The Gulf of Finland has become highly strategic. Before World War II, Finland and Estonia were prepared to close it to the Russian fleet, equipped with large coastal artillery and a jointly operated submarine fleet — including Lembitu, now a pride of our Maritime Museum.

What about now? Who controls the northern sea route?

Trade routes are not just maritime — they include aviation (flight safety) and pipelines. In 1999, a pipeline was blown up in a James Bond film; in 2022, the Nord Stream pipeline was destroyed in reality.

Article 42/7 of the European Union Treaty obliges member states to jointly defend any member state that is the victim of armed aggression.

In fact, much has already been done toward building common defense.

EU documents (the White Paper on European Defense from March 2025 and the Strategic Compass from May 2022) define the objectives and interests of European defense.

Protocol No. 10 of the EU Treaty sets the framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation in defense. Based on this, numerous essential joint projects have been launched. Estonia leads the development of integrated unmanned ground systems. Poland and Estonia, together with other countries, are advancing military mobility.

The European Union has created and successfully deployed joint naval forces to protect shipping and trade routes — EU NAVFOR Atalanta against Somali piracy, Aspides to protect shipping in the Red Sea, and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI for security and to combat illegal immigration in the Mediterranean. Joint border protection (Frontex) has also been significantly strengthened since the 2015 migration crisis.

We are in a strange situation. We are wealthy; we have money. We have armies, missiles, ships, and aircraft. All this is sufficient to deter Russia, ISIS, and illegal immigration — if only we acted together. If only we had a common political defense capability: decision-makers, institutions, people, and public support. Political defense means credible political deterrence above all — a real, credible readiness to decide collectively to use force. And that we are prepared to cross the so-called last mile — to use extreme measures when nothing else works.

Member states jealously guard their right to say no. All military decisions, including the deployment of missions, require unanimity. Member states have veto power. This makes decision-makers dependent on domestic politics, the stability of coalitions, upcoming elections — ordinary politics. Governments change constantly. Flexible operational decision-making is very difficult or impossible. The weaker a government, the more likely it is to say no. Our adversaries find allies in domestic politics who are willing to block joint action.

We are losing time. Time is one of the key components of credible deterrence. What is the use of modern weapons if politics does not allow them to be used?

How was the Schengen area of free movement created? How did the euro come into being? The Prüm Convention? And how was the consortium established in 1970 that became the world's most successful civil aircraft manufacturer — Airbus — which also produces military transport aircraft, helicopters, and participates in fighter jet production? All of these were and remain politically sensitive projects.

A group of member states took the initiative, and most others later rushed to join. Unanimity was bypassed. The EU treaties include rules for "enhanced cooperation," but unfortunately these cannot be applied to military cooperation — for now.

To defend Europe's eastern and southern borders, nothing more is needed than to move existing military forces closer to those borders. Against whom are the French and German land forces preparing to fight in their current locations?

During the period of occupation, the Soviet army used 1,565 sites in Estonia, covering 87,147 hectares across 800 locations. Why could we not offer bases to allied forces?

Along the northern coast of the Mediterranean lies the European Union; along the southern and eastern coasts are EU neighboring countries. This logically requires Europe to maintain strong naval power in the Mediterranean. To protect global trade, rapid-response forces in constant readiness must also be established quickly.

Before World War II, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states were left at the mercy of aggressors. All attempts to organize military cooperation between Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries failed. Poland stood alone, Finland stood alone, the Baltic states stood alone. This must not happen again. Poland and the Nordic and Baltic countries should take the initiative and begin creating joint air force, air defense, and air transport units.

The solution for Europe as a whole is to place at least some collective defense decisions under the full authority of the European Union — just as customs policy, competition policy, and the eurozone are — and to introduce qualified majority voting instead of unanimity.

The turbulence of history has created a crisis necessary for making radical decisions. A window of political opportunity has opened — if politicians focused on local issues recognize it. And we do not have much time.

This commentary is based on a presentation delivered at a defense policy conference organized by the Polish embassy in Estonia.