Martin Mölder: Four anchors of Estonian statehood in muddy waters

While the makeup of the Riigikogu will very probably be quite different after the next elections, this might end up meaning little if certain casts of mind do not change of become clearer, writes Martin Mölder.
Estonian politics as a whole has become increasingly muddled in recent years. Perhaps largely because there no longer seems to be a goal or principle that is enduring and recognized by most people. As [joining] the European Union and NATO once were. Instead, small but conspicuous changes in direction are being made — changes that no one would have imagined even a few years ago.
At one moment came the green transition, but then a few years later the realization begins to settle in that perhaps it cannot happen so quickly, so extensively or so straightforwardly after all. Once, a balanced budget was a sacred cow and public-sector debt the gravest sin. Then suddenly those same parties and politicians begin planning budgets with unprecedented deficits for the foreseeable future and borrowing more than ever before. And to top it all off, voters increasingly see not only Estonia but the wider world as a more unpredictable and dangerous place.
The next Riigikogu elections are very likely to bring about a mechanical reshuffling of power and the seats in parliament will be distributed very differently than they are now. But it would also be welcome if a certain restructuring or settling took place in Estonia's political discourse and practice.
I would point to four reference points that could structure that settling and that concern the very foundations of the kind of Estonian state in which the overwhelming majority of Estonian citizens would probably want to live.
First, the principle of sovereignty. Of course, Estonia is already a sovereign state, but we must be honest about what that sovereignty means in today's world.
No country can function effectively in complete independence, and cooperation — and with it the limiting of one's full freedom of decision-making — is necessary. Estonia should be highly vigilant and active in defining and understanding what is ultimately in our interests in dealing with other countries and what is not. That applies both in the context of the European Union and more broadly.
We must preserve the mindset that we should be, as much as possible, the masters of our own fate. Only very rarely does a moment reach Estonia's political discourse when we clearly say that, for example, this or that European Union policy is not in Estonia's interests. Many policies certainly are, but quite a few certainly are not. Why, with a few rare exceptions, do we hear practically nothing about them?
Second, the principle of democracy. And I am not talking about elections, which in the long run are the foundation of a democratic system of government. Democracy could also be understood a bit more broadly, as a certain mindset and attitude that should accompany the exercise of state power.
A democratic state serves its citizens; it does not work against them. The citizenry is not an object to be nudged, managed or surveilled. The state must be honest and open with its citizens. The state should not, on its own initiative, take steps that run counter to the preferences of the citizenry, even if there is a strong internal conviction that doing so is right.
And we should not think that we know better what is in people's interests than they do themselves because they are supposedly limited in their knowledge and capacity to understand. That kind of thinking belongs more to the arsenal of enlightened monarchy or elitism than of democracy. If voters do not agree with something, they must be persuaded, and if they do not understand, it must be explained. A democratic state is an honest and patient state.
Third, the principle of limited government. We have begun to get used to seeing the state as a universal problem-solver. If we operate with that mindset, the state expands, bureaucracy grows and the sphere of free action available to citizens shrinks. Yet the sphere free from state power is a value in itself and should be kept as large as possible.
The state should do as little as is absolutely necessary, not as much as possible, because only then can freedom survive in society. And one thing a limited state certainly should not do is nationalize value conflicts. Value conflict in society is inevitable to a certain extent. It has been with us since the beginning of time and will always remain with us, but it must remain something for free citizens themselves to shape, experience and struggle through — not something for state power to manage and direct. In Estonia, we have seen rather the opposite trend: value and identity politics are increasingly becoming the domain of the state.
And fourth, the principle of the nation-state. If the mid-2010s marked the high point in Estonia of a multicultural mindset that disdained the nation-state, it now seems to me that the principle of the nation-state is quietly returning as a positive force.
Estonians are a very small people and Estonia a very small country. We cannot change the world and no one else cares about our fate. And this is our only home. It is threatened by a dual demographic crisis: uncontrolled immigration, which would erode social cohesion, and a collapsed birth rate, which creates a vacuum in society that is very difficult to fill.
It is encouraging to see that, step by step, a greater consensus is emerging in Estonia that the demographic crisis truly is a crisis that must be addressed and that immigration beyond a certain point is a threat, not a solution. If Estonia abandons the principle of the nation-state, then in the end we will also give up our home because someone else will move in here — someone with a different language and culture, whose history lies elsewhere.
In the next Riigikogu elections, the distribution of power will almost certainly change. That is very important because it will remove a malfunction in Estonian politics that has lasted for almost an entire parliamentary term, in which voters' preferences and power were not aligned.
In the end, however, that may mean nothing if certain ways of thinking do not change and become clearer. If it does not become clearer to us what today's Estonia is, where it is headed and what the Estonia we want to avoid looks like. Sovereignty, democracy, limited government and the nation-state. These concepts can certainly be unpacked in different ways than has been done in these reflections. And they certainly should be. But the concepts themselves could be something around which we create clarity and direction once again amid the haze of our politics.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski









