We often hear talk about changes in the world order, with claims that the old rules-based and liberal system no longer works and has been replaced by a new one. Yet when it comes to describing exactly what this new world order entails, Estonia's foreign policy shapers and even experts tend to struggle. Still, there are a number of different visions and theories about the nature of this emerging order.

Let me outline one possible model, whose contours, in my view, have become most clearly visible over the past five years. In brief, we are moving toward a world of divided spheres of influence, vassal dependencies and mutually beneficial deals — one that stands in contrast to the old liberal world order where values served as the guiding principle and ensured a degree of stability and predictability in international relations.

Before turning to the three defining features of this new order, it is worth explaining why we are on the brink of such a shift in the first place.

In the Estonian media, a common view holds that all of this is driven by Donald Trump and, more broadly, the rise of right-wing populism. The dismantling of the old liberal world order is interpreted as an ideological project of Trump and his admirers, for whom liberalism and alliances do not align with their beliefs.

While this is partly true, it is only half the story. The shift in the world order has been driven by much more fundamental changes in 21st-century global politics. In short, the West is steadily losing its political, military and economic weight, while other, non-Western countries are becoming increasingly influential.

For these others — most notably China and several countries of the Global South (such as India and Brazil) — the post–World War II rules-based order shaped by the West was never fully acceptable as they were excluded from its creation in 1945. Thus, the emerging world order is not merely a whim of Trump's, but a new geopolitical reality in which an increasingly influential Global South is asserting itself more forcefully and the West must also adapt.

Over the next decade or longer, we will likely see a transition period in which many elements of the liberal world order still persist, even as features of a new, sphere-of-influence–based system begin to seep in. Eventually, a decisive shift toward the new order is likely.

What do these three elements of the new world order mean and what might they mean for Estonia?

First, spheres of influence. In the old liberal order, a country's status and security were largely determined by the international clubs it belonged to (such as the EU and NATO) or by its value system (the West versus the non-West). In the new order, great powers will agree among themselves on spheres of influence and a country's values or system of governance will matter far less. Geography and realpolitik interests will take precedence.

This is a rather unfavorable prospect for Estonia. It suggests that with each U.S. president, we may need to make separate efforts to persuade Washington that we belong in the U.S. sphere of influence rather than Russia's. If, on the other hand, we orient ourselves fully toward Europe, we may no longer be able to rely on U.S. military protection at a decisive moment.

Second, vassal dependencies. In the new world order, small and medium-sized countries (like Estonia) within different spheres of influence will not be entirely free to choose their systems of governance or shape their foreign policy. Key directions will require the approval of the regional hegemon.

If a signal comes from the United States that a particular major trade deal with China should not go ahead, Estonia will not pursue it. If there is a push to distance ourselves more from our European allies and align more closely with the United States, Estonia will cautiously follow suit.

If anyone considers such forecasts exaggerated, it is worth looking at Trump's foreign policy and what he actually expects from small states like ours.

Third, deals. Spheres of influence and vassal relationships will be based less on shared values — whether liberal or conservative — and more on mutual benefit. By belonging to the U.S. sphere of influence, Estonia gains security guarantees against Russia, but in return must also be useful to the Americans. Do we have strategically important manufacturing industries (as Taiwan does with semiconductors)? Are there significant U.S. investments here? Do we extract any minerals crucial to the global economy?

No one will rush to defend us simply because of past loyalty or shared values. In the new world order, the boundaries of spheres of influence will be in flux, creating so-called gray areas. Countries that fail to play their foreign policy cards skillfully often find themselves in precisely such zones.

With elections approaching, it would be highly welcome if liberal parties articulated a clear vision of how Estonia could survive in this much harsher new world order. Nostalgic longing and hope that the old rules-based system will return in its former security are no longer convincing.

Conservative forces, for whom the liberal world order has never been a good fit, should in turn engage their think tanks and develop a coherent narrative that convincingly argues that Estonia's interests would be far better protected under the new order than they ever were under the old liberal one. In short, one would like to see Estonia's parties and policymakers gradually reorient themselves to the 21st century, rather than continuing to live in the 20th.

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