A few weeks ago, French President Emmanuel Macron proudly announced that the country had set an ambitious goal for 2030: by then, 10,000 new recruits should voluntarily join the French army every year. Adjusted for Estonia's population, that would amount to around 170 men and women annually.

If a leading figure in Estonia's defense sector made such a proposal, they'd be out of a job the next day — it would be dismissed as absurd and laughable. But Macron is a man who jumps from one Ukraine crisis meeting to the next, playing a role-playing game called "I, too, shape Europe's destiny."

German generals complain they can't increase the size of their military because there's simply nowhere to house thousands of additional troops — no barracks, no beds, no blankets, let alone weapons. Yet in 2015, Germany managed to receive and shelter nearly a million people who arrived in the country over the course of a year in search of a better, safer life.

That's the level of ambition Europe's two largest countries can muster in the fourth year of war — countries with a combined population of 145 million prosperous citizens. And it's not even worth bringing up Spain or Italy, which have been watching Russia's massacre in Ukraine with indifference and have contributed barely a token amount of actual aid.

From this, Estonia can draw only one clear conclusion: west of Berlin, the talk shops are still grinding away, but there's no action — and none on the horizon. Former U.S. President Donald Trump put it bluntly, as is his style: Europe is weak, talks a lot and doesn't act.

Russia, China and even the U.S. only take seriously those who have power and resolve behind them. And truthfully, that's always been the case — it's just out in the open now. What ultimately matters are interests and interests alone. The U.S. has simply lost interest in coddling Europeans on defense and is clearly exploiting the Old World's years-long self-absorption and decline in both defense and economic capability.

This puts us in an extremely difficult position because, right now, Russia recognizes only the United States as a credible military counterforce on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. Our task is to do everything in our power to ensure the Americans do not abandon us.

Meanwhile, relations between the U.S. and the larger EU countries continue to deteriorate and, sooner or later, that will inevitably translate into pressure on the smaller countries along NATO's eastern flank.

We face a number of unpleasant questions. I'll list only a few — but trust me, there are many and we'll be expected to answer them quickly and without evasion.

For example, suppose the current U.S. administration tells us outright that, for the sake of world peace, Russia needs to be reintegrated into Europe and asks for help lifting EU sanctions. What will we say if that request comes with the veiled threat of pulling U.S. defense support? If economic ties between the West and Russia are restored, how will our society cope with Russians returning to Europe and to Estonia?

I don't know how to answer these questions, but hopefully the policy planning departments in our foreign policy institutions are thinking a few steps ahead about what the brutal post-Ukraine-war world might look like and how we plan to survive in it.

Will our state representatives be able to swallow the visible injustice and recognize that as painful as it is, the consequences of reacting inadequately due to a misreading of the world could be even worse?

This is something several of our politicians — those who've enjoyed popularity by presenting themselves as the most fiercely anti-Russian voices during the Ukraine war — should seriously consider. A sudden change in tone may soon be demanded of them. That tone shift will be easier if they refrain from uttering a few foolish statements now. Unfortunately, Vladimir Putin will not end up in The Hague, though that's where he belongs. Yet our foreign minister and the chair of the Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee still speak of Putin's trial at The Hague as if it were a foregone conclusion.

Estonia's survival is at stake and likely requires aligning ourselves with nearly all U.S. initiatives and taking American business interests into account as much as possible. Ultimately, this doesn't seem like a hopelessly complex task, but it does demand the ability to react quickly to rapidly changing situations. We've seen plenty of poor examples from Western Europe in recent years where storytellers respond far too slowly.

It's easier to call Donald Trump "daddy" with disgust than it is to face down another "daddy's" troops alone in Narva. Or to take a more grounded example: Estonia went to Iraq in 2003 knowing full well that it had to go — that this was how we could tighten our bond with the Americans. The government of the day quickly forgot the blatant violation of international law that the Iraq War undeniably represented.

That doesn't mean we should sideline our closest allies in Europe, but unless and until they begin to shift course, we have no other options. Sooner or later, the U.S.-China rivalry will intensify and the Americans won't be able to manage it alone. They'll need allies — even tiny ones like Estonia.

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