This year has been [U.S. President] Donald Trump's year — he has certainly shaken the world in some sense. As Estonia's prime minister, how have you experienced this? What kind of world are we living in?

It certainly has an impact. From our perspective, the United States is the most influential country in the world when it comes to security and Trump's messaging toward Europe has definitely shaken the understanding of the transatlantic partnership. If there's a silver lining, it's the same message Trump delivered during his first term: European countries need to contribute more to their own defense.

After all, this is practically the world's wealthiest and one of the freest regions. If we want it to stay that way, we have to invest in it.

From Estonia's point of view, this is completely understandable, even appropriate. We've taken it very seriously: next year, our defense spending will exceed 5 percent of GDP. Latvia is getting close to that, Lithuania and Poland are already above it. The Nordic countries are increasing their spending, as are many other European countries — Germany, the United Kingdom and so on. These expenditures are growing and perhaps as a kind of backhanded result, Europe, which used to be a peace project without weapons, may now become a peace project with weapons.

Knowing Russia and seeing that [President Vladimir] Putin's goals haven't changed, I believe that Trump's impact on Europe — "pull yourselves together" — whether it came as a cold shower or a warning, has actually been positive for us to some extent.

The downside is that it has also allowed Putin to return to the table. Putin and his Kremlin circle had been isolated for a time. Now we're seeing renewed boldness and messaging to the world. They're saying everything is great in Russia and that scientific and technological progress is happening, though we all know that's the same empty talk we heard toward the end of the [Soviet] occupation. In reality, their economic figures are quite poor. Financially, things are getting tougher for them, but militarily, they're still capable of producing more than Europe, so the situation continues to evolve.

In that sense, Trump's year in this region has mainly carried a security imprint.

In the economic sphere, I would say all the trade policy and tariff debates with Europe have been... In my view, free trade, liberal trade, trade without barriers has brought real prosperity to the world and reduced poverty. A return to tariff policies is definitely not a great step, but fortunately, the European Commission, which is responsible for trade, has managed things fairly well this year. Overall, it hasn't caused much more than occasional uncertainty.

From an economic standpoint, we may be in calmer waters by year's end, but it's hard to say what next year will bring.

In terms of values-based rhetoric, I'd say Trump's rise has certainly emboldened those who offer simple answers to complex questions.

If we look at Germany, AfD is flirting with the top spot in some areas. In the UK, Reform UK, under Nigel Farage's leadership, is actually in first place. In France, [Marine] Le Pen's group is the most popular and so on.

We've seen this shift in Estonian politics as well: emotionally charged men giving speeches to an empty Riigikogu chamber and waving their hands around — this kind of thing has already happened quite a few times. This Trump year has been a bit different from previous ones, but then again, no two years are the same.

Where do we actually stand in terms of this alliance? On the one hand, Trump's policies have pushed for greater investment in defense spending and so on. On the other, there's been a lot of criticism — claims, for example, that NATO's Article 5 isn't unconditional, that protection depends on who pays. There's also been sharp criticism directed at many European countries and even efforts to influence their domestic politics, as mentioned in strategy documents. International law no longer seems to matter as much — it's now a question of "whatever, you can make a deal with the aggressor." And in the current peace process, we're seeing the U.S. apply more pressure on Ukraine than on Russia. So, there are many points of tension. Where does this alliance stand at the moment?

I'd say that the NATO alliance is still functioning and quite strong. This summer, we had a NATO summit in The Hague and Donald Trump was there as well. His message was that Europe must contribute more to defense and Europe accepted that responsibility. He also said that as long as he is president, he remains committed to NATO. Before the summit, there had been concerns voiced publicly, but that clear statement — that Article 5 still stands — is very important. Especially considering everything that has happened since.

This year in Estonia has really been marked by hybrid threats — many more incidents than in previous years. For example, when Russian fighter jets entered our airspace, Italian F-35s — the most advanced in the world — scrambled to intercept them. Afterward, Donald Trump said: if you need to shoot them down, then do so and reiterated that he would defend the Baltic states and Poland and is committed to that.

So from a security standpoint, the message and the connection are clearly there. The United States often cites us as a model country when it comes to defense investments, one that takes its responsibilities seriously.

Perhaps today there's a bit less emphasis on shared values than there was a few years ago. The world as a whole has become a bit more transactional. Yes, in an ideal world, policy would be more values-based.

As for the Ukraine peace process, I would still say it's good that the Americans are putting pressure on Russia and trying to find a path to peace. But let's just say they're trying to get something from both sides and Ukraine is the easier one for them to push. That's where Europe comes in.

I'll remind you — as [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy recently said — the fact that Europe has secured billions in funding for the coming years — €90 billion — means Ukraine doesn't have to enter surrender negotiations. They can still speak on their own terms and the same goes for Europe.

So even if at times it feels like the Americans are putting more pressure on Ukraine than on Russia, Europe is helping to balance that by supporting Ukraine and maintaining dialogue with the United States.

That brings us to Europe and the most recent European Council summit. Yes, the funding was approved, but there was still no move to seize Russian assets. It seems the fear of provoking Russia still works. How would you assess how Europe and Estonia are managing in this "Trump world"? What should we be doing and how well have we done so far?

I would say Estonia has managed well. I know that around here it's not customary to be optimistic — that everything is generally terrible and the outlook gloomy. But Estonia has actually done quite well, considering we are a small country in an extremely dangerous region, with a raging dictator as our neighbor. Our defense is secured and today's threat assessments indicate that Russia is not contemplating aggression against NATO or European countries.

But we can't predict future plans, because Russia's goals have not changed.

Europe as a whole is much more complex because there are still countries whose economic interests are tied to Russia, even in the fourth year of the war. We keep explaining this to them. At the last summit, for example, we stood together with the German chancellor, the Nordic and Baltic countries — those of us who argued that Russian assets must remain frozen and that Ukraine needs financial support.

We reached something of a middle ground: Ukraine received €90 billion, which will keep it on solid footing for the next two years, and Russian assets remain frozen. No one has abandoned the idea of using them. In the future, these assets can be used either as loan repayments or as guarantees for new loans. As we say in Estonian, it's the "church in the middle of the village" — a fair compromise.

But it does show that there are still countries in Europe that — I don't know if they're afraid of Russia — but they do, in some cases, see Russia as a useful partner. And they may not want to support Ukraine in the way we do, because they don't view this as their fight. They don't understand that Ukraine is also fighting on our behalf.

So we need to continue explaining this. But fortunately, we are not alone. We are part of a strong region: the Baltic and Nordic countries are working closely together; so are Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom. That's the group we belong to and it's a very good group to be in.

Could the future lie more in a narrower coalition of the willing, if we see that broader Europe doesn't fully understand our security concerns and the Americans don't always, either?

The Americans are still here and are ensuring our security.

But when it comes to Ukraine — Ukraine is vital for our security and we don't see the United States standing firmly behind Ukraine at all times.

Trying to interpret the rhetoric of American domestic politics — and I'm not acting as anyone's spokesperson — I would say that at the second-to-last coalition of the willing meeting, which wasn't that long ago, [U.S. Senator] Marco Rubio was present. His message was actually quite simple: Zelenskyy walks through the doors of the White House, not Putin. Putin is not welcome there and U.S. intelligence and military aid continue to flow to Ukraine. So if you put all the rhetoric aside, that's still the reality.

Secondly, I think regional cooperation has become significantly more relevant. During my time as prime minister, the NB8 — the Nordic-Baltic Eight — along with Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom and occasionally within the JEF format, have been meeting much more frequently. That's about a third of NATO in regular communication. We're practically in daily contact on security issues. So regional cooperation in this area is only becoming stronger.

From our perspective, that's not a bad thing. This is one of the wealthiest and most capable regions in the world. Even economically: if you take the combined Nordic-Baltic region, we rank as roughly the tenth-largest economic region globally and we're the second-largest supporter of Ukraine. In that sense, we are quite significant players. We may not be the biggest here, but we're certainly in very good company. That's probably the direction things are heading in, but it doesn't mean we should shrink our focus.

I would argue that it's also our responsibility to engage with Central and Southern Europe. For example, at the last summit, Greece and Spain were actually on our side regarding the use of Russian assets. That's the kind of work we need to continue doing.

How do you view [French President] Emmanuel Macron's plan to begin organizing talks with Putin?

I've told him what I think. I'll just say that, in my view, Russia's goals have not changed. I understand his position — that Europe must also have a role in the negotiations and a seat at the table. I do understand that. Likely, the larger European countries — France, Germany — do have somewhat different perspectives on certain issues.

But Russia's objectives have not fundamentally changed. Putin can sign whatever documents, but they're not even worth the paper they're printed on. Still, somehow, we do have to reach peace eventually. And more often than not, real results with Russia come at the point when they're under serious financial strain. Fortunately, oil prices are low right now, sanctions are biting, Russian assets are still frozen and so on. They're facing real problems and if those problems deepen, they'll come to the negotiating table.

In Russia, politeness is actually seen as a sign of weakness — if you speak diplomatically, they interpret it as weakness. I've said this to Macron and to others. In my view, diplomacy alone won't work and I believe he understands that himself quite well — after all, he tried to prevent the war before it began. That didn't lead to much in the end. I think, unfortunately, that with Russia you get further with pressure and strength than with kind words.

You've already mentioned that there have been quite a few hybrid incidents this year, including several on Estonia's borders. How would you sum up Estonia's overall security situation, both in terms of direct military threats and hybrid influence activities?

The perception remains that Estonia is securely protected and that NATO is functioning as it should. I'll point to a few examples: in Poland, NATO jets shot down drones in NATO airspace for the first time. When our own airspace was violated, Article 4 was triggered. Looking back, NATO's decision-making mechanisms have worked very smoothly and our security is assured.

Take the sea, for example: many people at home, sitting by their Christmas tree or fireplace, may have forgotten that since spring — when we disconnected from the Russian energy grid — there has been an ongoing NATO operation at sea to protect critical infrastructure. NATO ships are patrolling there.

In addition to that, we've had incidents like the Saatse Boot, border guards crossing the [boundary] line and many other things. Knowing all of this, I would say Estonia's security is well protected.

NATO is functioning as a collective defense alliance. The future of our security will not be about a one-on-one confrontation with Russia — it's about collective action within NATO and that is working well.

Russia is aggressive, especially in hybrid operations — that should surprise no one. We had to close the Saatse Boot area very quickly because we needed to ensure the safety of our citizens — no one should end up on a stretch of road where armed Russian soldiers are taking a smoke break. We have to be more prepared for these kinds of things and this year has brought a lot of progress in that regard.

But overall, our security is assured. Russia itself recognizes that NATO is significantly stronger than Russia and that understanding is clear. That's exactly why they keep testing the edges, pushing at our borders to try our patience.

Let's shift a bit from foreign policy to domestic politics. Over the past month, there's been a lot of debate about the president's visit to Kazakhstan. Does it feel like this foreign policy discussion is starting to serve more of a domestic political purpose — perhaps with an eye on the next presidential election? Or is it still fundamentally a debate about how certain foreign policy steps should be taken?

It's hard to say. I myself support the president. One speech certainly won't change Estonia's foreign policy and from what I've seen, the president has clearly stood on the side of Ukraine and in favor of putting pressure on Russia — there's no question about that.

With visits like this, and I travel a lot myself, you can often be more direct in certain conversations behind closed doors. So I'd say this was more of a moderate storm in a teacup, if I can put it that way. I sincerely hope that's all it was.

And if someone wants to run for president next year, by all means: if you're a 40-year-old Estonian citizen, go ahead — iron your tie, or don't, but get ready.

The presidential election will be one of the biggest political events of next year. Who do you think will become the next president and do you support Alar Karis continuing in the role?

We haven't had an in-depth discussion about it within the party yet. Personally, I have a very good working relationship with the current president, but that debate certainly lies ahead for us next year.

I think all parties will go through their own deliberations and internal processes sometime in the spring. Presidential elections are usually a broader debate between parties, with efforts to find a balance. That's when the real discussion begins and candidates can be nominated — then we'll be in a position to assess who the candidate should be.

But once again: as the new year approaches, there's still plenty of time for anyone quietly planning a presidential bid to start putting themselves forward.

Will the Reform Party put forward its own candidate?

I think the Reform Party has some very good potential candidates, to be honest. But of course, what limits us is the tradition in Estonia, in terms of maintaining balance, that if you're the party of the prime minister, you typically don't expect the sitting president to be from the same party.

It's not prohibited by any formal rules, but I think it does somewhat limit the expectation that the candidate would come from the Reform Party.

Do you see it as a realistic possibility that the president will be elected by the Riigikogu? At the moment, the political situation or the arithmetic doesn't seem to support it.

I think it does, actually. It really depends on who the candidate is and whether a broader agreement can be reached. I believe it's possible, even if only narrowly.

If we look at it from the more liberal side, it depends on whether other MPs can be brought on board — it is possible to elect a presidential candidate who enjoys broader support from the liberal and centrist blocs.

So who would those supporters be — Reform Party, Eesti 200, the Social Democrats?

Independent MPs and, since the vote is secret, anyone from any other party, really. In the end, 68 votes fit quite nicely into a parliament of 101. It depends on who the candidate or candidates are, of course, but theoretically it's also possible that the process goes to the Electoral College. Both paths are clearly laid out in the law, both have been tested before and either option is entirely viable.,

The Reform Party's rating isn't particularly strong at the moment. The next parliamentary elections are still over a year away, but they're not that far off anymore. What are you hoping will win voters over in this last year and three months to get your ratings back up?

I think the most important thing is smart, substantive work. I've been in politics a long time and maybe I'm not a typical politician in that sense — I don't believe that trying to artificially make people like you wins support. If you do smart things, people will appreciate that. I think people can see through all the empty noise that's currently fashionable.

Let's be honest: this year, we've been somewhat at odds with our own core identity — efficient government and low taxes. I think next year we'll no longer be in conflict with ourselves and hopefully our voters will find us again. That makes things easier.

And let's put it this way: if the economic picture improves, I think the Reform Party's voters will start to see that little light of optimism shining at the end of the tunnel again. We're still the party of optimists — we believe the world can be better, that Europe can be stronger and that the economy will grow.

What are your hopes for the new year?

That the world will be calmer than it is now and that debates will be more substantive — not just reduced to three catchphrases. If I may wish for such a thing even in the parliament, which is the highest decision-making body in the Republic of Estonia — and in the world as a whole.

And that the economic outlook improves, which would mean better living standards for people both in Estonia and globally, at least in our region. The forecasts seem to support that.

Perhaps the biggest concern remains the security situation. If security isn't in place, everything else suffers. Fortunately, we're also taking steps to ensure that our level of capability and readiness will be high enough in the future for everyone to understand: Estonia is like an old power station door [warning sign] — do not touch, lethal.

This interview was conducted for the "2025 Aktuaalses kaameras" program. The broadcast will air on December 28 at 6:45 p.m. on ETV.

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