Since the 1990s, Estonian foreign policy has been marked by a strong sense of continuity. The goal set at the time — to integrate as closely as possible with Western organizations in order to ensure protection against the Russian threat — has served Estonia's interests well. We did not need to make a foreign policy U-turn in either 2014 or 2022. Estonia's Zeitenwende happened in 1991 and proved to be sustainable.

Now, however, we are faced with the question of to what extent that policy still holds and how to adapt to the systemic changes taking place in the world. Some of the key pillars of Estonia's foreign and security policy remain intact: Russia continues to be an existential threat and NATO, increasingly reinforced by the European Union, offers protection against it.

NATO's deterrence is not credible without the contribution of the United States. The U.S. remains a part of NATO and American withdrawal from the alliance is currently less likely than it was in 2018 (how close it came back then is described in detail in a recent book by former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg).

Nor has the U.S. significantly reduced its presence in Europe so far. From all of this, we can conclude that Estonia's security is protected — thanks, of course, also to our own efforts, without which allied support would not exist.

Yet in several important areas, the foundation of our foreign policy is eroding. In order to cope with change, we must recognize it, understand it and draw the necessary conclusions. Burying our heads in the sand and hoping that everything will continue as before would not only be foolish — it would be life-threatening.

Backing out of idealism

First, alliances are no longer held together by shared values and a common understanding of the world order. The United States' strong support for the Baltic states in the 1990s — at a time when many Western European countries viewed our aspirations with far greater skepticism than the Americans did — was rooted in a values-based vision of a free, democratic Europe.

For decades, the defense and promotion of democratic values around the world has played a central role in U.S. foreign policy, under both Democratic and Republican leadership. The U.S. has also operated on the understanding that establishing common rules and norms globally serves its own security and prosperity.

This defense of democratic values and the rules-based world order has also been the rationale for U.S. support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. But that rationale no longer holds. The new U.S. security strategy not only abandons such idealism but delivers a scathing assessment of it, portraying it as a root cause of America's problems. The new "flexible realism" appears to offer a perfect framework for a renewed friendship and revitalized trade relationship with Russia.

This brings us to the second major shift: the threat assessments of the U.S. and Europe have diverged. The U.S. no longer views Russia as a threat but instead aims to restore "strategic balance" with it. This concept has been used before in U.S.–Russia relations and has always entailed risks for countries that once belonged to Russia's sphere of influence — countries toward which Russia still has demands (including the withdrawal of NATO presence), demands the Kremlin sees as prerequisites for achieving that "balance."

It is well known that Russia has not abandoned these demands and continues to try to persuade the U.S. to accept its vision of strategic balance.

From Ukraine's perspective, there is a silver lining in that the U.S. defines its interest not just as achieving peace but also in rebuilding Ukraine and ensuring its survival as a viable state. At the same time, it is clear that ensuring Ukraine's security and footing the bill for reconstruction will fall to the Europeans. The U.S. sees its role as securing peace as quickly as possible, but the terms of that peace are of secondary importance.

The U.S. strategy states plainly that Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own defense. There is nothing surprising about this and many countries, especially in Northern Europe, have already begun to seriously strengthen their defense capabilities.

Washington views its allies in Europe as useful, but only if they act in alignment with U.S. economic, trade and political interests. Even then, Europe holds only tertiary importance for the U.S., following the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific region. From all this, it must be concluded that a significant reduction in America's military presence in Europe is only a matter of time.

Washington versus Brussels

The third major shift forcing Estonia to make difficult choices is the United States' openly negative stance toward the European Union. The current U.S. administration does not conceal its support for political forces in Europe that are "patriotic" and defend "true" democracy and freedom of speech — that is, right-wing populists who are ideologically closest to Trump's MAGA movement and who take a skeptical view of the EU.

U.S. interference in the domestic politics of European countries in a way that fundamentally undermines the EU and fractures European unity is unprecedented. It is also fundamentally incompatible with democratic principles when the U.S. administration labels certain parties as more democratic simply because they align with its preferences, while dismissing those that support a strong EU based on their own electoral mandates.

Estonia's adjustment to a changed alliance must be based on an honest assessment of the situation. Gone are the value-based alliance and the U.S.-led rules-based world order that have been cornerstones of Estonian foreign policy. Alliances are still held together by shared interests, but even those are narrowing between the U.S. and Europe, especially on the issue most important to Estonia: attitudes toward Russia.

Unfortunately, this new phase in transatlantic relations has brought with it a level of self-censorship unseen since the Cold War — not only in Estonia but across Europe. The understandable desire of politicians and diplomats not to publicly criticize a major ally has stifled open debate.

There is no quick exit from the current relationship of dependency, but the only possible path forward is for European countries to act collectively in strengthening their own defense capabilities and safeguarding their security interests.

Estonian foreign and security policy has already begun to shift more decisively toward Europe, particularly toward the countries in our immediate region, whose threat perceptions and defense postures most closely align with our own. Cooperation among the Nordic-Baltic countries, and more broadly among nations around the Baltic Sea and in Northern Europe, is now stronger than ever. Amid all the unsettling changes, this provides assurance that Estonia will never again be left alone.

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