Solace can be taken from the fact that at least the northern part of Europe is acting in that direction too, Raik added, in an end-of-year interview with ERR.

Looking back on this year, it is impossible to ignore the fact that it has been Donald Trump's year. What has this "Trump world" been like?

This has now, through the course of the year, gradually become clearer, though these key elements were of course already apparent during Trump's first term. A desire to reduce the U.S. burden as the lead nation responsible for the security of Europe and the world as a whole, and a more interests-based or transactional approach — all of this has now been re-affirmed and has also been developed into a more systematic policy.

Trump's first term was certainly chaotic and in Europe was largely treated as something short-lived. Yet by now, I think a new understanding has emerged in Europe that this is not a temporary thing at all — the transatlantic relationship has fundamentally altered.

We no longer have that world order in which the U.S., as a global leader, saw itself as responsible for preserving the world order, for instance by guaranteeing the principles of the security architecture and also defending the shared values of Western countries. These elements are not currently of interest to the U.S., and we have entered an era in which the U.S. worldview is highly great powers-centric. This is not an entirely new thing, but additionally it is also very interests-based and strongly focused on U.S. business interests. It expects its allies to take much greater responsibility, be it in Europe or elsewhere in the world.

The U.S. still talks a great deal about allies, for example in its new security strategy. In itself, the U.S. is not ending or abandoning those alliances, which have always been an important part of its global influence, but the U.S. wants much less responsibility on itself and expects allies to deal far more with their own security. The way the U.S. views the value of alliances is also very concretely interest-based. To the extent that allies are able to offer something that matches U.S. political and economic business interests, to that extent those allies are also useful and interesting from the U.S. perspective.

How big does this change seem, in the sense that universal values such as democracy, human rights, and international law are now rather a footnote for America? Previously this was a central element in American rhetoric, as far as I can remember, for decades and to some extent throughout our entire period of Estonian independence. We have been living in an era when we constantly heard these messages from America and wanted to believe them as well, because they were messages of a time that was a pleasant one for us.

On the one hand, this has always been a contradictory part of U.S. foreign policy. It is very easy to find examples of how the U.S. itself has not in fact consistently been guided by these values, all over the world.

But if we look now from the perspective of Estonia, the Baltic states, Eastern Europe, this values-based U.S. approach to our region has nevertheless been extremely important. The way the U.S. viewed the fate of the Baltic states, for example in the 1990s, showed an understanding of what a free Europe was and of the idea that countries striving for democracy, freedom, and integration with the Western community should be supported. It was understood that it was in the U.S.'s own interest to support such developments.

Or for example, if we look at U.S. support for Ukraine in the war against Russia, then the arguments in favor of why the U.S. should begin to support Ukraine whatsoever were initially very values-based. Ukraine is fighting for democratic values, fighting for the principles of the entire European security order, and if these principles and values cannot be defended in Ukraine, then they are much harder to defend elsewhere in Europe. I think these arguments no longer carry much weight in U.S. politics.

This great power-centric approach now means that in Trump's world it is a norm that there are great powers with privileges and special rights. They are stronger than others and they get to decide and determine the fate of smaller countries. The fact that the U.S. and Russia are negotiating Ukraine's future among themselves and have not been involving Europe at all would previously have been a very unusual approach, already from the perspective of the transatlantic alliance. But now it is as if this is the new norm, that this is how things work, and Europe then has to find its own way to fight in order to influence these outcomes as well.

Where have we arrived today with this alliance relationship between America and Europe — is it still an alliance, or is it more of a master-and-vassal relationship? Or is it a competitive relationship if we think in economic terms? Or is it at times also a relationship of rivals, where interests clash?

It is still an alliance, and there is still some common ground. The way European security and defense have been built up over decades still includes such a strong U.S. role that it cannot be changed quickly.

And very concretely, if we look at the U.S. presence in Europe or even in Estonia, at that level the alliance relationship actually still works and deterrence towards Russia exists. Add to this the huge political uncertainty about what comes next and the very likely future outlook that the U.S. wants to reduce its presence and its contribution. Work must then be done on how Europe will adapt and start to take on more responsibility itself. This has been talked about for years, and in fact it is not something wholly new. But the fact that the foundation of shared values seems to be crumbling away from beneath the relationship makes this uncertainty even greater. A more realistic stance has to be adopted on the European side, and an interest-based approach taken, finding such common ground as still holds the relationship together, as we do not really have any rapid alternatives to recourse to.

There are rational arguments in themselves as to why it is still in the U.S.'s interest that Russia does not start to dominate in Europe, that stability gets preserved in Europe, and that a wider conflict or war does not arrive. These are major questions, and Europe is still the most important ally and partner from the U.S. perspective. Trump too acknowledges this. He simply has a very particular understanding of what kind of Europe he wants to see in the future.

Precisely from this perspective of the role of values, in some very, very odd way, the values dimension has now been turned on its head. Trump is seeing that those political forces in Europe that are ideologically closest to Trump's MAGA ideology are the forces which the U.S. wants to cooperate more with, who it wants to support and who it would like to see in power in Europe in the future. This is also something unprecedented: the U.S. intervening in the domestic politics of European countries in this way.

The understanding of freedom, freedom of speech, and democracy that lies behind it also seems completely inadequate, as if the groups that appeal to Trump are more democratic than those other political parties or groups that in fact equally represent voters' interests and see that a strong EU is in Europe's interest. But Trump now views the EU in a very negative light.

And this national security strategy in a certain sense actually "trolls" Europe. Whatever was meant to be said could have been said much more politely, but it was deliberately worded in an irritating way.

This was perhaps the biggest surprise, that this approach to Europe is nevertheless so forcefully, in a sense, confrontational and negative, so unequivocally negative towards the EU and so clearly expresses a desire to support certain political movements. I would not really have expected that in quite this form, bearing in mind that Trump has in fact cooperated and communicated with several European leaders who do not represent, in the majority, those political parties Trump would like to see in power in Europe in the future.

Will NATO continue to function?

At the everyday practical working level, NATO works. Those U.S. forces which are present are continuing to perform their task in exactly the same way as they did before. NATO has its defense plans which are being implemented. From this perspective, then yes, everything works, and this gives cause for reassurance that at least in the near term, NATO deterrence towards Russia still functions. But in order for it to be sustained in the longer term, European countries must put much more of their own capabilities into it and strengthen their defense capacity and readiness.

So we have now reached the question of what Europe should be doing. Is there something more, in addition to strengthening defense capability, and how well have we managed? It is already nearly the end of the fourth year of the war. It is clear that America is pulling back, and at the same time the pace at which Europe is rearming does not seem to be what it ought to be in this situation.

That is indeed the case. The European countries have begun to invest much more in defense, and this direction is positive, but in the case of many countries, [rearmament is happening] still too slowly, while the understanding of the security situation and the threats is still very different across European countries. This is in some sense a geographical inevitability, but at the same time we are looking at threat scenarios that are very dark for all of Europe.

If it were to transpire that in Ukraine some bad temporary peace agreement were to be reached and Russia gained additional encouragement from that and moved forward with its plans to reshape the European security order, a broader conflict could arise. There could be a new attack by Russia against Ukraine or some other country.

These are all scenarios which must be taken very seriously. But unfortunately, it is not evident that all European countries are taking this equally seriously and are seeing that it would in fact affect the well-being and security of all of Europe if these negative scenarios were to come into play.

Europe in itself has the resources and the capability to prevent these developments, and work must be done towards that. But right now we see that it is the Northern European countries that have a shared understanding — the Nordic-Baltic countries, Poland, Germany is also dealing very seriously with defense — and I think this may be of decisive importance for the security of our region. The U.K. has of course always understood the security situation in a similar way to us and has had a realistic view of Russia. This is a positive aspect amid the current dark security situation.

In Northern Europe there is a strong group of countries who have the will to defend, where capabilities are being strengthened, and where there is a realistic attitude towards the need to somehow keep the alliance alive and cope with the U.S. that we currently have as an ally. Ukraine must continue to be supported. This is the most critical task at the present moment that affects our own security.

Russia, certainly also looking at the Baltic Sea region, can see that there are countries here that have the strength and determination. That is what brings me a certain reassurance in the current situation that we can cope with the security threats we are currently facing.

Could it perhaps ultimately be the case that a separate group breaks away from NATO, a so-called Northern European group that stands up for its interests, and a new defense alliance emerges?

That is not a realistic prospect right now. No such formal separation is taking place. Instead, coalitions of the willing are the current solution for how to act in practice to strengthen European security, how to add support for Ukraine, and how to find some solutions for Ukraine's security guarantees.

If this cannot be done collectively within NATO as a whole or within the EU as a whole, then these coalitions of the willing break off and make these decisions among themselves. This is not an ideal solution. It is always better to have the large institutions that certainly include all member states and have their own developed decision-making mechanisms that give reassurance also to small states that we are at the table where these decisions are made.

But as a pragmatic way out of a situation where both NATO and the EU are not sufficiently united, the way out is to do things within coalitions of the willing, which are not in any way opposed to NATO or the EU, but simply very practically do things that cannot be done with a larger group of countries.

What choices might Estonia face or what might accompany them? Could we not at some point be faced with such bad choices, where for example the Americans want relations with Russia to be very cordial and perhaps expect the same from Europeans? Or if we have to choose between America and Europe, if we have to choose between the interests of our major ally and perhaps international law, what should Estonia do, what should it keep in mind?

Estonia has of course always tried to avoid making such choices between the U.S. and Europe or between certain U.S. interests and the principles of international law. It is entirely possible that such moments of choice will arise more often in the future. And here it is necessary to think very carefully and, together with like-minded countries in Europe, shape these common positions.

For example, if a situation were to arise in which the U.S. is prepared to recognize the conquest of certain Ukrainian territories by Russia and their belonging to Russia, then this is something that European countries certainly cannot go along with. Estonia will not recognize the occupation of territories achieved through aggression. Here we encounter boundaries where it is necessary to remain firm in one's principles.

Similarly, in terms of economic interests there is certainly competition between Europe and the U.S., and economically Europe is the union to which Estonia belongs, the single market with all its strengths. And there is no need to overly fear the fact that in some issues U.S. and European interests do not coincide. There is competition, and I think Europe can in fact achieve greater respect from the U.S. perspective if it is able to define its own interests and draw those boundaries.

There is a desire to maintain the alliance relationship, but it cannot happen at any price. We cannot make changes to our policies that would seemingly preserve the alliance but in fact give up certain principles, norms, or values that are the foundation of our security.

Could there nevertheless arise the fear or danger that Estonia is ready for anything, as long as it preserves the alliance with the U.S., because, as we discussed earlier, Europe is very weak militarily?

We cannot be ready for anything. That cannot be Estonia's approach, and we have like-minded allies in Europe who assess this situation in the same way.

Yes, we try to be pragmatically realistic towards the U.S. up to a certain point. But if the U.S. shows readiness to go along with Russia's vision of the European security architecture, then that is the red line we cannot cross, because it would be so contrary to the security interests of the Estonian state.

We cannot, as it were, via the U.S. give our support to Russia's attempts to restore its sphere of influence. This cannot in any way be in Estonia's interests. Even if such a choice point arises, where it seems as if it is either the preservation of the alliance with the U.S. or losing U.S. support, I think that working against Russia's vision, so that Russia cannot impose its will, its dominant role, its vision of the European security order, is nevertheless the core of Estonia's security interests. This is something which must be upheld and worked on together with our allies and as much as possible still in cooperation with the U.S. But if in some issue this proves impossible, then positions that do not coincide with those of the U.S. must also be taken.

Peace talks on Ukraine are currently under way. Where might they lead?

I still do not see any very quick solution. From the U.S. side the pressure is of course very strong, but the pressure is primarily on Ukraine to agree to major concessions. The U.S. wants to reach a peace agreement. Russia plays along with this. But what I do not see is Russia's readiness for genuine peace. Russia continues to demand, in practice, Ukraine's submission to all of Russia's demands. Russia is not ready to make any concessions at the moment.

So in the end, we will still be arriving back at that point where pressure on Russia must be increased further. And this is not a hopeless approach, because the situation is not easy for Russia either and is becoming increasingly difficult.

So I hope that Europe and Ukraine can hold this line, that there is no reason right now to go down a path of agreeing to all of Russia's demands. Ukraine is not collapsing. It needs to hold out a little longer, and the cost of the war for Russia must be made even higher. The impact of sanctions is gradually working. Russia's economy is moving into an increasingly difficult situation, so we must reach that point where Russia genuinely wants to end the war.

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and X and never miss an update!