A malevolent spirit rules the world now — the spirit of Anchorage. That's what the red carpet laid out for Vladimir Putin on the Anchorage airfield brings to mind, along with Donald Trump fawning over him, the warm handshakes, pats on the shoulder, the grand friendship between the two leaders — missing only a Brezhnev-style kiss on the lips. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, this is the spirit in which things must continue. But if they don't, he warns, Russia will reconsider its stance toward further peace talks.

This spirit is everywhere now: it hovers over the hoped-for peace agreement, wafts from both Moscow and Washington, reshapes the global security order, legitimizes war and war crimes and rehabilitates Putin, the war criminal. It's something that clearly isn't understood in Europe.

For some reason, Kurt Vonnegut's novel "Breakfast of Champions" comes to mind, where an alien tries to warn the inhabitants of a burning house about a terrible danger by tap dancing and farting. It seems this is the language now being used with Europe. True, in Vonnegut's novel, the homeowner beats the alien to death with a golf club, but Europe is trying to understand him.

The spirit of Anchorage also serves as the backdrop to a recent study by the European University Institute titled "Global Risks to the European Union in 2026," the cover photo of which features Trump and Putin shaking hands on the Anchorage airfield.

The study points out that nothing — not even war with Russia — would shake Europe more in the year 2026 than a weakening of U.S. defense commitments. "A direct NATO-Russia war and the use of nuclear weapons by Russia are the two most impactful scenarios, but also the least likely," the report states. "By contrast, a U.S. withdrawal from security guarantees given to European allies is just as impactful as Russia's use of nuclear weapons, but far more likely. From the 2026 perspective, a full-scale war with Russia would probably be less shocking to experts than the weakening of U.S. defense commitments."

Security strategy or divorce notice?

In light of President Donald Trump's past remarks, the new U.S. national security strategy contains nothing new or surprising. It puts Europe in its place and speaks plainly of something that could figuratively be called a divorce or at least a threat of divorce if Europe does not begin to meet all of America's demands.

In short, the document says that the United States has coddled and cared for Europe, but now Europe must fend for itself. The time is over when the U.S. carried the entire world order on its shoulders like Atlas. At the same time, the strategy declares that America's focus will shift to the Indo-Pacific region, which is seen as the primary economic and geopolitical battleground of the next century.

The strategy document warns Europe of decline and civilizational collapse, pointing to the EU's own policies as the cause. Specifically highlighted are the EU's migration policy, which has transformed Europe and triggered conflict; the censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition within the EU; a steep drop in birthrates and the erosion of national identity and self-confidence.

It warns that if current trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in twenty years or even less and questions whether Europe can remain a trustworthy partner for the United States.

At its core, this is a clash of values — a conflict between conservative and liberal worldviews. President Trump and his MAGA movement have set a course toward restoring traditional values, which includes a return to biblical definitions of gender and marriage and a xenophobic nationalist agenda: Christianity versus Islam or white versus non-white.

One cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that demographic changes in European countries and especially the spread of Islam have increasingly become a source of conflict. These changes have eroded the sense of security and fueled the popularity of nationalist parties. Although there is growing talk in Europe about the need to tighten immigration policy, few have dared to acknowledge the fundamental nature of the problem.

Once again, literature offers inspiration — this time Michel Houellebecq's novel "Submission," which tells the story of how Islam peacefully and democratically takes over Europe and how Europe submits. Indeed, Angela Merkel acknowledged more than a decade ago that Islam is already a part of Germany.

On the other hand, the U.S. national security strategy does concede that Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States and that transatlantic trade is still one of the cornerstones of the global economy and of American prosperity.

It notes that the U.S. cannot afford to write Europe off. What's more, the document states that America is sentimentally attached to the European continent, especially to the United Kingdom and Ireland, and that it hopes to cooperate with countries aiming to restore their former greatness. Reportedly, there is also a longer version of the strategy that outlines U.S. plans to deepen ties with four EU countries — Italy, Austria, Poland and Hungary — with the aim of pulling them out of the European Union.

In conclusion, the document contains a great deal of bitter truth. Chief among its accusations is that, despite having a far greater economic potential (the EU's GDP exceeds Russia's by almost a factor of ten), Europe has not paid enough attention to its own security. It has failed to take the Russian threat seriously and allowed itself to be lured into a comfort zone by cheap Russian energy. And despite its economic superiority over Russia, Europe has still left the burden of managing relations with Moscow to the United States.

Bad rhetoric and worse timing

No matter how much bitter truth the U.S. national security strategy may contain, the timing of its principles' release could hardly be worse. Particularly misguided is the decision to announce at this specific moment a need to "restore strategic stability with Russia," as the document puts it.

While the goal itself may be sound, everything depends on how this brief phrase is interpreted or has already been interpreted. The issue is not so much the objective, but the rhetoric and posture of the U.S. president, which pressure Ukraine into accepting an unjust peace and signal a desire to swiftly restore good relations with Russia, regardless of the war's outcome. This has, in effect, made the U.S. and Russia de facto allies against Ukraine and placed the latter in an extremely difficult position.

This also reveals a fundamental conflict between the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. president either fails to grasp what a Ukrainian defeat would mean for European security or he simply doesn't care. If America's primary goal is to do business with Russia, then from that perspective, Trump may not be particularly concerned with what happens to Ukraine or how that affects Europe.

From the American viewpoint, one could argue that Ukraine might as well have remained part of Russia after 1991 if we recall the U.S. stance at the time. And in terms of doing business, it might as well go back. That would even be more convenient for the U.S. and might help prevent future conflicts between the two countries.

From Europe's perspective, however, Ukraine is precisely the country that holds back Russian aggression and, in doing so, essentially secures the rest of Europe. If Ukraine were to fall or weaken, the threat of direct war with Russia would shift over other European states. This is also acknowledged in the report "Global Risks to the European Union in 2026," which states that the security of the EU and Ukraine are closely intertwined and that any peace agreement favoring Russia — rewarding aggression and undermining Ukraine's vitality — poses a threat to Europe as well.

Furthermore, given that some voices in the peace negotiations have suggested the U.S. might be willing to recognize Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine as officially part of Russia, this would amount to the U.S. recognizing the occupation not just de facto, but de jure. That would, in turn, make it extremely difficult if not impossible for Ukraine to reclaim those territories through diplomatic means.

On top of all this, the strategy document says nothing about security guarantees for Ukraine. And while Trump may have given some verbal assurances, no such commitments have so far been formally outlined in connection with a potential peace agreement or, if they have, they remain undisclosed.

The shifting course of history

The U.S. stance of shifting responsibility for European security onto Europe itself can also be interpreted as a paradigmatic shift in the course of history. Such turning points are usually only recognized in hindsight, but this one is already manifesting clearly in the positions publicly expressed by the United States.

Europe, too, has by now come to understand that there will be no return to the former security order and that it must take responsibility for its own security. Europe's current security framework still heavily relies on the post–World War II legacy. Although the so-called Eastern Bloc disappeared from the European map with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. military presence in Europe remained. And now one must ask: how much longer will that continue?

The U.S. national security strategy also makes a valid point in noting that NATO cannot expand indefinitely. Since NATO operates on a consensus basis among member states, it's already clear how difficult that consensus is to achieve. And that means the alliance might not function effectively in the face of a serious threat. Of course, there remains the option to amend the North Atlantic Treaty to allow decisions, especially those under Article 5, to be made by a qualified majority, but that would also require unanimous agreement among all member states.

The U.S. strategy document further suggests that in a few decades, some NATO member states may no longer be "European" in character, raising doubts about whether these fundamentally altered countries will continue to see their place in the world or in the alliance with the United States the same way as those who once signed the NATO Charter.

All of this cannot be separated from the fact that the parts of the strategy dealing with NATO are highly favorable to Russia, as they effectively rule out the possibility of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. In other words, once again, the timing for raising this issue is extremely poor.

The true face of America

One might reflect on the extent to which the current U.S. administration's policies reflect broader American public opinion and national sentiment. If the Democrats were to win the 2028 presidential election, would U.S. policy revert to its previous track? Or, more fundamentally, what are the enduring elements of American policy — those that remain consistent even as administrations change?

Some clues can be found in the 2026 U.S. defense budget, which includes provisions for supporting Ukraine and allocates $800 million in aid over the next two years. Of course, one can question how much of this will actually be implemented under a Trump administration, given his negative stance toward Ukraine and his disregard for legal norms. Still, the defense budget is not something he can entirely ignore.

Nor can public opinion in the United States be ignored — after all, it ultimately determines electoral outcomes. According to a recent public opinion survey conducted by the Ronald Reagan Institute, 62 percent of Americans (57 percent of Republicans and 72 percent of Democrats) want Ukraine to win the war against Russia. Sixty-four percent support providing Ukraine with military aid (59 percent of Republicans and 75 percent of Democrats).

Few people trust the Kremlin and 70 percent of Americans say they do not trust Russia (61 percent of Republicans and 77 percent of Democrats). According to the same survey, 45 percent support the complete liberation of Ukraine's territory, while only 22 percent support the idea of Ukraine ceding territory. NATO is viewed positively by 68 percent of Americans (60 percent of Republicans and 80 percent of Democrats).

If a NATO country were attacked, 76 percent of Republicans and 80 percent of Democrats believe the U.S. should respond with military force. Fifty-nine percent of respondents oppose the U.S. leaving NATO, while 34 percent support such a move.

Unfortunately, one of the goals of politics is also to shape public opinion and at least in the short-term, Trump has the upper hand in that regard. Still, it seems unlikely that the majority of Americans are guided solely by cold commercial pragmatism, are willing to abandon the principles of international law or are ready to return to the Bible as a political guide under the influence of MAGA.

The bigger question is whether Ukraine can wait for the moment when America rediscovers its true face.

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