Harri Tiido: On Poland's foreign policy strategy
This time, the focus is on Poland's foreign‑policy strategy. Poland has been a consistent and in many ways crucial supporter of Ukraine, but recently tensions rooted in differing historical memories have resurfaced, Tiido notes.
Poland is the closest country among Estonia's partners and allies that can be described as large militarily power — and Warsaw is currently expanding its capabilities.
Daniel Fried, former U.S. ambassador to Poland, has observed that while Poland's political culture is often sharply divided, its strategic culture is consistent on core issues: the threat posed by Russia, the need for a strong NATO and strong ties with the United States, and Poland's strategic interest in Ukraine's survival.
This summer Poland released a new foreign‑policy strategy for 2026–2030, and here we examine how Fried's principles appear in it. The previous strategy covered 2017–2021 — a period after which circumstances have drastically changed. As the new strategy states, the near future has become far more unpredictable and unstable. Russia's aggression against Ukraine is the central reference point for Poland's long‑term strategy.
Beyond Russian aggression, Poland also sees attempts by certain other states to reshape the international order. In democratic countries, support is growing for strong‑handed leadership, along with the belief that authoritarian power can ensure control over social, economic, and technological change.
In defining national interests, the strategy retains all previous principles — including core Western values such as respect for human and civil rights, democracy, and the rule of law. European integration is seen as a historic opportunity for development, a foundation of security, and a means of increasing Poland's influence.
Poland is among the world's 20 leading economies and considers it necessary to fulfill its international obligations. This does not mean intervening everywhere; priorities must be set and focus placed on areas where Poland can make a difference. In other words, familiar logic: values must be combined with a sober, pragmatic pursuit of national interests — value‑based realism.
Regarding transatlantic relations, the strategy states that they coexist alongside the European project and are not an alternative to it. Poland sees mutually beneficial cooperation between Europe and the United States as essential. Strengthening Europe's defense dimension should not be perceived as a substitute for transatlantic ties.
Poland's ambition is to maintain U.S. military presence on its territory. The effort to keep Americans engaged appears repeatedly throughout the strategy. According to Polish foreign‑policy expert Sławomir Dębski, Poland seeks to become a stronger and more valuable ally for the U.S. in Europe in containing the Russia–China–Iran axis — even though statistics show that South Korea has recently become a larger arms‑import partner for Warsaw than the U.S.
The strategy states that Poland aims to build friendly and constructive relations with neighboring countries — remembering difficult pasts but focusing on the present and future. This presumably includes relations with Ukraine.
Poland has been a consistent and key supporter of Ukraine, but tensions rooted in historical memory have resurfaced — especially regarding the Volhynia massacre during Nazi occupation, when units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army killed tens of thousands of civilians, mostly Poles.
Ukrainians, in turn, recall that Poles have killed thousands of Ukrainians. These historical narratives clash. In July, Kyiv announced it would declassify all documents and conduct a joint investigation into the Volhynia events. It is unclear whether this will be enough; Poland will hold parliamentary elections next year, and the opposition Law and Justice party has already declared that it has no common path with "Banderite Nazi Ukraine." To give readers a sense of how these narratives appear in Ukraine, Tiido adds a link to an overview — though he notes he has not verified the accuracy of the claims.
For now, the strategy still includes readiness to support Ukraine in the long term. Poland recommends this to all of Europe, which must assume greater responsibility for security in its neighborhood. The strategy also calls for expanding defense and industrial cooperation with non‑EU partners, including NATO allies outside Europe.
Within the EU, Poland acts based on long‑term shared interests, which require compromise. Geopolitically, the EU is seen as needing to complement NATO.
To strengthen Poland's own position, one measure is belonging to the group of leading states, and Poland is deeply interested in having its citizens appointed to key EU roles. The strategy summarizes Poland's vision of the EU through three concepts: a geopolitical union, a union of values, and a union of growth.
By 2030, Poland aims to be a pillar of the EU's military and economic security. It considers maintaining unanimity in EU foreign and security policy essential, though it is open to discussions on increasing flexibility and preventing abuse of veto power by individual member states.
Poland supports EU enlargement but opposes lowering criteria to speed up the process. The Weimar Triangle — Poland, France, and Germany — is important, and could be expanded to include Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Bilateral agreements, such as the one signed with France, are seen as useful, and similar agreements are planned with the UK and other allies.
Interest is growing in the Bucharest Nine format, especially if Sweden and Finland are included — creating a unified security zone along the entire eastern flank from the Arctic to the Adriatic. Currently, however, there are cracks within this group.
The strategy also highlights Nordic‑Baltic cooperation formats and the Council of the Baltic Sea States, with Nordic and Baltic countries holding a special place in Poland's foreign policy. Evidence of this includes the Polish–Swedish defense cooperation agreement signed in June and the establishment of the Baltic Sea Pact.
The strategy is ultimately a document — and real life may still force adjustments.
Further reading
Editor: Kaupo Meiel, Argo Ideon
