Harri Tiido: Is the New Right a lasting phenomenon?

In Harri Tiido's background‑talk series, the topic this time — with the help of Stephen Davies — is the New Right. Davies considers it possible that Europe's New Right may develop into a kind of civilizational nationalism in which loyalty and identity bind Europe as a whole, Tiido notes.
Politics is generally a confusing phenomenon, and many people throughout history have earned their bread by explaining and interpreting it — and more. I will also take up this topic, with the excuse of British political historian Stephen Davies's book "The Great Realignment: Why the New Right Is Here to Stay" (Stephen Davies, 2026). And for those interested in the American background of the topic, I added a couple of links at the end of the text.
Davies starts from the assumption that, as a general rule, people politically cluster around some issue, which he calls a "focal issue." Historically, focal issues have divided political views broadly into right‑wing and left‑wing, but one focal issue does not have to remain so forever — it may fade into the background or be pushed aside by a new issue.
In the latter part of the last century, the ends of the political axis were, on one side, free market economy and, on the other, state control. Now the situation seems to have changed. The new dividing line is no longer the state's role in the economy. It is rather nationalism, sovereignty, and collective identity on one side, and cosmopolitanism, globalism, and rule‑bound technocracy on the other.
A trend toward a new right‑wing politics can be seen, described as populist or far‑right. That is, the political right is changing and acquiring a new meaning. Such changes generally occur regularly, about every 40 years, but a shift in political focus also means new alliances and new oppositions.
According to Davies, the change has already occurred in some countries, such as France, Poland, or the United States. In some places, such as Spain and Portugal, the process is only beginning. In some ways, we see the rebirth of old political issues forgotten during and after the Cold War.
The New Right means emphasizing national sovereignty and distinctiveness, contrasted with cosmopolitan individualism. Columbia University professor Mark Lilla has called this a shift from the age of intellectual ideologies to the age of competing online prophets, although he primarily has the United States in mind.
Calling all this populism is questionable, since there are both right‑wing and left‑wing populists, and they may unite under certain conditions. And it is a global phenomenon. It is not incompatible with nationalism, since nationalists in different countries see their similarities and the need for cooperation. It is worth noting that the New Right also involves anti‑elitism. The elite is said to have distanced itself from the people, and therefore power must be returned to the people.
At the same time, the New Right sees itself as the future new elite — thus it is somewhat elitist anti‑elitism.
The reevaluation of left and right is often described as the decline of centrist politics. Davies thinks this is mistaken, since the center is always a point located at equal distance from the left and right extremes as they exist at a given moment. When the extremes move, the center moves as well — it never collapses. We will examine this centrist politics more closely another time with the help of a different publication.
In the current great realignment, it should be noted that the representation of political forces in parliaments after recent elections still reflects the old division. A parliament's composition does not have to reflect the distribution of views in society up to election day. Based on surveys, one can say that Estonia is also currently in such a situation.
To generalize how we reached the current situation: in the 1990s, political parties were already in decline, politicians emerged mostly from among educated individuals who had no background outside politics. This was the spread of political "broilers," meaning politics detached from real life, the rise of political communication, and its shift first to television and then to social media.
At the same time, politics became more professional. After the collapse of the Soviet state, a consensus on the liberal world order held for a while, but everything began to change gradually, and conspiracy theories also began to spread. Worth noting is the so‑called "great replacement," inspired by writings of French author Renaud Camus — an exaggeration of the dangers of immigration.
Discontent was also caused by alleged corruption and elite‑orientation of national and international institutions. One may add cultural politics related to political correctness. Hostility arose toward policies aimed at reducing racial and gender inequality, and to this was added climate policy, which many found distasteful. In 2005–2006, these positions were formulated directly as a rejection of liberalism.
The central theme of the New Right is national identity; in economics, it supports maintaining the welfare state and endorses the role of the state. A kind of combination emerges that could be called national socialism — nationalism combined with state‑centrism.
Although this national economic policy is neither socialist nor egalitarian, it is also not capitalist. Rather, it is a kind of national collectivism or neo‑mercantilism — support for protectionism and a national development strategy that includes government intervention and directing investments.
Mainstream media is considered the mouthpiece of the public machinery; demands are made for government restructuring, mass dismissal of officials, and ending funding for various programs. And the elite does not mean the wealthy, who are rather admired. The enemies are people who manage the economy. The hallmark of this class is the value placed on higher education, which is criticized. And democracy is said to be questionable — a strong leader may be a more reliable choice.
Davies predicts that the new alignment will dominate for the next 30–40 years, and it is possible that Europe's New Right will develop into a kind of civilizational nationalism in which loyalty and identity bind Europe as a whole. This European demos would be Christian, white, and non‑American.
A separate force is techno‑rightism, especially its uncontrolled variant, which I will not discuss here, but which may leave a strong mark on the future. But in conclusion: politics is not in chaos — it simply is a constantly changing thing.
Further reading
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Editor: Kaupo Meiel, Argo Ideon











