Ports, oil terminals and the Baltic Fleet base in St. Petersburg and Kronstadt have been hit in Russia. What has been the significance of these strikes both militarily and psychologically? How do people perceive the war as a result?

The first important aspect of these strikes was their timing. They coincided with the start of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Although the Russian president himself did not arrive on the day the strikes took place — he came the following day — the attacks gave the forum an entirely different meaning and context. In addition, on the forum's opening day, the Ukrainian president published an open letter to the Russian president calling for direct talks on a ceasefire and a peace agreement.

All of this created a situation in which the Russian president, who traditionally addresses journalists at the forum and is usually interviewed in a discussion panel, was forced to talk not about his own agenda but about what Ukraine had proposed. That is the first important aspect of these strikes and it is primarily psychological.

Looking at the targets that were hit, St. Petersburg's oil port is important, although at the moment it may not be as significant as Ust-Luga and Primorsk. Nevertheless, it is important. The attack created a backdrop for the city itself — it was clear that an attack had taken place and that it was large-scale.

From a military perspective, however, the most valuable target was Kronstadt where both military and psychological significance converge. Kronstadt is the legendary base of the Baltic Fleet whose construction began during the reign of Peter the Great in the early 18th century. The strike can roughly be compared to an attack on the fleet's headquarters. The actual Admiralty buildings are located in St. Petersburg, Moscow and elsewhere, but fundamentally this attack carries very strong symbolic value for Russian citizens.

The corvette that was hit there may not be of great significance in itself because the Baltic Fleet is not currently expected to play an active combat role. The fleet still has four corvettes operating in the Baltic Sea, although they apparently also have to operate to some extent in the North Sea. What matters more is that the air defense system, which should have made an attack on such a facility impossible, failed to stop the Ukrainian drone strike. That is the greatest damage the Russian military and government as a whole suffered from this attack.

Vladimir Putin did indeed have to comment on all of this to some extent at the economic forum. How should his remarks be assessed?

The Russian president appeared to be in a bad mood when making his comments because at forums conducted on his own terms he is not usually forced to answer unexpected and unwelcome questions that suddenly dominate the agenda. He managed to handle the situation, of course. In a sense, it would have been possible to ignore it all and act as if nothing had happened, but it was ultimately decided that they could not do that and that Ukraine needed a response — both to the letter and to the attacks.

It visibly affected his mood and I do not think his performance was particularly convincing this time.

How should Ukraine's airstrikes in other regions be assessed? It has been a particularly intense week in Crimea, especially.

Ukraine's aerial attacks are currently taking place on what could be described as three different levels.

The first involves so-called killer drones operating directly along the front line. The effective range of these drones has been expanding continuously, although not uniformly across the entire front. In some areas, they operate at distances of 15 to 20 kilometers, while in others the activity is less intense, though those sectors also tend not to face large Russian formations. There are also the border regions — Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts — where both sides maintain only small, isolated units. Six months ago, exchanges of fire and drone attacks were much more intense there, but activity has since become more sporadic.

What is causing Russia more difficulties than the drones roaming the front line and preventing the concentration of military equipment are the attacks now taking place up to 200 kilometers behind the front against Russian military logistics. They are not hunting individual infantrymen in the rear. Instead, the targets are trucks, fuel tankers, ammunition deliveries, the movement of military equipment and, correspondingly, the evacuation of equipment and its transport for repairs. Over the past three weeks, all of this has become significantly more difficult, particularly in the southern sector.

Ukraine's long-range drone strikes have also intensified. They are currently being carried out effectively at distances of around 1,200 to 1,300 kilometers. The drones are capable of flying farther, but it appears that Ukraine is not yet sending large drone swarms over such distances as part of its operations. Only individual drones are reaching targets that far away.

At present, the primary targets are oil production and refining facilities, pipelines and other infrastructure. As a result, serious fuel shortages have begun to emerge in certain regions of Russia, though not yet across the country as a whole.

Can it be said that Ukraine has, in a sense, seized the initiative in the war through its successful drone strikes?

Unfortunately, probably not yet.

At the strategic level, Ukraine is trying to seize the initiative, while the Russian president and military leadership are trying to retain it at any cost. This has primarily led to an intensification of the information war.

Russia has not been able to escalate military operations significantly, but it must be acknowledged that the initiative along the front line remains almost entirely — or at least predominantly — in the hands of the Russian military at the moment as it is the side conducting offensive operations. Even though it is suffering losses and is unable to make meaningful advances, the initiative for now still rests with the Russian army.

Let's talk briefly about the front line. Are there any areas where the Russian side has been more successful and others where Ukrainian counterattacks have been more successful?

In reality, even a map shows that the blue and red areas are fairly interspersed. Even if we begin measuring territories that have changed hands in some locations, it does not carry particularly significant meaning. Neither side has achieved the kind of success that could be considered decisive in terms of troop deployments or movements.

Ukraine's chosen tactic — destroying Russian military logistics — may eventually produce results, but we know that Russia is doing exactly the same thing. It is likewise trying to destroy Ukrainian logistics and create conditions that would enable its own forces to advance.

If we look at the peace proposals put forward by Ukraine, as well as the accompanying rhetoric from the head of the Presidential Office, Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, various military figures and other politicians, including the Ukrainian president himself, they are currently trying to offer Russia an opportunity to freeze the conflict along the front line and begin negotiations from that point in order to halt the fighting.

Russia is unlikely to accept such an offer at present because, at least from the perspective of the Russian president, the Russian military appears to hold a certain advantage.

It seems to me that the Ukrainian military is not currently planning any large-scale ground operations that would produce advances comparable to those seen at the end of 2022.

At the same time, combat operations have intensified and the Russian army is currently suffering enormous losses.

Casualties in personnel and equipment losses on both sides are largely the result of drone attacks.

To a lesser extent, they are caused by artillery fire, glide bombs and perhaps some missile strikes, which have become increasingly infrequent. Ukraine is also using fewer missile strikes near the front line, whether launched from multiple rocket systems or from aircraft — the distinction is not particularly important. Their use has declined significantly compared with six to nine months ago.

Drones are the direct cause of this shift and they have brought about a situation in which most attacks along the front line are now carried out by small infantry groups on both sides. While combat activity may have intensified, the scale of these engagements remains very limited compared with 2024 when both sides were attempting to maneuver large armored formations.

What has grown substantially is the so-called gray zone where neither side maintains permanent positions. Instead, smaller groups operate there, attempting to demonstrate that a particular area is under their control.

One effect of Ukraine's attacks has been fuel shortages in certain regions, particularly in Crimea where fuel is now being sold under rationing limits. How could this affect public sentiment in Russia?

This is again a situation with major psychological significance. Compared with some other regions, it is relatively easy to restrict the delivery of fuel tankers to Crimea.

At the same time, many people remember that, for many, the collapse of the Soviet Union began to become visibly apparent when Soviet gas stations started running short of gasoline and diesel fuel. For that reason, I think this could carry considerable symbolic significance for Russia's population.

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