Raimond Kaljulaid: Interests of large European countries might not align with Estonia's

The initiative by Europe's major powers — the so-called E3 of the United Kingdom, France and Germany — to open a political dialogue with Russia should make us very cautious, despite the fact that it is also supported by Finland and Ukraine, Raimond Kaljulaid writes.
I do not dispute that Europe must take the lead in talks with Russia and step forward to drive that process itself instead of leaving it to the Americans. But for Estonian politicians, the primary question must be how this is done and how the interests of the Republic of Estonia are represented in that process.
The issue is not that we cannot trust our British, French and German friends. We can. Through the close cooperation of the Nordic and Baltic countries within NB8, we also have a strong platform for influencing policy. Nevertheless, we should be highly skeptical of talks that rely narrowly on the E3.
Even if a good friend is behind the wheel, it still matters where the car is headed. The foreign policy interests of Western and Eastern Europe overlap on many issues, but they can also differ significantly from our own.
Let me remind you of several things that are uncomfortable to discuss, but must be discussed.
During World War II, Europe's future was also negotiated. Those negotiations were likewise conducted by great powers: the United Kingdom, the United States and Stalin's Soviet Union. During those talks, the fate of the Baltic states was agreed upon with the Soviet Union.
An understanding was reached with Stalin that the Soviet Union would present its forcible occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in a more acceptable form by organizing elections or referendums that would make the annexation of Eastern European countries appear to be an expression of the free will of their peoples.
Half a century later, in 1989–1991, we faced a serious challenge because in Western Europe the Cold War was considered over with the fall of the Berlin Wall. We were effectively forgotten, or it was simply more convenient not to think about us.
Support for our restored independence was by no means self-evident among the E3 countries. In Berlin, for example, the Baltic issue was regarded as a highly disruptive factor in maintaining the good relations that had developed with the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev.
After Vladimir Putin came to power, many Western European politicians viewed our warnings about the threat posed to European security by Russia's growing revanchism and imperialism as exaggerated. Has that now been understood? I am not entirely sure.
I do not mean to suggest that we fundamentally cannot trust the E3 countries. We simply have to understand that these countries may hold different views on issues that are fundamental to us and may have interests of their own that do not align with ours.
It is also important to bear in mind that any agreements reached to end the war in Ukraine will affect us far more directly than they will Western European countries. The security guarantees provided to Ukraine will determine the extent to which Russia has a free hand to rapidly redeploy its forces toward the Baltic states and Finland and consequently the level of military risk in this region. Paradoxically, that risk could increase dramatically if the fighting in Ukraine subsides or comes to an end.
All of this clearly gives us the right to be at the table where decisions are made. We must not settle for promises that we will be informed or consulted. We must get a foot in the door and refuse to leave.
Diplomacy is conducted by people and in the end someone, together with a delegation, will physically sit down and negotiate with the Russians. To whom is that person accountable? To those who authorized them. If we are not part of that circle, then we do not have an equal position alongside the E3 powers. Why should we accept such a subordinate role?
We should also take as a warning sign former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's admission that he was prepared to discuss so-called buffer zones with Russia. It is unlikely that he made that decision alone. One may assume that at least the United States was consulted, but were the United Kingdom, Germany and France consulted as well?
The final reason I dislike E3-centered diplomacy is that, in my view, it fails to account for the new reality that has emerged in Europe.
The United Kingdom, France and Germany are very important and highly influential countries and two of them possess nuclear weapons. But Europe is no longer quite what it was during the Cold War when the positions of London, Paris and Bonn were considered paramount.
From a practical standpoint as well, if we imagine for a moment that negotiations do take place, it is crucial to avoid any kind of two-tier information system in which some countries — the E3, the major powers — receive updates first and only afterward share them with the rest, perhaps after first agreeing among themselves what will be said and how it will be presented.
In short, we cannot accept a situation in which issues that are decisive for our future are discussed in places where we are not present. History has taught us that this is dangerous. For that reason, we must not endorse a new diplomatic initiative toward Russia that relies narrowly on the E3. It is not consistent with our national interests.
--
Editor: Marcus Turovski











