Last week I read an editorial in a media outlet that praised the Estonian government's recent decision to cancel the procurement of new infantry fighting vehicles and redirect half a billion euros into drone capabilities.

This is misleading information. The source of the confusion is not the media outlet, but the state itself, through its veiled political communication.

In defense-related strategic communications, both in Estonia and elsewhere, optical effects play a major role. International defense media gave a great deal of positive attention to Estonia's decision to cancel the infantry fighting vehicle procurement. Perhaps this will encourage other countries to reassess their priorities. Such an effect would be useful even if it were purely optical.

At the same time, for the Estonian public, misleading optics are a serious problem when it comes to such urgent capability gaps as drones and counter-drone systems.

Over four years — the period covered by the state budget strategy — the amount freed up by not procuring infantry fighting vehicles for other capabilities is roughly ten times smaller than the politically comforting "half a billion euros" meme. Even that much smaller sum may not all go toward drone capabilities, nor toward the politically sensitive field of counter-drone defense.

There are two reasons for this. First, most of the cost of new infantry fighting vehicles would have come later than the current state budget framework period. Second, Estonia's existing CV90 infantry fighting vehicles require a lifecycle upgrade, which will consume a large portion of the funds "freed up" from not purchasing new vehicles, including in later years.

The cancellation of the procurement may also have been driven by unreasonably high bids or similar issues — in other words, the decision may not be directly related to a shift in funding priorities.

According to information provided by the Center for Defence Investments at the end of April, the total amount allocated in the defense budget for acquiring unmanned aerial systems during the period 2025–2030 is nearly €300 million. That funding was largely planned before the infantry fighting vehicle procurement was canceled, and just over one-third has now been covered by framework contracts: multirotor drones, FPV drones, decoy drones, and loitering munitions. Additional costs include infrastructure, training, personnel, and other indirect expenses.

However, the current national defense development plan does not provide for wartime counter-drone capabilities in sufficient scale against Russian long-range strike drones — capabilities that would allow protection not only of military operational areas, but also of the capital, the islands, and other "rear areas." That said, given the narrowness of the Baltic operational theater, even talking about "rear areas" is somewhat of an exaggeration, as military intelligence confirmed in recent Estonian Defence Forces annual report.

Part of the reason Western counter-drone development is lagging is that Russia's offensive capabilities are evolving very rapidly. Last week, Russia set a new airstrike record in Ukraine: around 1,500 long-range strike and decoy drones were launched within 24 hours. Just a year ago, the comparable record was 355 drones. The scale of the drone threat is increasing many times faster than our capability development decisions. Estonia and other NATO countries must recalculate their wartime capability needs in line with the adversary's evolving strike capabilities.

Commentators have pointed out that providing reliable kinetic defense in peacetime is very difficult. In part because appropriate means are lacking: NATO fighter jets generally cannot engage such low-flying targets, especially in peacetime; Estonia does not have interceptor drones in meaningful quantities.

Even if such means were available, intercepting drones in populated areas and in unrestricted airspace could be more dangerous in peacetime than not intercepting them. Estonia's wartime counter-drone problem is the opposite: there is greater freedom and more options to engage drones, but insufficient resources are allocated to protect cities and civilians.

A counter-drone defense network that protects the population and critical services is not an unrealistic fantasy, and it must be built — even though militarily we are moving toward a "shoot the archers, not the arrows" strategy. That approach is correct and important, but it does not apply in every scenario.

The military transition related to both mass robotics and the AI that enables it should be managed with the same vigor as, for example, the switch to the euro. Otherwise, defense reality will pull too far ahead of us. Compared to our adversary, we are already a couple of years behind. If we continue on the track defined by the current defense development plan, that gap will only widen over the next decade.

An updated development plan will soon be presented to the government. Hopefully, it will include countermeasures against long-range strike drones in adequate scale, so that both military units and the population, as well as critical infrastructure, can be protected at the same time. Counter-drone capabilities are also lacking among allies — this is not a problem that can simply be delegated to partners in collective defense.

Ukraine has recently offered to send its drone warfare experts to the Baltic states. Latvia, whose government has come under pressure due to slow progress in counter-drone development, accepted the offer quickly. Estonia and Finland, however, have for now chosen instead to urge Ukraine to improve its drone control.

Finnish media, citing NATO sources, reported that Russia is deliberately diverting Ukrainian drones into Baltic airspace, meaning that lecturing Ukraine will not solve the problem. When help is offered, it should be accepted — especially when it comes from the most militarily experienced country in Europe.

The rapidly evolving threat environment requires a very sober, mathematically grounded military assessment and swift adjustments to capability development plans. It is likely that as elections approach, the role of "optical effects" in defense communication will only increase further.

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