Michael McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, is now a political science professor at Stanford University. Last year, he published a book titled "Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder" (2025).

Given its content, the book was released at an awkward time. Donald Trump was back in power for a second term and had already made his mark through both his words and actions. McFaul tries to account for this, though he concedes that some of his recommendations may prove idealistic under Trump's leadership. He even considered rewriting the book but ultimately left it unchanged, hoping it might still prove useful to future presidents.

The book can thus be seen as an overview of U.S. relations with Russia and China across several periods — particularly during the Cold War, the post-Cold War era, and today. This constant comparison, however, leads to some repetition that can occasionally feel distracting.

Dividing history into periods is common practice, and to McFaul's timeline one could now add a distinct new phase: the era beginning with Trump's second presidency, whose end remains impossible to predict.

While McFaul is hopeful and offers recommendations for potential future presidents — presumably more committed to democratic values — I am less optimistic. Trump himself may fade into the past in a few years, but whether Trumpism will disappear with him is another matter. Given the group currently in power, there is little reason to be confident about fair elections, and the next leader could be worse rather than better.

The impact of Trumpism in Europe also remains uncertain, though recently Trump and his allies appear to have become toxic to many of the continent's radicals.

Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev has suggested that supporters of Trumpism in Europe should be openly labeled as representatives of foreign interests. Post-World War II Europe was often described as a U.S.-led project. Today, however, there is reason to speak of a post-American Europe. In Krastev's view, a form of "liberal nationalism" could emerge as a positive alternative to traditional liberal democracy.

Returning to McFaul, his assessments of Russia and China are worth noting. Both are authoritarian, but they differ significantly. Russia is a declining power, while China is a rising economic and technological force that has benefited greatly from the current global order. Russia aims to destabilize the West, whereas China seeks to reshape the existing system to its advantage without fully dismantling it.

In that sense, China presents an interesting case. In the past, the West believed that soft power and economic influence would spread democracy and market economies during and after the Cold War. Now, we find ourselves once again in a world where hard power matters more.

In some ways, China appears to have adopted what were once considered Western principles — relying on soft power and economic influence, at least for now. That may also reflect Beijing's assessment that its military capabilities are still insufficient.

According to McFaul, the West has consistently misjudged both Russia and China. The Soviet Union was once overestimated, with predictions that it might surpass the U.S. economically. When the seemingly invincible union collapsed, it was underestimated, with the belief that Western influence would steer it toward democracy. This led to rapid defense cuts in Western countries.

At the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow was once again overestimated, with many expecting Kyiv to fall quickly. Russia's failures then led to renewed underestimation of its capabilities. Still, even with limited military and economic resources, Moscow remains capable of threatening the security of both the U.S. and its European allies.

A similar pattern applies to China, though in the opposite direction. During and immediately after the Cold War, China was consistently underestimated. Meanwhile, Beijing quietly developed faster than expected. Now, McFaul argues, the pendulum has swung too far the other way, and China's strength — and the threat it poses to the U.S. and the West — is being overestimated. He believes China is not currently an existential threat to the U.S. or the free world, and unlike Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping has so far shown no willingness to use military force against the U.S. and its allies.

Both Russia and China seek to reshape the global order, as the Soviet Union once did. However, the ideological conflict today is less intense than it was 40 years ago. In this process, Putin appears more aggressive than Xi, and McFaul acknowledges that he has had some success both in Europe and the United States.

The biggest difference from the Cold War is that current leaders in Washington and Moscow appear to share certain ideas and values. As a result, the threat to the liberal democratic order now comes not only from Russia and China but also from within the United States — a phenomenon perhaps unprecedented in world history.

This could lead to a deep — and possibly lasting — rift between the U.S. and Europe. During his first term, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from several international agreements and institutions, and this trend accelerated during his second term. Foreign aid was sharply reduced, as was support for the international media environment. This created a vacuum in the Global South and international institutions that Russia and China — especially China — have moved to fill, gaining new supporters through their economic model and assistance.

In the global struggle between democracy and autocracy, Ukraine is currently on the front line. Supporting Kyiv in every way possible is therefore the most effective way to support democracy. McFaul concludes his book on an optimistic note, arguing that democracy's greatest strength is its ability to renew itself — meaning that nothing has been definitively lost.

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