Barack Obama's foreign policy was based on the approach "Don't do stupid shit." Whether he succeeded in following this principle is a matter of viewpoint. More so as political legacies tend to change over time and in the process of hindsight accumulation. This allows us to now say that the United States' gradual withdrawal from the role of global policeman, which began under Obama, has proved conducive to the world reaching boiling point.

There can be little doubt that when Obama drew Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad a "red line" for the use of chemical weapons only do to nothing at all when the latter proceeded to gas his own people, the Kremlin smirkingly took notes and lowered the perceived risk level of its still nascent "special military operations." A year later, Russia put its notes to the test by annexing Crimea, to which the West reacted with a few concerned statements and a handful of sanctions.

On the flip side, Donald Trump's foreign policy line has been as jagged and sharp as his signature on executive orders. Trump's second term, which kicked off with him yearning for the Nobel Peace Prize, has in just a few short years escalated into a series of campaigns that violate international law to the tune of "we don't even care," threatening to forcibly take allied territory, insulting fellow world leaders daily and, last but not least, threatening to wipe out an entire civilization.

The U.S. going from a "benevolent hegemon" to a predatory one is a telling example of how the world is transitioning from the recent regime of relative peace to a new, more volatile state. Even if it remains unclear as of yet where exactly we will end up, there is more than a little turbulence. Let it be said that Trump did not initiate this process — the world was getting more restless before he came along — but we can just as confidently say that the second coming of the "very stable genius" (or Jesus Christ?) has poured fuel on the fire.

This leaves Estonia and Europe in general pondering their next moves in this breaking point of history. Global lines of forces are shifting, as are ways of doing things. The Western way of life — the rules-based order, democracy and freedoms — are under increasing pressure from aggressive autocrats.

Former Belgian Prime Minister Mark Eyskens said in 1991 that Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. That image was both fitting and accurate at the time. Now, when the world is being ripped apart at the seams before our very eyes, remaining meek in geopolitics and defense is no longer an option for Europe. What we need is action, to put our foot down and demonstrate that Europe is not a museum over which a lethargic haze lingers and that the titan of the Old World can be roused from its slumber.

In order to gain the necessary focus, we should start by switching our Trump transponder to a less sensitive setting. Every statement he makes does not have to spark a lament or any kind of reaction for that matter. After all, we don't gasp every time a drunk gets loud or a toddler knocks something over despite being told to be careful. How we react to events is measured in context and based on personality, and the peculiarities of the master of the Oval Office are hardly news at this point.

Despite the metamorphosis of U.S. leaders, the Americans remain our most important allies when it comes to defense. That is why we need to keep in mind here in Estonia, which is located right next to Russia and its imperialist ambitions and where continued U.S. support is more important than ever, that our possibilities for speaking freely about our key ally are more limited than, for example, in Spain or the Vatican.

Naturally, independent commentators enjoy the perks of free speech, but people who represent the country must observe its national security interests. For instance, it would be wiser not to vilify the U.S. administration's MAGA policy at the level of the government, even if it does rub one the wrong way. What is more, meddling in another country's internal affairs isn't exactly compatible with international etiquette. And while the current U.S. administration is clearly unbothered by this, that does not mean Estonia should mimic this kind of diplomatic laxity.

However, a restrained demeanor in allied relations should not lead to concessions in key principles. If we want to serve as an advocate for the rules-based order on the international arena, our words are only credible and worth something when they are consistent and match our actions.

What this means is that, when necessary, Estonia will have to position itself in ways which may be uncomfortable in terms of allied relations but legally and morally right. Otherwise, should the time come when we need to look to the international community for help, we run the risk of seeing nothing but shrugs and the question: "where was Estonia with its international law when..."

We already see how the Global South's reaction to Europe's security concerns is lukewarm at best, as the West's eagerness to preach truth and justice has historically been placed in the formula of "our problems are the world's problems, while your problems are just that." The reader may now ask themselves when did they last or have they ever heard an Estonian or European politician talk about the war in Sudan.

Once the focus is set, it is possible to get down to brass tacks. Europe needs to go up a gear — all of Europe, even if we here are mostly interested in Estonia's security and prosperity. As put by [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary General] Jonatan Vseviov in his speech to mark the fifth anniversary of the Estonian Council on Foreign Relations: talking about Estonia's freedom and security, we must minimally think in the category of Europe, as the freedom and safety of Estonia does not depend only on these roughly 45,000 square kilometers of land and 1.3 million people.

There is widespread realization in the European Union that it will not be able to rise to the challenges of the changing world if it keeps the status quo. And yet, it seems Europe has been hitting one snooze button after another. Instead of rushing to develop a capital market or execute the recommendations in the reports of the Brussels "holy trinity" of Mario Draghi, Enrico Letta and Sauli Niinistö, the European Parliament last autumn debated whether it is okay to call a vegetarian burger a burger. Telling and symptomatic.

While there may be the will to get things done, action has not followed. The tools are blunt and outdated. Many important decisions require unanimity (meaning that all Member States have to vote in favor) and need to pass through a gauntlet of bureaucracy. Therefore, we should start, and with a measure of urgency, by whipping the European Union's slow machinery into far more decisive shape.

Going about it systematically would require a broad-based reform of European founding treaties, which, at this point in time, we might describe as unlikely in realpolitik terms. The founding agreements can be changed only if every Member State agrees, and that is not on the horizon. Even if one critic of the European project falls off the wagon, another will soon rear its head.

If an organization that functions unsatisfactorily cannot be changed, there is little choice but to leave behind the old body and start from scratch. Of course, with an organization the size of the European Union, that would amount to a draconic, gigantic step, which is why it is sensible to start by trying out various transitional and emergency options, of which there are a few.

In doing so, it would be wise to spend energy on activities with the potential of being effective. We should avoid empty displacement activity, like the plan to give the EU's foreign and security policy new momentum by moving the EEAS from the European Council to the European Commission, or simply from one administrative structure to another. You cannot treat an open fracture with a band-aid.

The founding treaties include provisions for "enhanced cooperation," which allow at least nine Member States to develop closer partnership than would be possible between all members. While no organization should prioritize having several speeds, it is a lesser evil than a minority of skeptics holding the majority back from growth. The history of European integration has demonstrated that initially passive states will start to feel left out after a while and seek to join cooperation formats once advantages become obvious.

Another option, which has not been used once since The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) provided the EU's institutional framework, is passerelle or bridge clauses. These make it possible to switch from the unanimity requirement to a qualified majority. According to the latter, at least 55 percent of Member States representing at least 65 percent of the EU population would be required for a motion to pass. A blocking minority would require at least four Member States representing at least 35 percent of the population.

Most votes in the European Council already follow a qualified majority, while some critical areas are still subject to the unanimity requirement, including foreign, defense and security matters and new members.

Naturally, employing the bridge clauses requires the approval of all Member States and in some cases even at both the government and parliamentary levels, which makes "crossing this bridge" politically difficult. However, the first coalitions of the willing seem to be taking shape regardless. It has long been the position of the Estonian government that we need to retain our right of veto in foreign and security policy matters. While the position shouldn't be belittled, as it stems from a legitimate concern for the protection of our sovereignty, our recently rigid approach could do with another look.

It is true that a qualified majority system would run for Estonia, which represents just 0.3 percent of the EU population, the risk of ending up on the wrong side of the vote so to speak. But we should ask ourselves how likely this would be, provided the European Union keeps its value compass. To my knowledge, in its 22 years as a member of the European Union, Estonia has never had to use its veto to protect its national interests in matters of foreign and security policy.

People also tend to forget — or not know in the first place — that according to longstanding traditions in the EU, voting is not rushed even in fields where qualified majority already is the norm. Attempts are made to avoid official hand-raising, address everyone's concerns and seek a consensus.

Member States, including Estonia, will eventually have to decide which is more important — desperately clinging to an assurance on paper that nothing can be done without our approval, or contributing to diplomacy and the system so that the right choices can be made at critical junctions with the necessary urgency.

Let us also not forget that even though Viktor Orban was a prime example, a single person leaving the room will hardly solve the problem of it being possible to hold the Union hostage with a single veto. In Bulgaria, a Kremlin-friendly party won the elections, while next year France might get a president who recently backed Orban. And so on.

We see no signs of reactionary, radically populist and pro-Russian forces throwing in the towel in Europe. That is why those who represent a democratic, secure and successful Europe must also up their game.

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