Air Force: Ukrainian drones stray into other countries due to countermeasures or faults

Col. Fredi Karu, chief of staff of the Air Force, told ERR that Ukraine does not use Estonian or other NATO countries' airspace to launch attacks against Russia. Instead, drones end up in other countries' territories due to electronic jamming or technical malfunctions.
This week, Ukraine carried out what have been described as its most massive and extensive airstrikes to date against Russian ports and oil infrastructure along the Baltic Sea. What exactly was targeted and how significant is the damage?
It is true that the Ukrainians carried out large-scale attacks over several consecutive nights. In northwestern Russia, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Finland near St. Petersburg, there are two very important oil ports for Russia: Ust-Luga, which is closer to our border, and Primorsk.
Both were hit repeatedly over multiple nights. It is currently difficult to assess the full extent of the damage, as it depends on what exactly was struck — for example, a pumping station — and how quickly repairs can be carried out. Fuel storage tanks were certainly hit, as flames and columns of smoke from Ust-Luga were visible even from Estonia.
How were these attacks carried out? What routes did the drones take and how many might there have been?
The drones most likely launch from Ukraine and travel across the western part of the Russian Federation. It is quite a long journey. Although they generally fly in a direct line, they have to pass through various air defense "bubbles," which means they make turns and adjust their routes along the way.
It is very important to note — as has been repeatedly emphasized at the government level — that Ukraine generally does not use Estonian or NATO airspace for these operations, including that of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland. If you look at a map, you can see that Ust-Luga is only a few dozen kilometers from our border. Russia's air defenses are also active: they jam drones electronically or pursue them with fighter jets, which is why some drones have previously strayed into our airspace.
In the incident when the Auvere smokestack was hit, were there more drones that entered our airspace?
I don't recall the exact numbers off the top of my head for the night when Auvere was hit, but some drones have indeed entered our airspace.
You said it is important to note that Estonian airspace is not used. When Ukrainians plan such attacks, do they provide any kind of warning to us or to neighboring countries?
Ukraine generally keeps its attacks and successes fairly confidential. Of course, we maintain contacts with them, but it is not public information to what extent they provide warnings, if at all.
You mentioned that drones have to pass through Russian air defenses. Is this system distributed unevenly — for example, stronger near the border and at key targets, with gaps in between?
What you described is indeed the case. A large number of air defense units are positioned along the front line or near the border, to prevent Ukrainian drones from entering Russia. One of Russia's main disadvantages is the sheer size of its territory — it is not possible to fully cover the entire country with air defense systems.
Air defense coverage is certainly very strong around Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as near major ports. However, Russia faces the problem that Ukraine has destroyed a significant number of its systems in recent years. Although Russia continues to produce more, I am skeptical that it can fully replace all of its losses. They also have to redeploy units to higher-priority areas, such as Crimea. As a result, it can be assumed that air defense coverage near some oil infrastructure sites has decreased.
How does a drone end up over Estonian territory? Is it due to a technical error or the result of Russian interference?
It is difficult to say — both explanations are likely valid. A drone may experience a technical malfunction in its navigation or targeting system. At the same time, Russia has very strong electronic warfare capabilities near St. Petersburg and Moscow. They jam drones and, as a result, a drone can become disoriented and start moving in the wrong direction.
On Sunday, there was news about drones reaching Finland. Is anything more known about that or what can be assumed?
The information is still fresh and not much is known yet. Most likely, it is the same scenario: the drones became disoriented for some reason and ended up in Finnish airspace.
These Ukrainian drones cover very long distances. What exactly are they and are they domestically produced?
The Ukrainians consistently say — partly to reassure their allies — that these are their own domestically produced drones. They have developed them extensively and are now capable of producing them on a large scale. The distances are long, but as seen in Ust-Luga and Primorsk, they are able to successfully strike their targets.
How do these differ from Russian drones?
I believe they are relatively similar — the core components, such as the wings and engine, are essentially the same. The differences likely come down to targeting systems and how well they can withstand electronic jamming. This war has effectively become a war of imitation: Ukrainians obtain enemy drones, Russians capture Ukrainian drones and both sides adopt the best features. As a result, they are largely similar.
If we compare Russia's and Ukraine's capabilities in air warfare, who currently has the advantage?
Both are highly capable, but the initiative appears to be on Ukraine's side. Because Ukraine is smaller and under attack, it is forced to be more innovative and come up with new solutions.
If we look at equipment supplied by the West — air defense systems from the United States, Italy, France and Germany — this reflects a competitive, market-driven environment. Manufacturers must compete with one another to develop better systems. In Russia, innovation may be somewhat more limited, as production is state-driven. The S-400 is not a bad system, but there is less pressure to continuously improve it, since the state will purchase it regardless. In terms of innovation, Ukraine has a slight edge.
Let's also talk about the situation on the front line. How successfully have Ukrainian forces advanced on the southern front?
Recently, the front line has remained largely static. Ukrainian forces have been more successful in certain areas, carrying out sudden attacks and maneuvers, but they later return to their positions. There have been no major changes in the front line at this time. The heaviest fighting is still taking place near Pokrovsk.
There has been talk of gradual Russian advances near Pokrovsk. Is that visible?
They attack every day with units of varying size — sometimes at the level of a squad, sometimes just in pairs. By attacking from morning until evening, they occasionally achieve small breakthroughs. However, those few square kilometers continue to come at a very high cost in casualties. Ukraine is still employing the tactic of making the enemy "pay dearly" for every piece of land.
How noticeable is the so-called Starlink effect — that Russian communications have been disrupted?
Communications are extremely important in warfare and the loss of Starlink is certainly disruptive. However, the Russians are not standing still. They have adopted older methods of communication and are developing new ones. It does affect them, but it does not bring their attacks to a halt.
Summer is ahead. Who would you give the advantage to right now? Who may have more opportunities?
I would hope Ukraine. That advantage may not be reflected only on the battlefield, but also in the economy.
For example, in the consequences of these attacks on oil infrastructure?
Exactly. One cost is having to replace equipment at the port, but at the same time, exports are halted. That is very expensive.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski, Johanna Alvin








