State Secretary Keit Kasemets on Friday sent out for approval a draft bill that would expand drone surveillance and countermeasure capabilities. According to him, the current legal framework is not sufficient to prevent and respond to threats originating from airspace, as it was designed primarily with manned aircraft in mind.

The main actors in counter-drone activities are the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) and the police, both of which have called for legislative changes and were involved in drafting the bill, Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) Deputy Director Veiko Kommusaar told ERR.

The press release introducing the draft bill stated that the police are increasingly becoming a "drone police." If this legislative amendment is adopted, what will it change in police work?

If the draft is passed, it will mean that the Police and Border Guard Board and the police more broadly will gain the authority to respond to drone-related threats across the entire airspace of Estonia. Currently, the legal framework primarily restricts our activities to designated no-fly zones established either by us or by other state authorities. For example, the entire eastern border is a restricted area and no-fly zones have been established over certain critical sites, which gives us the right to intervene there.

What will qualify as a drone threat going forward? For example, if an ordinary person's regular drone recently lost control and flew over an airport, would the police be able to shoot it down in the future?

Indeed, at the moment when monitoring systems detect such an incident, we do not actually know whether the person has lost control of the drone or has a deliberate intention to disrupt airport operations and aircraft — or even to carry out an attack. This gives us the immediate right to intervene because it constitutes a heightened and direct threat to air traffic and human life. In a collision between a drone and an aircraft, the aircraft could crash.

At that point, we have no other option but to respond to the elevated threat and only afterward determine the original cause. The primary objective is to neutralize the risk to air traffic.

To be very specific: if a similar incident were to happen again — if a drone enters an airport's no-fly zone — would the police take it down immediately?

Yes. Since an airport is a restricted area where flying drones is not permitted, we already treat such situations as a heightened threat and respond accordingly under current law.

If, in the future, this same authority is extended to cover the entire Estonian airspace, then in cases where an illegal drone is flying, for example, over Central Estonia — possibly transporting contraband or serving some other unknown purpose — and it lacks registration or identifying markers indicating who is operating it, the police would have the authority to assess the threat across all of Estonia's airspace. Based on that assessment, a decision would then be made on how and by what means to intervene, up to and including bringing the drone down.

No-fly zones are clear — there are specific rules in place. But taking that same Central Estonia example: if I order a drone online and, on a nice summer day, want to film a family picnic, could that also end up being taken down by the police?

For people who purchase drones, the Estonian state has established a set of operator requirements. One of these is that individuals must complete drone training and they are also required to register their drone. If these steps have been completed, responding authorities will have the information indicating that this is most likely not a drone that requires intervention.

Of course, if additional information emerges suggesting that someone has fulfilled all operator requirements and registered their drone but intends to use it for something other than recreational filming, then those cases will also be examined if such information is available. But in general, if people have properly complied with the requirements, we do not see any issue with their recreational or professional use of drones.

The draft bill would also introduce different rules for drone detection. How will that work?

Together with the Estonian Defense Forces and the Air Force as a whole, we are developing new air surveillance software for Estonia that will integrate all existing systems used for monitoring and surveilling airspace, as well as additional systems to be added in the future. Under the law, all devices that, for example, operators of national defense sites may acquire in the future must be integrated into these systems.

As a result, we will have a very clear overview of which drones are flying in Estonia, at what altitudes and whether they have the required permits or whether they are drones that require a response to determine who is operating them and for what purpose.

How significant is the role of the Defense Forces in this new arrangement?

The Estonian Defense Forces will undoubtedly play a very significant role, particularly when it comes to drones that require countermeasures which the Police and Border Guard Board does not possess. For example, if we are talking about fighter jets, missiles or heavy firepower — capabilities that war drones may involve — then state authorities will in any case work together.

In the context of the law, both institutions are granted the authority to respond to such threats: the police with immediate competence and the Defense Forces with urgent competence in cases involving military drones or situations that require a level of response beyond what law enforcement agencies themselves can provide.

What counter-drone capabilities does the police currently have?

We have electronic tools that can interfere with drones and are capable of detecting communication between a drone and its operator. In the near future, our arsenal will also include interceptor drones and, of course, we already have firearms available to respond to such threats.

If you ask whether all of this is sufficient, then of course it is not. We are continuously developing our capabilities, acquiring new tools and training units. At the same time, strong cooperation with the Estonian Defense Forces remains essential. By combining our existing resources and jointly monitoring the airspace picture, we are able to respond to threats far more effectively together.

Under the draft bill, operators of sites critical to the functioning of the state would also gain the right to conduct drone surveillance and countermeasures on their own territory. What kinds of sites are these?

The state is still working on that list. These are sites that are essential both for the continuity of the state and for the provision of critical services, and the list of such sites is not public.

If we assume that such a site is, for example, North Estonia Medical Center, would the hospital itself actually have the authority to take down drones, without the police needing to intervene?

The police will in any case respond to such situations, including when operators responsible for protecting specific sites are not prepared to apply such measures themselves immediately. If, for example, a regional hospital is included on that list, then in principle the security company providing services to that site would have the authority to carry out both surveillance and countermeasures. However, this does not mean that the state would not respond.

Does this mean that operators of such sites would be required to hire a company to handle drone surveillance?

The draft bill does provide for that possibility. As far as I know, discussions are currently ongoing regarding the conditions under which and the specific obligations with which these requirements would be imposed on site operators.

Why is this necessary?

It is certainly a multilayered approach that allows both state and private sector resources to be used more effectively against drone-related threats. One key priority is ensuring that all surveillance data feeds into a single, unified operational picture.

It is also important to understand that when a drone approaches our borders, surveillance systems or radar images cannot immediately determine its purpose — whether it is a military drone, a reconnaissance drone or perhaps transporting contraband. In responding to such situations, we are the first to assess what is happening, but if the appropriate capabilities lie, for example, with the Estonian Defense Forces, then they will take action. Given how quickly a drone detected near the border can become a threat, such situations can escalate within minutes.

The fact that the state is upgrading its surveillance and countermeasure systems to the next level does not, unfortunately, mean that drones will not already be operating in our airspace before we can respond adequately. The timeframes involved are simply extremely short.

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