For some time now, foreign policy disputes have periodically emerged between the government and the president, with relatively minor differences in approach regarding the Russia-Ukraine war leading people associated with the government to publicly condemn the president in various ways.

In this context, on May 12, the Institute of Societal Studies conducted a rapid survey* among Estonian citizens in which respondents were asked to evaluate the foreign policy of institutions and individuals, the effectiveness of various aspects of the Estonian government's foreign policy and, more specifically, the extent to which the president should, in respondents' view, be allowed to diverge from the government's foreign policy positions.

Overall assessments of the government's foreign policy and that of its key relevant members are unfortunately fairly negative. The government's foreign policy as a whole is viewed positively by 31 percent of respondents and negatively by 56 percent. The share of positive ratings for the foreign minister is even lower, at 24 percent, while the prime minister receives 22 percent.

More broadly, former EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas also receives a negative assessment: 50 percent evaluate her foreign policy negatively and 33 percent positively. Nor does the Foreign Ministry fare much better overall: 46 percent rate it negatively and 35 percent positively.

The only figures to receive a net positive assessment are President Alar Karis and Foreign Ministry Secretary General Jonatan Vseviov individually. Since the latter is generally less well known, there were many "Don't know" responses in his case. Vseviov's foreign policy is rated positively by 34 percent of respondents and negatively by 25 percent. The president receives a positive assessment from 63 percent of citizens and a negative one from 23 percent.

Looking at net foreign policy ratings by party affiliation — including non-voters — reveals an expectedly varied picture. The president receives a positive assessment from voters of all parties. Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna receives a negative assessment from all voters except those of the Reform Party (the Eesti 200 sample is too small, though the assessment there would likely also be positive). The prime minister fares little better, with his foreign policy receiving a positive assessment only from Reform Party voters and narrowly from voters of the Parempoolsed.

The government as a whole receives a positive assessment from Reform Party, Parempoolsed and Social Democratic Party voters, while all others — including non-voters — assess it negatively. The same pattern appears in the case of Kaja Kallas and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Secretaru General Vseviov also finds broader support across party lines. He receives a net negative assessment only from EKRE and Center Party voters. Among non-voters, his rating is narrowly positive, while among all other groups it is clearly positive.

We also asked respondents to assess how successfully the Estonian government has dealt with foreign policy issues. Since it is reasonable to assume that not everyone considers every specific issue important, respondents were also able to indicate this (for example, among ethnic Russian respondents or EKRE voters, considering support for Ukraine unimportant was more common). This reduces the number of non-informative responses being automatically categorized as unsuccessful.

Out of seven areas, the government received a positive assessment in three. The government's work supporting Ukraine is clearly approved of (62 percent), as are relations with EU member states (59 percent). Strengthening Estonia's security receives a slightly net positive assessment, though responses are largely split: 44 percent consider the government's foreign policy efforts in this area successful, while 39 percent consider them unsuccessful.

The government's most negative assessment came on an issue recently highlighted as a shortcoming by the president as well. Long-term foreign policy vision is considered unsuccessful by 51 percent of respondents and successful by 21 percent. The government receives an almost equally negative assessment regarding the mitigation of threats stemming from Russia where 49 percent consider its actions unsuccessful and 26 percent successful.

The government also receives slightly net negative assessments in relations with the United States (40 percent unsuccessful, 33 percent successful) and in making Estonia's voice heard internationally (42 percent unsuccessful, 37 percent successful).

Turning to party-based assessments of these issues, we again look at net ratings. As expected, the government receives devastating assessments from EKRE and Center Party voters on five of the seven topics. Interestingly, EKRE voters are divided on support for Ukraine and relations with EU member states. There is no broad consensus in their assessments. Center Party voters, on net, consider the government's actions on supporting Ukraine and communication within the EU successful, while viewing all other areas as unsuccessful.

The second group consists of Isamaa voters and non-voters. Both groups consider support for Ukraine and relations with EU member states successful, while viewing long-term foreign policy vision and mitigating threats from Russia as unsuccessful. There is no consensus regarding strengthening Estonia's security, making Estonia's voice heard internationally or relations with the United States.

Most areas are approved of by Social Democratic Party, Parempoolsed and Reform Party voters. Social Democratic voters give the government a negative net assessment only on the issue of long-term foreign policy vision.

Generally speaking, when looking at the problems that — in addition to the government's overall low support — may be driving broader negative assessments of the government's and its members' foreign policy, these are the failure to develop a long-term foreign policy vision and the failure to mitigate threats stemming from Russia. These are the two issues on which criticism of the government's actions spans the political spectrum.

With caveats and nuances, the government's effectiveness in relations with the United States and in making Estonia's voice heard internationally is also more broadly viewed as problematic.

To assess the president's recommendation to maintain dialogue with Russia in various forms, respondents were asked what approach Estonia and the EU should take in communicating with Russia. Forty percent believe pressure should be maintained while diplomatic channels remain open — the option closest to the president's position on the issue. Another 29 percent would like to see active dialogue aimed at ending the war and discussing conditions. Only 22 percent support a hardline approach involving maximum pressure and isolation without dialogue.

We also asked how closely the president's positions should align with those of the government. Forty-five percent found that the president should represent the government's positions while also being allowed to express personal views. Thirty-three percent said the president should act as an independent foreign policy voice and a counterbalance to the government. Only 10 percent believed the president should purely represent the government's positions.

Stepping back for a moment, it is worth recalling the issues on which the conflict between the president and the government has been most pronounced.

The conflict runs almost entirely along the axis revealed by the survey questions: Karis has pushed a pragmatic, dialogue-oriented and longer-term line (the Dubai special envoy proposal, his NBC remarks on territory, his comments in Helsingin Sanomat about preparing for dialogue, criticism in Lääne Elu of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' excessive focus on day-to-day politics), while the government (Tsahkna, [Prime Minister] Kristen Michal and more recently also Lauri Läänemets) has advocated continued strong pressure and isolation. The Kazakhstan visit and Ambassador Jaap Ora's resignation in December 2025 triggered tensions that have only accumulated over the following four to five months.

This axis aligns directly with the survey's two most negative net assessments: developing a long-term foreign policy vision (51/21) and mitigating threats stemming from Russia (49/26). These are also precisely the areas where Karis' public narrative ("preparing for the end of the war," "looking beyond the horizon") and the government's narrative ("apply pressure today") persistently clash.

In other words, the survey's strongest negative signal comes precisely from the areas most visibly highlighted by the conflict over the past six months. With certain caveats, the conflict also overlaps with the two softer net negative areas: relations with the United States (Karis' repeated message that the EU must be at the table with Donald Trump) and making Estonia's voice heard internationally (criticism published in Lääne Elu that "there are no people, skills or sometimes even knowledge," along with Raimond Kaljulaid's parallel diagnosis that Estonia is "desynchronized from what is happening in the world").

Where there is no overlap is on support for Ukraine (62 percent) and relations with EU member states (59 percent). These are exactly the two areas receiving the strongest positive assessments in the survey. Both sides — the president and the government — emphasize the importance of supporting Ukraine and cooperation within the EU and the president's nuances (temporary territorial concessions, an EU special envoy) have not altered the baseline position.

The conflict is therefore thematically focused. It does not spill across the entire foreign policy spectrum, but instead runs precisely along the two lines the public also identifies as the government's weakest points, while avoiding the two lines viewed as successes.

The picture is reinforced by two additional survey findings. Asked what approach Estonia and the EU should take toward communication with Russia, responses containing some element of dialogue collectively received 69 percent support. The government's pure line of maximum pressure and isolation received 22 percent.

Asked whether the president should act in foreign policy as the government's representative or as a counterbalance, 79 percent chose an option involving some degree of independence; the option of strictly representing the government's line received 10 percent. Thus, both Karis' substantive position (the need for some element of dialogue) and his procedural position (that the president has room to act as an independent voice in foreign policy) enjoy majority support, while the government's rigid alternatives (pure isolation, strict adherence to the government's line) do not.

To some extent, the question of which came first — the chicken or the egg — still hangs in the air here. Unfortunately, the survey format does not provide a clear chronological answer. Some non-causal hints might perhaps be gleaned from President Karis' approval ratings, where support for the president appears to have risen rather than fallen during the active phase of the conflict over the past six months.

The survey was conducted May 12–13 in Norstat's online environment among Estonian citizens aged 18 and older, with a total of 1,005 respondents participating.

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