To what extent was it a surprise to you that the United States and Israel decided to attack Iran last Saturday morning?

It was surprising and at the same time wasn't. It wasn't surprising because we saw how the United States had been concentrating military forces in the region. As many analysts have said, it's a bit like in classical Russian theater: if a gun is hanging on the wall, then by at least the third act it has to fire a shot. So it was not surprising that this military operation began.

However, what did somewhat pull the rug out from under everyone was the fact that on Friday, February 28, when Iran's leadership was destroyed and the Israeli Air Force dropped bombs on Khamenei's residence — where Iran's entire ruling elite had gathered — peace negotiations between Iran and the United States were actually taking place in Geneva at the same time.

Frankly speaking, it was a treacherous move that the Americans did not announce that the peace talks had ended or signal anything of the sort. They did not say that we are no longer talking with the Iranians and will instead move to other methods. They did not say that, and in my view that strike was below the belt.

The United States has recently carried out a series of very forceful military interventions and actions — we can mention Venezuela, then U.S. operations against drug cartels and now the attack on Iran. What kind of image have the United States and the Trump administration painted of themselves in the world right now?

A highly contradictory one. We all remember that when Donald Trump first became president, he declared himself the president of peace. He said he intended to put an end to all military adventures and interventions in other countries aimed at establishing democratic systems there or exporting Western values. He argued that such things simply do not work. He was extremely critical of all previous administrations that tried to do this in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Now he himself has become an ultimate hawk. This is in 2026. Last year he still believed he might even be able to pursue the Nobel Peace Prize because he said he had ended wars. Although at the moment no one can say exactly how many wars he actually ended.

He himself claims seven or eight.

Seven or eight — perhaps even more. Now he has suddenly presented a completely different side of his character and it turns out he is the most hawkish of all the hawks. Some preliminary statistics have even been compiled suggesting that he has carried out more military interventions this century than any of the presidents before him. It is a very interesting transformation of personality.

That said, one must still give him some credit, if that is the right word, in the sense that his interventions — at least if we look at what happened in Venezuela — were not framed as restoring democracy or bringing it to the people. Rather, it was a kind of "fine-tuning" of the regime to recall a phrase once used by one of our Estonian prime ministers.

Maduro was removed from power there — a man who had built his entire political career on opposing the United States — and in his place they left someone who comes from exactly the same environment. She holds essentially the same views and no democratic reforms are going to be carried out in Venezuela. The sizable Venezuelan opposition — whose representative even received the Nobel Peace Prize, which Trump himself missed out on — has suddenly been pushed aside.

In Venezuela, things are still being done, to put it mildly, with rather unpleasant people. But those unpleasant people are acceptable to the current U.S. administration.

This brings to mind a famous remark attributed to Nixon about a Central American dictator: "He's a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch." /.../ So when Trump intervenes in other countries' affairs, it is not a project aimed at promoting democracy, but rather a deliberate effort to install someone who suits him.

It is unlikely that a similar kind of "fine-tuning" would work in Iran. But how possible is a scenario in Iran where someone from within the same regime takes over leadership instead of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and begins cooperating with the United States? In other words, could a kind of lite version of the Iranian regime come to power?

I assume that is exactly what the current bet is on. We do not know how many actors inside Iran may be able to intervene in this process. Yesterday we were informed that Khamenei's son — whose father was killed — has been chosen as the new religious leader, and he is known to hold even more extreme views than his father. He is also more closely tied to Iran's repressive apparatus, more specifically the Islamic Guard Corps.

The Revolutionary Guard.

The Revolutionary Guard. The new ayatollah who has now supposedly been chosen is more closely connected to them, which means he could be an even more ruthless figure than his father. Of course, we do not know that for certain.

According to Iran's constitution, an electoral body of 88 members is convened to make the selection and it has been reported that the building was attacked when this body gathered. Whether they were all killed or not, or whether the vote ended up taking place over Zoom, we simply do not know. As one Israeli commentator joked, Iran's constitution says nothing about holding elections over Zoom. The electoral body is supposed to meet in person.

Iran specialists know that this is a Shiite state where the transfer of power from father to son is viewed very negatively. That is not how things are traditionally done there. Their principle is to choose the best successor — and a blood relative is not necessarily the best choice. So there is a certain contradiction here.

But there is also a contradiction in the country between Shiites and Sunnis, and it is the Sunnis who have ruled so far?

What you are describing was the situation in Iraq before 2003, when the Americans invaded. There, Sunnis ruled the entire country, while the Kurds and Shiites were in a suppressed position. Iran, however, is an overwhelmingly Shiite state. There is a Sunni minority, but it is so small that it is hardly worth discussing. There are, however, other minorities that are more relevant to talk about.

Shiite principles generally do not favor or tolerate the transfer of power from father to son. We do not know whether this is some kind of attempt to muddy the waters or a sign of yet another crisis. The very fact that power is being passed from father to son suggests that the nature of Iran as an Islamic republic may have changed. It seems that principles once considered almost sacred have now been set aside.

It may be that Iranian society itself is undergoing some sort of transformation. Although, judging from Donald Trump's previous statements, the goal of his military intervention could not have been the reshaping of Iranian society, it is possible that such changes could nonetheless occur as a consequence of this war.

A few weeks ago there were very large-scale demonstrations in Iran, during which the authorities reportedly killed thousands or even tens of thousands of people. At the beginning of his attack, Donald Trump said he was calling on protesters and regime opponents to seize power. Did those demonstrations push Trump to launch the attack now? We know that it was also preceded by the Twelve-Day War that weakened Iran's military capabilities. How realistic is Trump's call for regime opponents to take power? Is it really that simple?

Here again there is a certain ambiguity. First, we must acknowledge that those street protests — or even what could be described as an attempted uprising — that we observed in early January were suppressed very brutally. Although, during the buildup of military forces in the Persian Gulf region, Trump encouraged Iran's opponents to continue their actions and promised that help would arrive soon, as we can see now that help came too late. Several weeks passed between the suppression of the unrest and the moment when the Americans and Israelis launched their attack on February 28. The protests had already been drowned in blood by then.

Another point worth discussing is the theoretical debate about how revolutions actually break out — not only in Iran, but in any country.

When I studied history in school and later at university, great emphasis was placed on the importance of mass mobilization. For example, in the case of events in Russia in 2011–2012, when there was also a large popular movement, analysts calculated that if about 2 percent of the capital's population takes to the streets, that is a sufficiently large mass for something significant to begin happening. Now we have realized that this is a somewhat romantic notion.

The people are an important prerequisite, but those people must also have political leaders or organized forces ready to take the reins. As far as we know about Iran's internal situation, there is plenty of public dissatisfaction, but there are simply no opposition politicians ready to reshape the country's political life. They are either in exile, dead or in prison.

The son of the former shah of Iran, who lives in exile in the United States and calls on people to take to the streets from afar, also leaves an unethical taste in one's mouth. If you call people to the barricades, you should be among your own people — not sending them from afar to confront the Revolutionary Guard who can simply open fire with machine guns using live ammunition.

When the president of the United States calls on people to go out into the streets, it may also be linked to a new message that the U.S. does not rule out a ground operation on Iranian territory. That is something that had previously always been ruled out and which proved extremely costly in Iraq and Afghanistan. We were all certain — and I personally was certain — that they would not repeat that mistake. This call for the public to take to the streets could be a kind of substitute for sending U.S. ground forces into Iran.

In addition, Iran is not a demographically homogeneous country. There are many ethnic minorities living compactly in certain regions, such as Azerbaijanis and Kurds. The Kurds, at least in Iraq, have long been U.S. allies and effectively have their own state there.

The Kurdish minority in Syria has also been very important. The United States supported them with weapons and, apparently, even with military advisers. As for the Kurdish minority in Iran, it at least seems that the United States may be trying to motivate or influence them — perhaps with the idea that they might now begin a decisive struggle against the central government.

But this is a double-edged sword. From what we understand about Iranian society, even those people who are extremely skeptical of or hostile toward the ayatollahs' regime generally do not see the breakup of the country as anything positive for Iran's future.

But from a realistic perspective right now, perhaps it is not a completely crazy idea?

It is still too early to say. We can imagine all kinds of scenarios. For example, it could happen that the Kurdish minority living compactly in western Iran is indeed determined, that they have weapons and a military plan and that they begin a war against the central government.

But it is also possible that all the other peoples of Iran would instead rally around Tehran and say: no, what the Kurds are doing is unacceptable and we should instead fight to preserve the unity of the state.

Do we have a rough idea of how many truly fervent supporters of the regime there are and how they might be distributed compared with its opponents?

Analysts of Iranian society say there is a core group — a fairly solid core — that makes up about 15–20 percent of the population and supports the ayatollahs' regime.

These are, of course, members of the armed structures, their family members, as well as officials and the clergy. Perhaps one or two million people in that sense. Iran's population is a little over 90 million, so if 15–20 percent are firm supporters of the regime, you can calculate how many millions of people that amounts to.

But here it is important to emphasize that while 15–20 percent of fervent supporters may not sound particularly impressive, they are all armed. In other words, all the people in Iran who have weapons are supporters of the regime, and that is a decisive factor.

The opposition — or those who might begin an armed struggle against the regime — are essentially empty-handed. And if we talk about revolutionary processes and the outbreak of civil wars, the experience of the Russian Revolution of 1917 shows that when the tsarist regime began to collapse, power was ultimately taken by the Bolshevik Party, which at that moment had perhaps only 5,000 members across the vast Russian Empire — and it turned out that this was entirely sufficient.

A small but determined, armed and well-organized group with a clear plan can accomplish a great deal. When it comes to the opposition in Iran, that kind of force currently does not exist, unlike the situation in 1979 when the Islamic Revolution took place.

At that time, the ayatollahs' movement included many energetic young men and when they seized power in Iran, the network of clerics in mosques throughout the country was interconnected and organized.

Today there is no such organized force within Iranian society. Whether the calls from the president of the United States — saying from thousands of miles away, across several oceans, "organize yourselves, do something" — are enough to spark the emergence of such a movement remains unclear.

What is interesting, at least regarding Israel's actions, is that in addition to various military targets, Israel has also bombed police stations and, specifically, infrastructure belonging to the Revolutionary Guard — in other words, the infrastructure of the repressive apparatus.

The possible goal may be that if a popular uprising were to occur, that repressive apparatus would already be weakened or its weapons depots destroyed. In other words, it may be an attempt to throw a bit of "yeast" into Iranian society — something that could start the fermenting process.

Let's talk about the broader regional effects in the Gulf states. It apparently came as something of a surprise that Iran began indiscriminately bombing its neighbors across the Gulf — the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and even Cyprus. What does this suggest? Does it indicate panic?

One view is that this reflects panic on the part of the authorities in Tehran or even outright foolishness. But there is also the opposite interpretation. Reportedly, the United Arab Emirates — which lies only about 250 kilometers south of Iran — has been hit with missiles even more than Israel has. That has come as a surprise above all to the sheikhs of the UAE and to the international community.

Some believe that because Donald Trump has very close business ties with the wealthy oil monarchies through his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, Iran's attacks may be part of a deliberate strategy. There has even been an ironic joke circulating that Jared Kushner does not represent the United States in the Emirates, but rather represents the Emirates in the United States — acting as a lobbyist for the oil sheikhs.

The aim of Iran's strikes may be to inflict so much pain and frustration on those oil monarchies that they all go together to Washington, figuratively crying on Trump's shoulder, and ask him to bring the situation to an end.

For the United States, the uncomfortable aspect is that the wealthy oil states of the Persian Gulf are full of U.S. military bases. The official justification for establishing them in the first place was precisely the need to defend the region against Iran. Now that there is an actual need for protection, it turns out that U.S. air defense may not be quite as impressive as expected and Iranian missiles and drones are getting through.

At the same time, quite a lot of those missiles and drones have still been shot down.

Yes, but Dubai marketed itself for decades as the sunniest and safest place in the world — a place of eternal prosperity where nothing terrible could happen. Now images are coming from there showing destroyed hotels and columns of smoke rising into the sky. That is a real shock.

So when Iran began attacking these small and relatively defenseless states, there may actually be a strategy behind it: to cause so much pain that they will ask Washington to put an end to the situation.

But at the same time, couldn't this also be like shooting themselves in the foot, bringing the anger of their neighbors down on them?

Yes, although it is also said that the Iranian authorities may not have any real alternatives. They have been placed in a situation where it is either kill or be killed — the regime is fighting for its survival.

And another very important factor here is Russia, which it seems could be said to have left Iran completely alone right now.

Yes, it can be said that no clear message is coming from the Kremlin. On the one hand, Russia signed an agreement with Iran last year in which the two sides were supposed to help one another. Now that moment has arrived, yet no assistance is forthcoming. After the killing of the ayatollah, Vladimir Putin merely expressed very dry and formal condolences in accordance with diplomatic protocol — there was nothing personal in it. Russia's reputation has received yet another stain.

On the other hand, what is happening in the region is pushing up oil prices, which benefits Russia as a country heavily dependent on oil revenues.

A third point is that the attention of the global community and of the United States is now shifting toward the Middle East, meaning Ukraine is being pushed somewhat into the background. Because Middle Eastern countries need more air defense, missiles that Ukraine desperately needs could instead be sent there. That would mean Ukraine might no longer be able to defend its airspace as effectively.

Could the attack on Iran embolden Russia further — for example, because Russia also justified its aggression against Ukraine as a way to prevent a Ukrainian attack on Russia? Or could it instead deter Russia, since it demonstrates the West's significant military superiority over Russian weapons?

Probably the former. I would not say it directly encourages Russia, but it does seem to retroactively justify Russia's behavior. Russian propaganda has already begun saying that the United States and Israel are doing things that Russia is told it cannot do.

Another troubling moment is February 28 when Iran's leadership was eliminated. That can be called an assassination and it represents a new step in international affairs. Although Russia has used very harsh rhetoric — now toward Zelenskyy and earlier toward Georgian President Saakashvili — it has not attempted to physically eliminate the leaders of other countries. If Trump has now taken that step and shown that it can be done, some dictator somewhere might try the same thing. I have the feeling that Donald Trump is behaving like a dictator.

Looking at the overall situation over the past few months — the war in Gaza, the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iran and the war in Ukraine — how dangerous a time are we actually living in right now?

That is more of a rhetorical question.

How great is the risk of escalation?

Extremely high.

People talk about a third world war. But that would presumably require certain other actors rallying behind Iran, which we do not see at the moment?

Iran does not have allies. Iran chooses very carefully what it does. For example, it has not attacked Turkey. Attacking Azerbaijan might be justified in the sense that Azerbaijan is Israel's most reliable supplier of oil and their relations are excellent, extending even to military cooperation. But Iran does not attack Azerbaijan because that would automatically mean Turkish involvement and Turkey would likely not hesitate to launch a ground operation.

A very big question mark is China. China clearly does not like the current situation. Interestingly, China now appears to be the last firm anchor in global politics speaking about international law and civilized conduct. At the moment, those correct words are coming from the Chinese side. Of course, we do not know whether, watching all of this unfold, China might start to feel that it could take some sudden action regarding Taiwan. If something like that were to happen, there would no longer be any brakes.

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