What stage has this attack — or this war, as it may already be called — in Iran reached? The United States and Israel have carried out their strikes and Iran has begun retaliating. What stage is the conflict at and who currently has the upper hand? Have the strikes by Israel and the United States dealt Iran a devastating blow?

The asymmetry in military capabilities is certainly very significant. The ability of the Americans and the Israelis to carry out precision strikes against both Iran's leadership and its military targets is impressive. Iran does have a certain capacity to inflict damage on countries in the region, focusing primarily on United States interests, and the Americans maintain several important military bases in the region.

It can be said that, militarily, the United States and Israel clearly have the upper hand. However, achieving all strategic objectives through airstrikes alone is difficult, if not impossible. The Iranian regime has undoubtedly chosen the path of what could be described as a final struggle. It continues to control all armed structures within the country and so far there are no signs of a shift toward the people or the opposition. Under such a repressive regime, it has been extremely difficult — if not impossible — for the political opposition to organize. This means there is no clear opposition leader currently operating inside Iran. Organized political opposition continues to exist primarily in exile, which certainly complicates the possibility of a swift and painless transfer of power.

Why did this attack happen now? What prompted it and how can it be explained in simple terms?

Israel has been warning for years and stating that Iran poses an existential threat to Israel. The United States is Israel's strongest security guarantor and partner.

It is likely also a matter of a window of opportunity, in which the intelligence services of the two countries concluded that the moment had come when a limited number of precision strikes could hit a significant number of Iran's political and military leaders. This is a combination of many different factors and it cannot be entirely ruled out that domestic political considerations in either the United States or Israel also played a role.

Iran has also begun attacking other Persian Gulf countries, particularly those hosting U.S. bases. Has this truly expanded the conflict into a region-wide war and might we see those same countries begin attacking Iran today or tomorrow?

I consider that unlikely. So far, those countries have refrained from attacking Iran and it is unlikely that either the Americans or the Israeli government want a large-scale global war involving all countries in the region.

In military terms, I do not believe the Arab states have anything significant to add. There is no military capability lacking on the part of the Americans or the Israelis that Arab countries in the region could provide in a meaningful way.

So there is likely no reason for those countries to further weaken the Iranian regime?

All of these precision airstrikes are based on highly specific intelligence, which I do not believe Israel or the United States would want to share with Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.

What could happen next? Does Iran still have some reserve capability to repel incoming attacks or to strike Israel further or have we already seen the biggest blow?

Iran has circulated certain propaganda videos showing its drone stockpiles and it likely retains some capacity to continue. The question is at what level of intensity or operational tempo.

The Americans and the Israelis also do not have an unlimited supply of what are very expensive air defense systems to intercept relatively rudimentary, technically simple and inexpensive attack drones. So Iran may employ a form of attrition tactics. The key question, however, is how much the United States and Israel can achieve by continuing airstrikes without additional ground involvement.

Whether such a tactic could ultimately lead to the achievement of a strategic objective — namely, the fall of the theocratic regime and the emergence of a credible new authority capable of controlling a country of 90 million people — is the central issue. So far, at least publicly, no highly convincing strategic plan has been presented outlining how to reach that goal. Instead, there have primarily been calls for the Iranian people to take power into their own hands.

It is clear that Iran's opposition has not been able to organize. At the same time, no one besides the regime currently exercises meaningful control over any substantial armed structures on the ground in Iran. Without relying on significant force, the consolidation of a new authority would likely not be possible.

Could this mean that the United States and Israel would ultimately need to deploy ground forces to some extent to help forces that currently still make up the opposition begin transforming Iran?

There are two points to consider. First, no emerging authority can expect much legitimacy or popularity if it comes to power solely on the bayonets of a foreign power. Second, there is not the slightest indication of any political will on the part of either the United States or Israel to deploy their troops on the ground.

In that sense, it is possible that the current theocratic regime could be forced to fall, but this may not be followed by rapid stabilization or a swift transition to democracy.

We are unlikely to see an Afghanistan solution there, so to speak?

Countries are very different. Compared with Afghanistan, Iran is first of all much larger, but it is also more educated, has a very long history of statehood and operates on an entirely different level. By history of statehood, I mean that Iran has functioned as a state that has centrally controlled its entire territory.

It is certainly a far more significant center of power in its region than Afghanistan has ever been. Historically, Afghanistan has served more as a buffer state between major empires. Iran, by contrast, is an independent center of power. In that sense, I do not believe there are many direct parallels.

That said, if we look more broadly at the history of regime-change policies in the region, they have rarely turned out to be linear success stories.

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and X and never miss an update!