Former president: Europe needs fundamental changes to rise to new security situation

In an interview with ERR, former President Toomas Hendrik Ilves said European leaders have yet to grasp the fundamental shift in relations with the United States and the emergence of a confrontation. According to Ilves, the European Union needs a restructuring in order to finally build an independent defense capability that does not rely on the U.S.
We've seen what has unfolded around Greenland in recent weeks. Can we still realistically rely on the Americans who have been the main guarantors of NATO's deterrence? What happens next?
I believe it should be clear to all of us just how much has been left undone on this side of the Atlantic. Europe's problem for the past 35 years has been that we haven't focused on our own defense.
If we look at Western European defense spending during the Cold War, it was roughly where we in Estonia are now — around 4 percent. We've been living under the illusion of a "peace dividend" — a term, by the way, coined by George H. W. Bush. (In the former U.S. president's view, defense resources freed up by the end of the Cold War could be used in other areas, while the U.S. would continue to act as the guarantor of global security – ed.)
Now we find ourselves in a situation where our defense is underdeveloped and we're heavily dependent on the U.S. And we can't say that the U.S. did not try and prevent us from developing autonomous defense over the years. In fact, this was one of the major foreign policy battles between the U.S. and Europe back in 1998 when the European Union adopted what's known as the Saint-Malo Declaration (The joint statement, adopted in Saint-Malo on December 4, 1998, laid the foundation for the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. It established that the EU must have the capability to use military force when NATO as a whole is unwilling or unable to intervene – ed.) for addressing security matters itself. That caused a great deal of friction. The Americans asked: how dare you?
But now the new U.S. leadership is very clearly anti-European. If you read their national security strategy, published in mid-December, you'll see that — if not an outright enemy — Europe is named as the main opponent and receives the harshest criticism. In my view, Europe has not taken that criticism or the situation seriously enough.
Take NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, for instance — he referred to Trump as "daddy" at the last NATO summit (Rutte called Donald Trump "daddy" during the most recent NATO summit – ed.) and said earlier this week that everything is just fine. And yet, this week, the foreign ministers of Greenland and Denmark met with the U.S. vice president and they left the meeting looking grim.
That shows we haven't taken what's happening in EU–U.S. relations seriously enough. And let me add: this shift is coming from the U.S. — Europe did not initiate it.
There is now a great deal of work ahead. It's not just about building up a massive, 100,000-strong military force (a proposal made last week by EU Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius – ed.), though that certainly must be done. In order for Europe to be autonomous and independent, we need major reforms within the European Union itself.
The European Union is often described as a peace project, with all matters of defense left to NATO. But surely a substantive structural shift would first have to take place within the EU? With the current setup, isn't it basically impossible to add operational defense cooperation?
Perhaps the first thing we would need is a security council where these issues are discussed on an ongoing basis, similar to the National Security Council in the United States where experts stay continuously informed. Such councils exist in several European countries, though not in Estonia, admittedly.
But more broadly, we need to carry out far more significant reforms. Let's say that our first steps have now been taken with the loan proposed for weapons purchases. That's welcome, but we still need to address the structural deficiencies within the European Union.
First among these would be a unified, integrated capital market, which would allow us to attract far more investment. We could channel those investments into high technology, because in truth, we're not just dependent on the American arms industry or military — we are completely dependent on American technology. The Americans themselves joke about Europe's technological backwardness. Everything we use in high tech comes from the U.S.
Second, we need to overcome resistance to joint borrowing. Several member states have opposed it for decades. Europe has done it twice: once during the COVID crisis and again just before this past Christmas when the European Union — without Hungary, of course — decided to take out a €90 billion loan to support Ukraine after Belgium blocked the redistribution of Russian assets held by Euroclear.
Small states on Russia's border are in an especially difficult position. Let's be honest — there's no guarantee in Europe that Trump-style copycats won't come to power, acting selfishly as heads of state. Hungary will certainly not remain an exception. Just look at the popularity of nationalist parties in the UK or other countries. Right now, we're leaderless and don't even know which direction to look. European unity could fall apart right before our eyes and we're not prepared for that.
Slovakia and Czechia are already halfway there. Yes, we're in a difficult situation — but that's life and we have to deal with it. There's no point in complaining.
Personally, I would support invoking Article 7. (Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union is a mechanism the EU can use to respond to breaches of its core values by a member state – ed.) In the case of countries like Hungary, which are drifting toward authoritarianism domestically, it's warranted.
This is a problem that exists in any kind of union. We need to pull ourselves together and clearly define which decisions are made by qualified majority voting, rather than unanimity, which allows this kind of obstruction.
Right now, European countries are using elaborate balancing diplomacy toward the current U.S. administration when it comes to the Greenland issue. The hope seems to be that maybe the Americans will just forget about it and other unpleasant matters as well. But is this kind of diplomacy sustainable? The shift in America isn't just about Donald Trump personally — it's a much longer-term, systemic process.
Absolutely, it's not a sustainable policy. The real problem lies with the Western European countries, which haven't had to deal with serious, uncomfortable realities for a very long time. Countries that have a clearer understanding of Russia are willing to take bolder steps across a range of areas. And not just rhetorically, as we've seen with several Western European states.
But NATO Secretary General Rutte is currently engaged in pure ostrich diplomacy, insisting that "everything is fine" — even though everyone can clearly see that it's not. Ursula von der Leyen hasn't been particularly bold either; it's obvious she doesn't want to say anything critical.
At the end of the day, Europe's leadership needs to reach the understanding that we're in a new situation and must start doing things differently. And that we do not agree with what the U.S. is doing.
The sooner that happens, the better for Europe itself. The Americans need to be made to understand that one of our core principles is that we will not allow these kinds of tactics to be used against Europe.
A good example of directness toward the Americans is EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas. Is this the kind of courage other European leaders need as well?
Absolutely. Kaja Kallas is the first high representative in the history of this institution to have both the intellectual capacity and the courage to speak out. If you look at Federica Mogherini and Josep Borrell, they were extremely timid and did absolutely nothing.
At the same time, there's little real optimism when it comes to European leaders, especially after a recent report leaked suggesting that, according to some major powers, the EU should appoint a special envoy to engage with Vladimir Putin. This also appears to be a clear attempt to create parallel structures, since Kallas's positions and rhetoric don't sit well with several of the larger member states. So is the whole game continuing in this typically soft, overly polished European manner?
This isn't really about Kaja Kallas — it's more about the major European powers wanting to conduct foreign policy on their own. That's why, historically, the high representative role has been filled with softer figures who didn't dare to speak out.
But appointing a special envoy would be a clear misstep and would undermine the institution, regardless of whether the high representative is Kaja Kallas or someone else.
Above all, this proposal stems from a certain frustration, especially in France, that they're no longer leading foreign policy the way they did under Sarkozy. The major powers can't operate the way they did during the Mogherini or Catherine Ashton eras and that's a source of irritation for them.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski, Mirjam Mäekivi








