Let's start broadly, with a wider view of Europe. It's been almost a year since you were the European commissioner for energy. You've surely had time to reflect and draw some conclusions — what is currently going wrong in Europe?

I think if we zoom out even further and look at things in a global context, Europe is actually a region where many things are going right. Especially when it comes to attracting investment, Europe's advantage is that it is so boringly predictable.

For example, in the United States, decisions can change overnight and for reasons that are hard to grasp. In Europe, things work as agreed — whether it was this year, last year or even five years ago — and those agreements are honored. I think that's a real strength.

But what's going wrong is that Europe has never faced such a complex situation before — where a neighboring country and a future part of the European Union is at war. And that war has lasted longer than anyone feared. So this pressure from the war is definitely influencing all the decisions made by the European Commission, whether it's the next seven-year budget or even how to manage economically today and tomorrow.

You say Europe is predictable and agreements are upheld, but if we look at the past ten to twenty years, the United States, with all its dynamism, has grown significantly faster than Europe. China continues to grow rapidly — though one could question the reliability of their statistics. Still, would you say Europe is stagnant? Not moving forward?

It's always easier to grow quickly when your starting position is much weaker.

That wasn't the case for the U.S.

True, but if we compare how the average European is doing in life versus the average American, there's much more dissatisfaction among everyday working Americans than among Europeans, who, for example, have guaranteed healthcare and the safety net of pensions. So in terms of social security, Europe is definitely ahead.

Now, when we talk about investment — whether manufacturing will stay in Europe — that's indeed one of the biggest questions today. I remember two years ago, we were all nervous when then-President [Joe] Biden introduced a massive support package. Many European companies said they were going to relocate their production to the U.S. because the tax incentives there were so favorable that Europe no longer made sense as a destination for their investments.

But they've all come back, because overnight, everything that had been agreed under the Inflation Reduction Act was basically rolled back. So I think that's a clear sign that Europe is a strong consumer market. Europe has made it clear that it is backing many new technologies, and that's our key advantage.

Looking at what Donald Trump is currently doing — even though a customs agreement was supposedly signed with Europe — there is still ongoing pressure. The latest news is that he's demanding Europe ease the regulations imposed on U.S. companies. In the current light, it seems the United States is aggressively trying to attract production to its own soil while creating advantages for its own companies over European ones.

I follow U.S. news daily and read the papers — there are definitely mixed signals coming out of there. For example, when South Korean automakers that began relocating production to the U.S. ran into trouble when their Korean trainers were arrested without cause and deported. It's complicated.

The situation there is difficult, but what Europe has done — I think today's European Commission has struck the right tone in how to negotiate with the Trump administration. For example, offering access to our gas market, which is certainly appealing to a U.S. president eager to ramp up oil and natural gas production. In exchange, Europe secured favorable tariff rates for its other exports.

It's true that President Trump has a hard time understanding that value-added tax is not an additional tariff, but something everyone pays in Europe. Still, I think that step by step, with a bit of charm offensive, we've managed to reach agreements with him. And those deals Europe has with the U.S. are much better than those available to our major trade rivals — whether in the developing world or China.

What about the United Kingdom?

Things aren't easy for the British either. The UK isn't really our competitor, and in that sense, the European market doesn't lose anything if the UK manages to negotiate tariffs with Trump.

From Brussels, I hear people saying, "We've reached an agreement with Trump and now everything's clear." But watching Trump, it seems like there's never really an agreement. Even if he signs something, it doesn't stop him from making new demands the next day.

That's true. And if you look at the big statements coming out of the Commission about how to strengthen Europe's economic growth, the main point is this: Europe, with its 405 million citizens — who are globally among the most affluent — is the most attractive market in the world. So the priority is to protect the market from unfair competition — like when goods are produced under much looser rules outside Europe than what our own businesses must follow.

But that's already happened. Goods made under far looser regulations, often heavily subsidized by the state, have long been on the European market. I'm thinking, for instance, of China. This isn't some future risk — it's already reality.

Yes, and the European Commission has a dedicated commissioner for exactly this issue. During the last mandate, for example, various restrictions were imposed on Chinese electric vehicles because it became clear the Chinese government was providing unfair state aid — aimed at wiping out any chance of a competitive EV industry developing in Europe. This kind of oversight is ongoing, to ensure that state subsidies don't distort our market.

In addition, we expect that a cross-border mechanism will be introduced soon — one that tells our trading partners: "You can let your factories pollute if that's your choice, but you'll pay a tariff for it." If you want to trade with Europe on equal terms, then you need to adopt the same principle: the polluter pays.

I have serious doubts that this will actually happen, especially considering Trump's recent moves. He's calling these kinds of measures unfair trade barriers. And the way I see it, he's saying that if Europe wants to trade with the U.S., it needs to remove them. Whether he follows through is unclear.

I remember when Trump first became president and announced that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement — he had plenty of followers then. But when he gave similar speeches in New York last month, other world leaders didn't follow him. On the contrary — after his speech, others took the podium to say that one, two or three of the world's major industrial powers would continue shifting their economies to greener foundations.

He no longer has as many nodding along. There's now a growing recognition that adopting new technologies is no longer just about environmental responsibility — the market itself is driving this shift and it makes sense from an economic perspective.

It's true that the biggest "elephant in the room" for Europe is energy costs. Here in Europe, what we or our companies pay for electricity is significantly higher than in China or the United States. And during your time in office, you weren't able to bring those prices down.

Yes, that's true, because my term coincided with the biggest energy crisis of this generation. Perhaps the last time Western Europe saw something of that scale was in the 1970s, when oil producers decided to squeeze the Western world and stopped sending out oil cargoes. A similar thing happened in 2021 when Russia began quietly destabilizing our gas markets.

At the time, a large portion of electricity was generated in gas-fired power plants. Fortunately, we made it through that crisis and today prices have dropped significantly. That required replacing many gas plants with renewable energy capacity. But the fact remains: 90 percent of the natural gas used in Europe today is still imported. True, it's no longer mostly from Russia. Now, we're buying more liquefied natural gas from the United States and pipeline gas from countries like Azerbaijan, Algeria and Norway.

As long as you're importing from others, your input costs — like energy — are inevitably higher than in a country like the U.S., which produces all the oil and gas it needs domestically and even has a surplus to export to other parts of the world.

But if we look at China, which has also historically been heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels, they're replacing some of that with renewables. They've got hydropower and they're rapidly building out solar and wind. But they're also continuing to build domestic coal plants. Their focus isn't so much on a green transition but rather on energy security, independence and electrifying their economy. Competing with that kind of China is extremely difficult for Europe.

That's absolutely true. In Asia, coal plants are in their teenage years — the average age is about 14 — whereas here in Europe, they're well over 40. So it was a relatively easy step to start retiring these aging coal plants from the 1970s and 1980s here in Europe. In China and elsewhere in Asia, those investments haven't even paid themselves off yet.

That said, China's push to electrify its economy is something Europe also plans to do. If you reduce your trade balance deficit by spending less on oil and petroleum products and instead invest in renewable electricity production, then in the medium term, that's obviously a very smart strategy.

Renewable energy is great, but with today's technologies, it can only make up a limited share of the energy mix — especially weather-dependent renewables. They require storage solutions, but we still don't have a long-term storage method that's both efficient and economically viable.

Intermittent renewables work well with hydropower — it's a great combo, as we see in Scandinavia — but that model is hard to replicate across the rest of Europe. Meanwhile, look at Germany: they shut down their nuclear plants. Didn't you, as commissioner, feel like saying to the Germans, "Come on, be reasonable"?

Actually, the Belgians made the same decision as the Germans — this all happened after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. You can't underestimate the influence of public sentiment. When an accident like that occurs at a nuclear plant, politicians respond to public expectations. The Belgians changed their policy as well — their plan was to replace nuclear power with gas plants that hadn't yet been built. By 2021–2022, it was clear that gas usage needed to be significantly reduced, not ramped up several times over.

I've spoken with the Germans and reopening their closed nuclear plants is completely off the table. The expertise fades quickly and the investments required for restarting would no longer make sense. Overall, if you look across the EU, most of the 100 nuclear reactors are nearing the end of their expected lifespan and very few new ones are coming online.

One of the most recent additions is Olkiluoto, right in our neighborhood, but as we know, that project took far longer than initially planned and ended up costing much more. So, nuclear energy rollouts in Europe have been heavily delayed.

The Swedes are planning new nuclear plants and more ideas are being floated elsewhere. But surely you don't believe Europe can achieve fully carbon-free electricity production without nuclear energy?

That decision — whether to use nuclear or not — is up to each member state. But clearly, hundreds of billions in investments will be needed just to replace the existing plants that would otherwise disappear from the market.

When the European Union declared that the Green Deal is a growth strategy, I understood where it was supposed to lead. But looking at where we've ended up — buying nearly all the technology and equipment, like solar panels or generators, from China, instead of building an industry here in Europe that could develop and manufacture those tools — it feels like the economic side of the Green Deal has failed.

It's simply not true that we buy everything from China. Europe actually has a strong industrial base. For example, when it comes to grid components, two of the world's three largest companies are European.

Europe is also a leader in wind energy, especially offshore wind. The largest manufacturers are still European. And this is key — installing offshore turbines requires port access, so China can't just overtake those markets with its expansion policy.

Now, in the case of solar panels, yes, you're absolutely right. Most of them are made in China. But there's one major advantage compared to, say, turbines: once your solar panel is installed on your roof, no one can turn off the sun. In contrast, if you buy a gas turbine, you may not have access to the fuel anymore.

Still, the plan to develop a European capacity to produce and export these technologies globally has not materialized — take battery technology, for instance, or the capacity to produce electric vehicles. Europe is not leading in those areas.

That's true, but we're moving in that direction, trying to assert our position. When it comes to batteries, the key issue is that Europe currently doesn't produce the valuable raw materials needed. China has locked up access to many mining operations and, more importantly, holds a near-monopoly in the refining of rare earth elements.

That's one area where Europe is actively working on solutions. One of the keys is recycling — because eventually, those batteries will need to be processed and once they are, those materials will already be here on our soil.

I just get the sense that, for years, Europe has been guided by idealism and a vision of a brighter future — while our main geopolitical competitors, and I don't mean Russia but rather the U.S., China and to some extent India, are all operating with a much more pragmatic mindset. Trump's America made it clear they don't care — they'll do whatever they want. China, too. Aren't we, in Europe, being forced to rethink our approach to ourselves and the world? Are we inevitably being forced to become either irrelevant or more pragmatic?

I think Europe is actually quite pragmatic. It just appears overly idealistic because, in the absence of a global leader on climate policy, Europe has had to step up and fill that void. But beneath that, there is a strong layer of pragmatism.

For example, right now EU member states and the European Parliament are negotiating our goals for 2040. The strategy clearly includes not only what's already available — like solar and wind — but also heavy investment in technologies that could help us in the future but aren't yet commercially viable, like carbon capture. That means if we use fossil fuels that emit CO₂, we capture that CO₂ and reduce emissions that way.

The other major pillar is nuclear. There's a large group of EU member states who say it's unfair to set targets based only on renewables. They argue that nuclear — since it also doesn't emit carbon into the atmosphere — deserves a stronger place in the picture. So for 2040, Europe has stated that carbon capture and small modular reactors are technologies we will actively support, with funding and political backing.

On the other hand, if we look at recent elections across Europe and shifting public opinion, we're seeing the rise of political movements that want to significantly change current policies.

That may be, but the way Europe is structured means that changing an agreed-upon policy requires a majority across all 27 member state governments. The fact that a populist comes to power in one or two countries doesn't mean that Europe as a whole is mired in populism.

You can never rule anything out entirely. But let's move on to topics closer to home — Estonia. Do you already know who you'll vote for in the upcoming local council elections?

Yes, I do. And I'm honestly glad I don't vote in Tallinn. A lot of my friends say they won't even bother voting and that's hard to hear. But I've made my choice in Haapsalu.

Is it a party or an electoral alliance?

It's an electoral alliance. In a way, I'm reaffirming the decision I made when I chose Haapsalu as my base in Estonia — that's because things have been run reasonably well there. And I want the city to continue in that direction.

So does that mean Tallinn — governed for years by the Center Party and now, for the past year, by a four-party coalition — has not been run well?

I'd like to believe that we're not being ruled by fools in Tallinn — let's put it plainly. But what has happened here hasn't exactly been inspiring. The elections are just around the corner and people aren't feeling motivated to go vote, to put their trust in one side or another. That's a reflection of both the recent past and a longer history.

People have seen enough of the Center Party and many have decided they don't want to go back to that. But what the Reform Party did this summer only benefited the opposition.

Reform didn't just tarnish itself — it dragged down everyone who joined them in the city government. As someone who has spent a long time in politics and closely follows it, I refuse to believe that it was done out of foolishness. I think what happened this summer — Reform blowing up the city coalition — was driven by their desire to gain extra votes in the Riigikogu. It wasn't about Tallinn; it was all about parliamentary math.

But did the Reform Party actually gain any additional votes in the Riigikogu from this?

I think they acted hastily and erratically. And that's not a good look for a governing party — it doesn't inspire confidence that they know what they're doing. Over the decades, Reform's success formula has been to swap out coalition partners after two years, like changing old socks, and bring in a new one. That way, anything that went wrong can be blamed on the previous partner and they can start fresh.

But this year, something unexpected happened: they kicked out the Social Democrats, but Isamaa didn't step in to take their place. That wasn't part of the plan. Last time Isamaa was invited, they joined the government for nine months. Their refusal to come to Reform's aid now caused serious disruption, because the usual playbook didn't work.

So now they have to go hunting for votes in the Riigikogu to get this year's budget passed. And I think there's a general consensus that Eesti 200 is about to fall apart, which means [Prime Minister Kristen] Michal needs additional parliamentary support if he wants to keep going.

You don't think the Reform Party itself might start falling apart?

That doesn't really matter all that much, because the mandate they received in the last election still obliges them to soldier on. It's a bad situation — no one else seems very eager to help them and we're looking at a year and a half of wasted time.

In your view, is Kristen Michal up to the job — either as party leader or as prime minister?

I don't think he's a foolish man. But all his recent moves have come across as cynical and ineffective. And once again, we're left thinking about the poor voters — those who know there's an election, but also know that the real problems affecting their daily lives won't be addressed by this vote.

So will Kristen Michal still be party leader or prime minister by the end of this year or next?

I don't know. But I'm absolutely sure they'll go into the next election with a different chairperson.

You've also once tried to remove a party leader. And in the end, not you personally, but Jüri Ratas did succeed in replacing Edgar Savisaar as chair of the Center Party and eventually became prime minister. How hard is it to actually change a party leader from within?

If there's a clear understanding that it's necessary for the party's survival, then it's possible — even if your opponent is Edgar Savisaar.

But how does it actually happen? Is it all schemed out behind closed doors or do people just visit each other's kitchens and say, "Something needs to be done"? What do you think is happening inside the Reform Party right now?

I think right now everyone's just trying to keep a straight face and make it through these elections. After that, serious discussions will begin. Take Reform in Tartu — they feel they're being punished not for what they've done locally, but for how badly the party's reputation has deteriorated. In several other cities, Reform hasn't even managed to put together a full candidate list.

That's not exactly unheard of in Estonian politics — many parties don't field candidates in every district. So it's not shocking. But who could succeed Kristen Michal as prime minister and Reform Party leader?

Honestly, it doesn't really matter. They have plenty of well-established, experienced people. Reform's overall brand can be rebuilt quickly in time for the next parliamentary election. They've got the best financial resources and a strong advertising agency. What they need now is a fresh face.

Maybe they need to suffer a crushing defeat in the local elections for that rebirth to happen. Then voters will feel like they've "punished" them — and two years later, they'll be back waving the yellow flag and giving their support to a renewed, phoenix-like Reform Party.

Don't you think the Reform Party has lost its value proposition for Estonian voters? Sound fiscal policy used to be a cornerstone. Now they've taken the national budget as far into deficit as possible and plan to keep going. That's not an easy thing to reverse. Isn't this something that could haunt them long-term?

Yes, absolutely. They're acting as if there's no tomorrow. No one knows how badly this might affect their core voters — the ones who might just throw up their hands and say, "Not a single voice of dissent was heard in that party when they plunged into deficit — not just for defense spending, but also to hand out tax breaks to the highest earners." And that's in a year when the deficit is already considerable, even without those tax cuts.

And in the future, no matter who's in government, we'll inevitably have to start raising taxes again, because the EU's deficit rule will return.

Exactly. What they did with this year's budget is extremely sneaky. They knew that, based on current projections, there's little chance they'll be around to take responsibility for that deficit two years from now. It's someone else's problem. Pushing their own ineptitude down the road is like kicking an empty Coke can down the street. Someone will eventually have to pick it up — meaning someone will have to solve the imbalance between taxes and government spending.

You've run and observed many campaigns in your life. Could things like that — handouts or tax breaks — actually help win support and get better election results?

You mean promising to balance the budget?

No, more like saying: "Next year, you'll get €1,800 more."

No, I don't believe that works at all. I have a long memory and that strategy was once tried by the Coalition Party. They were in the same position as Michal is now — they won too many seats in the election, 40 seats in the Riigikogu. Then their support just kept falling and poor Mart Siimann couldn't do anything to stop it.

When the election came around, they tried handing out massive gifts to different voter groups and it didn't help at all. So in the end, in the big picture, voters are not stupid.

After the elections, Mart Laar came in and immediately introduced a negative supplementary budget, slashing things with a big red pencil. But you were with the Center Party at the time. I assume you weren't exactly enthusiastic about that kind of move?

No, I wasn't — mainly because the Center Party actually won that election. In 1999, we delivered a strong result for the first time. That was also the first time I ran for the Riigikogu — I think I was around number 163 on the party list.

And back then, the Center Party didn't shy away from talking about taxes, unlike what we saw two years ago, when there was total silence on any potential tax changes — only for a bunch of tax reforms to be introduced right after the elections. In 1999, the Center Party was very clear: Estonia needed a progressive income tax.

Do you still believe that?

Yes, I do. Having worked in Brussels for five years and paid the higher tier of a progressive income tax, my opinion hasn't changed at all.

Is that something that could motivate you to return to politics in the future?

I don't think taxes alone would push me back in, but more broadly, I think it's a real problem when the people who shouldn't be in politics are the ones doing it — and those who could contribute hold back just because politics is stressful and often exhausting. At some point, people have a responsibility to get involved and offer their solutions.

I've been sitting in the gallery for a while now and what really gets under my skin is when I see blatant stupidity. I think, "Surely someone could step in and say, 'Don't do that.'"

What kind of stupidity have you seen?

There's been plenty. For example, the way important alliances were recklessly damaged — like this summer, when the Reform Party decided to make a fuss over free kindergarten spots just months before the election. It felt thoughtless and like something cooked up by political strategists out of thin air.

I really believe it's crucial for parties to have people who can stop bad ideas before they go too far. I've been in that kind of position in the Center Party — many pointless or harmful decisions didn't happen because there were people who said no.

Speaking of stopping bad ideas, in the campaigns you worked on or helped lead as a prominent Center Party member, there were also... let's say, colorful moments. Just think of the "K-kohuke" ad campaign. How much shady money or under-the-table deals were involved back then?

I think if someone tried to run a campaign today like we did in 2002 — when Res Publica came onto the scene — they'd be in serious trouble. The rules have become so much stricter over the years. Now we all walk around saying how boring the campaigns are, that nothing exciting happens. But that's the result of everything being transparent, down to the last cent. Parties don't have the ability anymore to quietly ask friendly businesspeople to finance some parallel campaign effort.

Do you think that's a loss?

No — life is just a bit more boring, but it's a lot safer.

But how did ideas like that come about back then? Did you all sit in some party backroom and brainstorm new schemes? Was it a matter of not having money and trying to be creative?

Before every election, those in power have always tried to limit the opposition's chances of getting a good result. For example, in this cycle, some people were stripped of their voting rights in local elections and that has clearly backfired.

Back when the K-kohuke campaign happened, outdoor political advertising had been banned. You weren't allowed to put your name or candidate number on posters or share any political messaging in public spaces. Today, as we walk around, we can see that rule has disappeared — but at the time, one key method of voter outreach was suddenly gone.

The kohuke ad was like a tongue-in-cheek royal joke. It didn't explicitly say elections were coming, but because it ran during election season and on the same billboards where campaign ads normally appeared, people picked up on it subconsciously. They understood what the joke was really about.

Well, it wasn't exactly subconscious, was it? It was a big green "K" (for Keskerakond –ed.)

On the very same billboard space where Center Party campaign ads would normally have been.

Exactly. Back then, was it common for businesses to cover the cost of party ads?

I think so. At that time, corporate donations were still allowed — those only got restricted later, this century.

Should corporate donations be allowed?

No, I think the kind of lean campaign environment we have today is actually a good thing — more sustainable. We're moving toward a model where it's more rewarding to be active year-round, not just take a three-year break and then gear up in the fourth year. Being consistently present — giving interviews, appearing on TV — might help a politician more than spending €1,000 on a single billboard.

Of course, being a popular politician helps — sometimes that gets you elected. But since we're talking about the Center Party again: after Tanel Kiik lost the leadership contest to Mihhail Kõlvart, you finally decided to leave the party. Why don't you support Kõlvart's leadership?

Let's be honest — Tanel Kiik gave up less than a year before I left and I was very critical of that. In my view, just because a party elects a new chair doesn't mean that's set in stone forever. There will be another congress and if the leader isn't up to the task, they'll be replaced. That's how it works in any normal party. A good example is the Social Democrats — they change chairs every four years and the outgoing ones don't get offended or storm out.

For me, the turning point was when I realized I could no longer prevent bad decisions. My role in the party had become meaningless. What really pushed me to leave was when the party council — without even putting it on the agenda — passed a decision, without quorum, to leave the ALDE group in Europe. And they did it without explaining to members what being part of a European political family even means. No one cared that we joined ALDE in the first place because we had strong cooperation with the Finnish and Swedish center parties.

They wanted to jump straight into a Euroskeptic group in the European Parliament, apparently on Jaak Madison's recommendation. That's a group led by people like Czech politician Andrej Babiš, who just won an election. And I just couldn't see myself being part of that kind of anti-European company.

And yet, after Kõlvart became chair, many predicted that the Center Party would fade into irrelevance. But that hasn't happened — on the contrary, the party seems poised for a strong win in Tallinn's upcoming local elections, even though Russian citizens can no longer vote. So perhaps they managed to recover without your help in "preventing stupidity"?

Elections always swing like a pendulum. Two years ago, during the Riigikogu elections, Reform used the fear of war to gain disproportionately strong support among Estonians. Now the pendulum has swung back and that's what we're seeing.

And the Center Party hasn't become too Euroskeptic — even after Jaak Madison joined

Give them time.

So you do think that shift is coming?

I do. I think the overall mood in the party is very similar to where Madison came from — maybe the membership is more Russian-speaking, but the mindset on European issues is heavily influenced by that same Euroskeptic atmosphere.

So you wouldn't say Mihhail Kõlvart has actually done a pretty competent job as party leader, considering the constraints and resources he has?

The fact that he's managed to field full candidate lists and that he enjoys strong personal support in Lasnamäe is definitely a plus. He's also been lucky — and in politics, you need luck.

They (Center's opponents –ed.) once again tried to mess with election laws. Every time that happens, it backfires. I remember when people tried to end Center's majority in Tallinn by redrawing electoral districts — it only gave them more wind in their sails and they scored their strongest result ever. That kind of move only mobilizes voters who feel they're being targeted unfairly. And they just did the same thing again in the Riigikogu.

Some people really need to take a long, hard look in the mirror.

What would the Center Party have looked like under Tanel Kiik? Would things be roughly where they are now or would it have been a completely different path?

I honestly have no idea. I haven't seen Tanel Kiik up close in a leadership role. But it's quite likely that under his leadership, the Center Party wouldn't have lost power in Tallinn in the first place. Let's not forget: the entire painful episode the party has endured stems from the fact that Kõlvart simply let everyone walk away without trying to stop them — people like Tanel Kiik and others who were also critical voices in the Tallinn city council.

So yes, Kõlvart has taken some hits too. As the winner, he could've extended a golden handshake to the losers and kept those council members in the party.

Looking at how Center Party members have left for other parties, a colleague made a sharp observation: every party seems to know what Tallinn voters want — to vote for a Center Party candidate. For example, former Center chair Jüri Ratas is now in the European Parliament with Isamaa. If you were to return to politics, which party would you choose?

That's a good question. If I had a clear answer, I probably wouldn't have been able to resist jumping back into Estonian politics now that I'm living here again. But I don't have that answer yet. I know there are good, respectable people in every party. Ultimately, it's the people who make the team — people you either want to join or don't.

There aren't that many options. On one hand, you could rejoin your good friend Jüri Ratas in Isamaa. On the other, many former Center Party members have found their way to the Social Democrats. Which would it be?

I'm not making that decision right now. I've chosen a third option: to observe from the sidelines, test my patience and stay out of the first fight I see. Just because there's conflict doesn't mean I need to jump in and take sides.

Do you plan to run in the next parliamentary elections?

Right now, I'm working about 40 hours a week — but that job doesn't tie me to Estonia. If, in a year and a half, I've put down stronger roots here and have work in Estonia, then I won't rule out getting involved in Estonian politics again. But for now, that decision hasn't been made.

That all makes sense. But I'd like to ask about something else. You were the minister of economic affairs and communications who helped bring the airport project to Pärnu. Do you still think that was a good decision?

The airport already existed in Pärnu — it was something the locals were very eager about. As proof of that enthusiasm, the mayor of Pärnu signed an agreement stating that the city would cover operating costs until incoming flights could offset them. There was a runway capable of receiving charter flights. And I think we can all agree — if we had known that the grand reopening would coincide with the COVID pandemic, we would've approached things differently.

But back in 2017, locals believed the railway would be built anyway, the four-lane Via Baltica [highway] would be completed and all that was missing were planeloads of tourists during the off-season, when nobody else wanted to be in Pärnu.

What else could I do when every parish elder, the mayor and the county governor were writing to me saying this is what Pärnu needed — not some temporary fix on a privatized rail line? I think it was the right call to listen to the local leaders.

But today, we're exactly where many people predicted we'd end up — no one is flying there and the airport has become a financial burden on taxpayers.

If you look at other small countries with multiple airports, that's sometimes how it goes. Technically, Pärnu Airport is part of Tallinn Airport. But let's say Ryanair considers Tallinn too expensive — it could choose a smaller airport like Pärnu instead.

So I wouldn't write Pärnu Airport off just yet. And more importantly, planes still fly from there to the small islands, just as they did before. So shutting the airport down completely was never a realistic option.

One could also argue that Ryanair could be offered lower landing fees if Tallinn Airport didn't have to cover Pärnu Airport's costs.

True — but according to the agreement, those costs are covered by the city of Pärnu.

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