ICDS director: Russia's situation is poor, but it can continue to wage war next year

Pressure on Russia must be increased to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiation table with Ukraine, International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS) Director Kristi Raik said.
Finland's President Alexander Stubb recently said that Putin has probably made the greatest or most severe geopolitical strategic mistake of recent history. Can this be agreed with, and can you explain it?
First off, it is notable that the Finnish president criticizes Russia so directly. This demonstrates that times have changed, including in Finland, and I think it also reflects Finland's political stance; that Finland strongly supports Ukraine remaining an independent state and believes in that. This is an important political message and naturally one can say that Russia has not achieved the major goals it set with its attack on Ukraine. Rather, it has moved further away from them, as if the aim was to subjugate Ukraine under Russian control, it does not at all seem likely today that Russia will achieve that.
On the other hand, of course, one cannot state that Russia is clearly losing this war either. Sadly, that is not on the horizon. Ukraine certainly cannot liberate the territories occupied by Russia for the foreseeable future. For Russia to lose clearly, the situation would still need to alter significantly. This is still a loss for Russia, when bearing in mind its original objectives.
Does this also mean that we will not see any negotiations in the near future where Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sit at the same table, perhaps also with U.S. President Donald Trump?
I think that for Russia to genuinely develop a desire to negotiate with Ukraine, much more pressure will still need to be applied on Russia. I would hope that Trump also grasps this and evaluates the situation accordingly. This, of course, is the message that European leaders have constantly tried to convey to him. At the same time, it has probably been very important for Trump to treat Putin with respect, and he tends to hold the worldview that great powers ultimately come to an agreement among themselves, and that Russia is much stronger than Ukraine, so consequently, Ukraine must give something up.
However, if Trump truly wants to move towards peace, then now is the moment when it should start to dawn on him that additional pressure must be applied to Russia in order for that to happen.
Is there any sort of glimmer of hope that from this Alaska process things will turn into a peace negotiation process, or has that in fact already fizzled out by now? There is no clear signal of when leaders could meet, where, and under what conditions.
Right now, it does not seem likely that Zelenskyy and Putin could meet anytime soon, as had been planned after the Alaska meeting, and I think actually the most important concession Trump made there in Alaska was that he gave up the demand for an unconditional ceasefire.
That was not a realistic demand on Russia, and, again, pressure should also have been applied to Russia, but it would nevertheless have been that step that would have actually moved the process forward. Now Russia has conceded in that respect, and the political process is dragging on, and Russia is finding it easier to drag it out further still, hoping to improve its position at the front before things reach the negotiation stage.
At the same time, we know that because of Ukraine's attacks, Russia is now undergoing a fuel crisis, or at least a fuel shortage. Certainly not a nationwide crisis yet, but a shortage, while their breakthrough at Pokrovsk has been repelled, plus, in actual fact, no major advances are in sight either, so that they could trade off at any negotiations.
In other words, Russia's situation is not particularly good, and it seems Russia still believes it is more beneficial for them to prolong the war than to engage in serious negotiations. Up to now, this estimate has remained unchanged, despite Russia's economy not doing well. Ukraine is carrying out attacks against the oil industry, which have been notably successful. Economically, Russia is still holding out, and the assessments are still that it can continue fighting next year as well, unless decisive additional pressure comes via new sanctions.
Is there any kind of signs we should be looking for that tell us, for example, that Donald Trump's patience with Moscow's actions has somehow begun to break? That he rather takes a firmer position, and all those sanctions he has spoken of and then abandoned — he will at some point start to enforce?
Very hard to say. There have been such points in time before when it seemed he had listened to European and Ukrainian leaders and indicated he was ready to impose additional sanctions. Then again he has given more time to Russia, and he has also said that Zelenskyy could end the war in a single day if he wanted, in this way putting pressure on Ukraine as well. Without a doubt, the pressure has remained greater on Ukraine, and similarly, also during the last week. Among other things, Vice President J.D. Vance has again indicated in his interviews that somehow both sides, Russia and Ukraine, have made concessions, and that both sides must make concessions. That is the official U.S. position, but in reality, the Americans themselves cannot say what concessions Russia has actually made.
Russia has said it agrees that Ukraine may get security guarantees, but even there, when going into details, Russia's understanding of security guarantees is a thing that would certainly be unacceptable for Ukraine. I would say that this is again, in a sense, a concession by the U.S. to Russia, inasmuch as the U.S. accepts this: That Russia has a right in this matter to determine what kind of security guarantees Ukraine will get. With this, the debate is going ahead with Europe talking very concretely about what the Europeans are offering as security guarantees, but as for Russia's role in this debate, the U.S. is handing Russia that role. Russia's positions are in no way credible as security guarantees, which would actually be acceptable to Ukraine.
What credible security guarantees can Europe even provide? We know that over time such guarantees have been given to Ukraine, but none of them has ever held out.
I would say that the most important thing is still that Ukraine receives long-term support and that Ukraine's own military capability is strong. It receives aid from Western states, and in addition, some way must be found for European countries' troops to also be present in Ukraine, but it seems that this cannot really be the core of deterrence. The core remains Ukraine's own capability. The fact that Western countries are also in Ukraine means that they are automatically also participants if Russia should attack again. Then they would be part of Ukraine's reaction as well, and they are within the conflict. That would provide an additional deterrence.
Some European leaders have pledged the presence of their soldiers in Ukraine in the future, and Estonia has also made statements on this matter. But will the voters in those European countries actually live through the fear of war, with their own soldiers' boots somewhere on the ground in Ukraine, and genuinely near or at the front line?
That question is also still unresolved, whether they will be deployed near the front line or rather in supporting functions further away from the front. These political debates in Europe are difficult. For example, in Germany. It is still not clear what the ultimate political desire in Europe is.
I think this is a very important test, and this message is, of course, necessary for Ukraine: That it will get this security guarantee. It is necessary for the U.S. that Europeans take European security seriously. It is also necessary for Russia that Russia sees what its options are going forward. I think Russia has not abandoned a hope of somehow stripping Ukraine of its sovereignty and subjugating it. How Russia evaluates the situation also depends on what kind of security guarantees get offered and what opportunities Russia sees in still achieving something through war.
Is there any imminent date we should be watching which might give us an understanding of what the U.S. thinking is, and what kind of security guarantees Europe is offering? What can we expect?
One date that has been talked about is the shortlisting of Nobel Peace Prize candidates. It can be assumed that Donald Trump personally is still interested in pushing things further in the name of peace. This is said half-jokingly, but despite that, there are many indications that this is genuinely important for him.
In that sense, I expect that he will also continue to act toward this, so one should certainly not lose hope. Perhaps he will still utilize additional measures.
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Editor: Andrew Whyte, Johanna Alvin
Source: "Ukraina stuudio," interviewer Reimo Sildvee.










