Normally, such high-level meetings are planned months in advance. What lies behind the rush to arrange it? What objectives are the U.S. and Russia pursuing? And what consequences could its potential outcomes bring?

Trump's turn from disappointment to ultimatums

Until recently, there was no indication that a summit would take place so soon.

Throughout the summer, Moscow showed no interest in a ceasefire and, confident in its strategic advantage, openly declared its intention to continue the military offensive in Ukraine. Against this backdrop, subtle shifts emerged in Donald Trump's attitude toward Putin. After their sixth consecutive phone call in early July, Trump—speaking for the first time since his inauguration in a tone of frustration — said he was dissatisfied with Putin because their conversations were leading nowhere.

Shortly afterwards, Russia launched its most devastating strike since the start of the full-scale invasion, deploying more than 700 drones and missiles on a single night — leaving no doubt that the Kremlin had no intention of engaging in meaningful peace talks. According to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the very next day, Trump called him to announce his decision to provide Ukraine with "everything it needs" for self-defense — a pledge he made public on July 14 during their White House meeting. Trump also issued an ultimatum: If a "peace deal" was not reached within 50 days, the U.S. would impose secondary sanctions on any country purchasing Russian oil and natural gas.

Another clear sign of Moscow's disinterest in a ceasefire came on July 23, when Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met in Istanbul for just 40 minutes. While they agreed on another prisoner and body exchange, no progress was made toward a broader settlement.

During a visit to the U.K., Trump again voiced disappointment with Putin and said he might shorten his ultimatum to "about 10 or 12 days." Some observers interpreted this as a shift in U.S. policy — from pressuring Kyiv to pressuring Moscow. Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul even called it a "big change" in Trump's strategy toward Putin. But this impression proved misleading: Rhetoric shifted, actions did not.

Playing the Kremlin's games with Medvedev

Putin ignored Trump's revised deadline, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov drily remarked (link in Russian) that the U.S. President's statement had been "noted." Trump's words, however, caught the attention of Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council and former Russian President. Medvedev reacted with a provocative social media post, warning that any ultimatum to Russia was a step toward war.

Since the start of the invasion, Medvedev has filled his social media with aggressive attacks on the West and Ukraine, frequently amplifying Kremlin propaganda. Between 2022 and 2024, he threatened nuclear strikes against the West at least 30 times. His online outbursts are part of Russia's cognitive warfare — designed to instill fear of nuclear war in Western elites and paralyze decision-making in Ukraine's favor.

Washington appears to understand Medvedev's actual role in Putin's power vertical. A month earlier, Trump had rightly noted that Medvedev irresponsibly used the "N-word" because he was not "the boss" in Russia. Nonetheless, Trump engaged him in a public back-and-forth—earning a routine "zombie apocalypse" threat (link in Russian) in return. Using these provocations as a pretext, Trump ordered two nuclear submarines deployed to "the appropriate regions."

Back to the Putin-Witkoff plan

While continuing to lament his disappointment with Putin, Trump said on August 1 that he would soon send Stephen Witkoff back to Moscow for talks — later clarifying that the visit was at the Kremlin's request. Paradoxically, that same day, during a visit to Valaam Island, Putin quipped (link in Russian) — indirectly addressing Trump — that "all disappointments come from excessive expectations." A few days earlier, Peskov had stated (link in Russian) that there was no "substantive preparation" for a Trump–Putin summit, suggesting instead that their next meeting would likely occur in early September in Beijing. In other words, there was no sign the Kremlin was eager for rushed negotiations — raising the possibility that the Witkoff visit had been initiated by Washington, with Moscow merely playing along.

After some confusion over dates, Witkoff met with Putin on August 6. Leaks indicate (link in Polish) that their discussion centred on the "Trump peace plan for Ukraine" outlined during a four-hour meeting back in April.

The core proposal (link in Polish): in exchange for a ceasefire, Ukraine would have to recognize — de facto or de jure — the loss of five regions, and sanctions on Russia would be lifted. As in the spring, U.S. officials — especially Trump — resumed pressing for a "territory swap" between Russia and Ukraine, signaling disagreement with Volodymyr Zelenskyy's stance. While Europe's political establishment scrambled to respond to Washington's "diplomatic blitzkrieg," Trump moved quickly to formalize the Putin–Witkoff plan.

In short, Trump continues to pursue his own agenda, separate from Europe's. Actually, he has never abandoned the idea of a quick deal at Ukraine's expense, followed by a return to business as usual with Russia. That may be his purpose for Friday's Alaska meeting. The public sparring with Medvedev and the submarine redeployments appear intended to bolster Trump's image as the leader who had to strike a deal with Putin to avert "nuclear apocalypse." Trump has already argued that the war in Ukraine could escalate into World War III.

Deciding the matter without Ukraine and Europe at the table would be the ideal scenario not only for Trump but for Putin, too. From his perspective, a US-backed deal to divide Ukraine and impose formal limits on its sovereignty would be an unprecedented post-Soviet geopolitical triumph. Unlike the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia or the annexation of Crimea — accepted de facto but never recognized de jure by the West — formal approval from Washington for the seizure of southern and eastern Ukraine would effectively legitimize Russia's claims to its "zones of special responsibility."

Given Russia's worsening economic troubles, its top priority in Alaska will also be lifting Western sanctions. Exploiting Trump's eagerness for a quick deal, Moscow may seek to compel Ukraine to recognize occupied territories as Russian — an enormous step toward dismantling the whole western sanctions regime imposed on Russia. In addition, televised images of Moscow and Washington deciding the fate of European states — reminiscent of the Cold War — would give the Kremlin propaganda ammunition to portray Russia as a true great power and further consolidate Putin's regime.

So far, the outlook is bleak for the security system on the European continent. Whatever the outcome of the Alaska summit, it is unlikely to end Russia's war against Ukraine. On the contrary, it would confirm the Kremlin's perception of "the collective west" as weak and encourage further expansion of Russia's sphere of influence through military aggression. But this only reinforces the urgent need for Europe to strengthen itself faster and to rely more on its own capabilities, so as to successfully meet the security challenges of the near future.

This article was first published by the ICDS.

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