Kristi Raik: Major powers playing with the fate of Europe

If U.S.-Russia talks end with a "take it or leave it" offer to Ukraine, the terms will almost certainly not favor Kyiv. Nothing suggests Donald Trump sees a fundamental problem in letting Russia keep part of Ukraine's territory and blocking its NATO membership, writes Kristi Raik.
Ahead of the planned August 15 meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, Europe faces a situation in which two major powers will be negotiating not only over Ukraine, but likely also over the broader future of European security. Of these two, only Russia has a clear vision of the new European security order it wants to achieve.
The lead-up to the meeting gives the impression that it is Trump who is most eager to sit down together, seeking the prestige of being credited with ending the war in Ukraine. When it comes to the terms for peace, he has shown considerable willingness to accommodate Russia. Trump's stance allows Putin to expect a favorable outcome.
Russia's major power status to be recognized
When serving as U.S. president, Barack Obama stated that Ukraine was more important to Russia than to the United States. Unfortunately, this is one of the few aspects of America's stance that has not changed. Trump's conduct to date shows that he wants to remove the war in Ukraine as an obstacle to developing good relations with Russia. He has passed up every opportunity to exert serious pressure on Putin.
What sets Trump apart from his predecessors is his broader view of the world order and U.S. interests. A world in which great powers agree on the fate of smaller ones and divide spheres of influence among themselves works for him. This naturally aligns with Putin's interests, as Putin seeks recognition of Russia's status as a great power and its right to a sphere of influence in Europe. Putin also benefits from the fact that Trump's behavior strains relations between the United States and Europe.
Trump's first term was by no means bad for Ukraine or for NATO's eastern flank countries. But that was largely thanks to the "adults in the room" who surrounded him at the time — and who are not part of his team this time around.
Trump's previous meeting with Putin during his first term, in Helsinki in 2018, was a shock to many U.S. and European security experts. Fiona Hill, who attended the meeting as Trump's adviser, later recalled how, during the press conference, she considered ways to interrupt what was becoming an embarrassing encounter for the United States — even pretending to have a sudden medical emergency.
At that meeting, Trump showed more trust and respect toward Putin than toward his own country's security services. Putin can no doubt exploit Trump's vulnerability to flattery and gestures of respect, as well as his admiration for strongman leaders — a category in which he wishes to place both Putin and himself.
Nothing suggests that Trump sees any fundamental problem with allowing Russia to retain part of Ukraine's territory and blocking Ukraine from joining NATO. The core principles of European security — that borders must not be changed by force and that every nation has the sovereign right to choose its own alliances — hold no value for him.
Ukraine's NATO membership is not, at least publicly, part of the expected U.S.-Russia agreement, but this is of little importance to Putin, since Trump has already made it clear that he does not support Ukraine joining NATO.
What is significant, however, is Trump's stated willingness to lift sanctions against Russia in exchange for a cease-fire. That would run completely counter to the goal of achieving lasting peace and would only strengthen Putin's belief that Russia can continue advancing toward its strategic objectives.
Europe still not at the table
One major benefit of a second Trump term for Europe is that Europeans have at last begun making significant moves to strengthen their military capabilities. But this work will take years, and Europe's security — including Ukraine's — will continue to depend on the United States. Europe does not have enough leverage to secure itself a seat at the table in negotiations over Ukraine and, more broadly, European security. Ukraine's own participation in such talks is also uncertain. Trump appears to have dropped his earlier insistence that Putin meet not only with him, but also with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Europe's primary role in the coming peace process is to support Ukraine. It has long been clear that the United States intends to leave the responsibility for guaranteeing Ukraine's security to Europeans. European leaders have worked hard to at least ensure that Trump keeps Europe informed and listens to what Europe has to say.
Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz, Alexander Stubb, Mark Rutte and others have no doubt tried in their dealings with Trump to persuade him to take the interests of European allies into account. Trump has shown a positive attitude toward them, but Europe's influence over his Ukraine policy has been limited. Still, it is at least something that Trump has agreed to provide weapons to Ukraine, funded by European money. There is also some hope that Trump sees NATO as beneficial to the United States — especially now that Europeans have pledged to raise their defense spending to 5 percent (or, more realistically, 3.5 percent).
If the result of U.S.-Russia negotiations is to present Ukraine with a "take it or leave it" offer, the terms will certainly not favor Ukraine. A potential deal in which Russia would agree to a cease-fire in exchange for full control of all four Ukrainian oblasts it currently occupies in part would be nothing lasting, let alone a just peace. Ukraine's current defensive lines, including physical fortifications built over a long period, are partly located in the territories Russia demands. Ukraine, of course, has already made clear it is not prepared to cede territory.
Europe has a vital interest in ensuring that Ukraine remains a sovereign state and helps defend Europe against the Russian threat. Trump must be continually persuaded that forcing a bad deal will not bring peace to Ukraine, but will instead heighten the risk of a wider war in the future — possibly within just a few years.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski










