Next year, several important elections are expected around the world, and one of the most closely watched will certainly be the election of a new president of France in April. So far, the most popular candidate is Marine Le Pen, the de facto leader of the far-right National Rally. She is the de facto leader because, formally, the party is headed by Jordan Bardella due to Le Pen's legal troubles. Bardella was politically shaped entirely under Le Pen's guidance, although their views do not necessarily coincide completely.

I will try to introduce the foreign policy positions of the National Rally, as the party has not been particularly active in presenting them publicly. Circumstances are now changing, and Le Pen herself has already expressed some views in the media. As the election approaches, more will certainly follow.

It should be said at the outset that the party's views have evolved over time. Marine Le Pen worked hard to free the party from the antisemitic image it acquired under her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and to make it acceptable within the political mainstream. To a large extent, she succeeded.

On the party's website, there are 16 thematic overviews presenting Le Pen's pre-election positions, but foreign policy is not among them. For example, the overview of security policy focuses on crime and terrorism, rather than defense policy. The party's previous election manifestos have mainly addressed its attitude toward the European Union, which it no longer intends to leave, preferring instead to reform it from within.

Researchers at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) undertook an unusual attempt to identify the foreign policy of Le Pen's movement. They decided to analyze transcripts of parliamentary committee meetings on foreign policy, European affairs, and defense policy in order to determine the party line based on the statements of its representatives. They examined transcripts from June 2024 to the summer of 2026, a total of 300 documents. The AI program Pinpoint was used in processing the texts, but only to locate relevant passages; the final assessments were still made by humans.

In addition, a couple of interviews were used, revealing that deputies generally enjoyed considerable freedom in expressing their views, except on certain sensitive issues. It also emerged that foreign policy within the party is generally reserved for its leaders, namely the formal party leader Jordan Bardella and the parliamentary group leader and de facto party leader Marine Le Pen.

I will begin with attitudes toward Russia and the war in Ukraine, as this is probably the most interesting subject for us. Here, there appears to be a certain difference between the party's younger and older members. Younger Le Pen supporters, led by Jordan Bardella, regard Russia as a threat both to Europe and to France.

The traditional and older wing largely shares the Kremlin's interpretation of the war and believes it was caused by NATO's eastward expansion. It should be remembered that the National Rally, especially in its earlier incarnations, was generally known for being pro-Russian. The party saw common ground with Moscow regarding so-called traditional values, and some party figures remain close to Russia to this day, such as MEP Thierry Mariani.

Marine Le Pen visited Russia several times, where she was received by the State Duma, and in 2017 she also met Vladimir Putin. In 2014, only a few months after the annexation of Crimea, the party received a €9 million loan from a Russian bank based in the Czech Republic. The loan was repaid quickly in 2022 after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.

According to parliamentary committee transcripts, several representatives of Le Pen's party condemned the full-scale aggression and praised Ukraine's resistance. Parliamentary support for Ukraine was especially evident during the 2025 visit of the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, who was praised and supported in speeches.

The National Rally's support for Ukraine can be characterized by the words "yes, but...". In other words, it comes with various reservations. Russia's large-scale attack in 2022 is condemned as a violation of international law and national sovereignty, but the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin was criticized by several party MPs.

A similar pattern applies to attitudes toward sanctions against Russia. On the one hand, the party does not formally oppose them; on the other, it argues that sanctions are a double-edged sword for Europe because they may harm European, and therefore French, economic interests.

Formally, the party is not opposed to arms deliveries to Ukraine either, but again only conditionally. Such assistance must not deplete France's already insufficient military stockpiles. Military aid to Ukraine must not be financed, directly or indirectly, at the expense of French taxpayers. In other words, Paris should neither fund it directly nor participate in European military assistance if it is financed through common EU funds. Finally, military support for Ukraine must not draw France into escalation with Russia.

The party is resolute regarding Ukraine's accession to the European Union: under no circumstances, and with no integration of Ukraine into Europe. As for ending the war, National Rally deputies appear to believe that some form of peace conference should be organized, although they do not specify what its outcome should be.

Le Pen herself has later justified opposition to further aid for Ukraine by pointing to France's economic difficulties, which are indeed considerable. Incidentally, according to the Kiel Institute, French assistance has not been among the largest so far, totaling €26.2 billion. Germany, for example, has provided more than €50 billion, while the European Union as a whole has provided nearly €230 billion.

The party opposes a common European defense because France, in its view, should develop military capabilities solely for its own protection. Although strongly supportive of national sovereignty, it does not support the concept of European sovereignty proposed by President Emmanuel Macron in 2017. The party is not explicitly opposed to extending nuclear deterrence. It does not intend to leave NATO, although withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command structure remains possible, as France once did under Charles de Gaulle. President Nicolas Sarkozy returned the country to the structure in 2009.

In conclusion, if Marine Le Pen becomes president, French foreign policy will likely undergo changes, though the extent of those changes remains uncertain, just as her chances of electoral victory remain uncertain.

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