The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) published an analysis of Russia's embedded influence in Finland, authored by Sinikukka Saari. I borrow some ideas from there and expand the topic a bit.

The concept of "embedded influence" needs a short explanation. Namely, Russia has for years shaped the strategic environment by embedding its manipulative influence also into seemingly lawful forms of cooperation. This definition of embedded influence activity is also closer to Russia's understanding of subversion.

Talk of Russian hybrid influence is mainly characteristic of the West. What the West calls hybrid activity is rather what Russia calls active measures, that is, subversion abroad. These measures have been known already since Soviet times, when they referred to political influence methods, including spreading disinformation, organizing demonstrations by front organizations, and even murders.

Russia also used embedded influence in Finland, because until the year 2022 Finland's foreign policy sought to maintain pragmatic, cooperation‑oriented and economically beneficial relations first with the Soviet state and then with Russia.

Moscow sought to achieve longer‑term goals by influencing Finland's political decision‑making. Mainly the idea was emphasized that Finland and Russia have unique, mutually beneficial relations based on trust and good‑neighborly cooperation. In addition, a skeptical attitude toward European Union and NATO countries was encouraged, especially toward the Baltic states, who were portrayed as irrationally Russia‑hostile, highlighting against their background Finland's pragmatic and responsible behavior as a neighboring state.

From time to time, attempts were made to carry out carefully calibrated operations so that Finns would not retreat from their previous policy. For example, airspace violations or directing migrants to the Finnish border. It cannot be claimed that these aspirations had no success. In Finland there were decision‑makers who feared that ignoring Russia's investment opportunities for security considerations would give competitors elsewhere in Europe a chance to profit themselves.

I add that certainly there were in Finland — and possibly still are — so‑called dormant influence agents who step forward at the necessary moment. In this context it would be interesting to know how many of them there might be in Estonia. As time passes they age, and in fact it would probably be high time for Moscow to "wake them up," so to speak.

In Finland's case, things were set straight by the start of Russia's full‑scale aggression in Ukraine in 2022; cooperation broke off sharply and Russia was left without its main levers for influencing Finland. Therefore Russia had to move on to ordinary measures — cyberattacks, GPS signal jamming, organizing migration waves, disinformation campaigns and such.

Finland's great advantage is a strong crisis‑preparedness culture and a comprehensive security approach, that is, the readiness of society as a whole to withstand threats. Although despite this, according to the analysis, authorities were slow to understand the risks that accompanied Russia's strategic investments or the acquisition of real estate with Russian money near critical infrastructure and military bases. We know about this thanks to journalism, academic researchers and civic activists. I admit that when writing background stories (link in Estonian) about Russian real estate located in Finland, I used very thorough overviews published in the Finnish media.

The cohesion of society and the broad consensus of political forces in foreign and security policy is a phenomenon worthy of attention. One can only wish that Estonian political forces would also publicly remain in consensus on these issues.

In Finland's case, the example given in the analysis is also interesting: Russian hybrid measures and political pressure often produced the opposite of the desired result. As a broader example, Finland shows how Russia's provocations in foreign countries may begin to undermine the embedded influence. At least it is worth hoping so.

I add some thoughts. First of all, I agree with those who say it is long time to stop talk of Russian hybrid measures or hybrid war. In foreign‑language media, reference has repeatedly been made to the interview of Estonia's foreign intelligence chief Kaupo Rosin (link in Estonian) in the British newspaper The Telegraph, in which he called Russia's actions in Western countries state‑supported terrorism.

A word has its power, and changing terminology would cast new light on this whole set of diversions and sabotage acts. Or then use the definition "warfare with disguised methods." Otherwise there is such whining about the grey zone and hybrid and who knows what. The time should be suitable for this, because several countries have already specifically pointed to Russia as the force behind what has happened on their territory.

From this would follow another possible step that could also be applied here. Namely, charges should be brought against perpetrators of such activities not for hooliganism or vandalism, but specifically for terrorism; surely lawyers will find a proper justification for this.

Because prevention is important and Russia widely uses one‑time actors, including often young people, the change in the basis for such charges should also be widely communicated. In journalism it should be announced that from now on such acts fall under the terrorism paragraph together with correspondingly harsher punishments. It should also be talked about in schools, at meetings with young people, on social media and so on. That is, make those who might feel tempted aware that even a small thing can end very badly.

Decisiveness is also needed in dealing with Russia's shadow fleet, around which there has already long been much pontificating. In a recent publication of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), for example, the establishment of special zones at sea is recommended, referring to environmental restrictions, through which only ships with limited emission levels could pass. Old tankers presumably do not belong among them. In addition, the detention of captains and suspicious crew members, to make the profession risky for them. Or also the confiscation of ships or their cargo.

I would add another possibility: to stop shadow‑fleet vessels headed to Russian ports before the Danish Straits, for example due to environmental hazards, insufficient documentation or sanctions. Whether as a NATO operation or as one by a coalition of the willing. And so on…

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