Former Commander of the Defence Forces Martin Herem claimed in an interview published by Delfi over the weekend that Estonia still has not deployed ground‑based cameras or acoustic sensors for detecting drones. Is this true, and if so, why? When could such systems begin operating, and what does that depend on?

The Defence Forces do not comment on individual technical elements of unmanned aerial vehicle countermeasures or air‑surveillance capabilities — including their placement, use, or readiness levels. Revealing such information would give the adversary an unnecessarily precise picture of what solutions Estonia uses, in what combinations, and in which situations.

What can be said is that detecting and countering unmanned aerial vehicles does not rely on a single sensor or a single weapon system. It is a comprehensive, layered capability that includes detection, decision‑making, influencing or neutralizing the threat, and notifying the public if necessary. A camera or an acoustic sensor alone is not a silver bullet or a standalone solution to the entire UAV threat; it is only one possible component of a broader system. Developing such a capability requires different sensors and countermeasures to work together, feed usable information into the command chain, and integrate with the activities of the Defence Forces, allies, and other state agencies. What matters is not only having a device, but also its integration, training, maintenance, communications, data processing, and legally correct use.

Capability development is ongoing and depends on the threat picture, procurement, testing, training, compatibility with allied systems, and practical operational experience.

General Herem also pointed out that Estonia has not yet adopted — because it is restricted from public release — a manual defining how hostile drones should be shot down. Why is that, and could it change?

Guidelines related to countering unmanned aerial vehicles and engaging aerial targets do exist within the Defence Forces, but their level of detail and operational logic cannot be fully public. The reason is simple: publishing exact procedures, tools, or limitations would allow the adversary to adapt its actions accordingly.

It is important to understand the principle: countering an unmanned aerial vehicle is not only a technical matter, but also a legal, tactical, and safety‑related one. Each case requires assessing the nature of the object, its trajectory, potential danger to people and infrastructure, risks associated with shooting it down, the airspace situation, and coordination with other state agencies and allies. In peacetime, decisions are largely tied to civilian safety and avoiding unnecessary harm.

Documents intended for internal use are applied in exercises and training by the units and personnel who need them to perform their duties. At the same time, some general training information is public. For example, the Defence Forces' publicly available shooting‑range training regulations refer to drones as unmanned aerial targets and describe exercises involving firing at aerial targets.

However, this does not mean that the public regulation describes the full decision‑making and operational logic of UAV countermeasures. Operational guidelines will remain internal‑use documents due to security considerations.

Former EDF chief Herem also stressed the importance of short‑range air defense in countering enemy attack drones. What is the current state of this capability in the Estonian Defence Forces?

Short‑range air defense is important in countering unmanned aerial vehicles, but it is only one part of a broader air‑defense and counter‑UAV capability. There is no single universal solution against attack drones. A layered system is needed, using different detection, command, and countermeasures at different altitudes, speeds, and against different types of targets.

The Defence Forces continuously develop short‑range air defense and UAV countermeasures, taking into account lessons from the Russia–Ukraine war, Estonia's threat picture, and cooperation with allies. The capability can be employed when necessary, but the Defence Forces do not publicly comment on exact readiness levels, deployment areas, response times, the number of systems, or tactics.

The Defence Forces train these activities with allies and other state agencies, adjusting procedures according to evolving threat scenarios. The public can be assured that the threat posed by unmanned aerial vehicles is taken seriously, and that developing short‑range air defense and UAV countermeasures is one of the Defence Forces' key practical priorities.

An ERR report on June 12 highlighted that Estonian drone‑development companies face major regulatory obstacles when testing their products. Have changes been made or are changes coming that would make it easier for such companies to operate in Estonia? If so, what changes, and when might they take effect?

There are indeed several regulatory and practical constraints that make product testing difficult for defense‑industry companies. We are working to resolve these bottlenecks, and several important changes are already being prepared.

The Riigikogu has passed the first reading of amendments to the Weapons Act and the Explosives Act, which will update regulations on handling, storing, using, and supervising weapons and ammunition, and create a clearer, more modern legal framework for defense‑industry activity. Although these changes alone will not solve the testing‑capability issue, they are an important step toward a more modern and functional regulatory environment on which further testing‑system development can be built.

A major challenge is the limited testing capacity of existing infrastructure. Current training areas are under heavy load, and their primary purpose is to support the training of the Defence Forces, the Defence League, and allied troops.

 At the same time, the volume of companies' testing needs has grown sharply in recent years. Therefore, we are developing a testing ecosystem that would coordinate testing requests, map companies' needs, and help use existing infrastructure much more efficiently. The goal is to better plan the use of training areas, identify available time slots, and, where possible, divide larger training areas into smaller testing zones so that smaller‑scale tests can be conducted more frequently. We are also exploring options for expanding testing areas.

It must also be considered that testing larger weapons, weapon systems, and other high‑risk technologies is socially sensitive. Safety requirements must be thoroughly thought through, and Estonia's small size imposes limits. For some types of testing, neighboring countries — such as Latvia — may offer more space or more flexible conditions.

Our goal, however, is to develop a well‑functioning testing system in Estonia, where different testing options are clearly mapped and where Estonian defense‑industry companies can test their products as extensively as possible here at home.

Security expert and former Ministry of Defense deputy secretary general Meelis Oidsalu wrote in Postimees on June 19 that the government‑approved Estonian Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2026–2030 is merely a "political sweetener," not a substantive, detailed plan for drone and drone‑defense development, and he expressed hope that such a plan will be completed soon. Is work underway on this, and when could a more detailed plan be expected?

The Estonian Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2026–2030 is a nationwide framework accompanied by a separate action plan through 2030, with concrete activities, deadlines, responsible parties, and involved stakeholders. The roadmap's purpose is to unify previously separate efforts by various agencies, companies, and research institutions and provide a common direction for developing the field. The action plan has been approved by all relevant parties, and each activity has a responsible lead and participating stakeholders. The responsible party defines the details of each activity and leads its implementation.

The roadmap addresses unmanned systems more broadly than just drone defense: it includes security, legal frameworks, testing opportunities, industrial capability, education, public services, and cooperation with companies. Specific drone‑defense capability development, technical solutions, and operational plans fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, the Defence Forces, and other relevant agencies.

Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said on June 10 that Estonia hopes within 2–3 months to conclude a broader agreement with Ukraine enabling military cooperation not only in the drone field but also more widely (including battlefield management information systems). Has there been progress?

Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the drone agreement on Tuesday in Ankara at the NATO summit. In addition to cooperation on drones, the agreement includes cooperation in developing knowledge, technologies, and industry.

Commenting on the newly signed agreement, Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said: "It is clearly in Estonia's interest to obtain knowledge and technologies from Ukraine to strengthen our own defense capability and defense industry. The agreement means that Estonian‑Ukrainian joint ventures can begin production in Estonia, and Ukraine will approve the necessary export licenses for selected products. We are already assembling a steering group to select and process potential joint‑production projects under the 'Build with Ukraine' framework."

What was the reason Estonia did not sign the so‑called drone agreement during President Zelenskyy's visit to Estonia?

On the sidelines of the NB8 summit, Estonia and Ukraine signed a bilateral declaration of intent to negotiate and conclude a drone agreement in the future. Since negotiations on such an agreement began only shortly before the summit, and Estonia considers it important that our own interests (including those of the Defence Forces and defense industry) are represented in such an agreement, the process of agreeing on the details required more time.

This article has been edited slightly for clarity from the original Estonian version.

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