You recently returned from a multi-day state visit to Finland. You told Õhtuleht that you went to Finland to find out the formula behind their people's happiness is. What did you learn?

I didn't learn all that much, to be honest. I'll probably have to go back and ask again what it really is. It's not an easy question to answer — how a person becomes happy. Some Finns themselves don't even believe they are the happiest nation. Still, there's always something to learn from neighbors and adopt, though not copy outright.

Maybe it's their calmness... They tend to take things more easily and don't get upset as quickly. And they don't seem to chase the absolute maximum — they find joy in smaller things. If they don't get 100 percent, they're still satisfied with 60 percent. We, on the other hand, are constantly striving for the maximum, pushing ourselves, and then happiness never quite arrives. The reality is different.

Could you also see that Finnish happiness in their eyes when you met with politicians or business leaders in Finland?

Every nation behaves differently. When I look into the eyes of our own politicians, there's a spark there too. As long as you're able to be in politics and hold power, that sparkle is very much visible.

Not everyone has that sparkle, I suppose?

Well, yes. Some are more downcast than others. Just like in nature, there's diversity — it's the same among politicians.

In Finland, you gave speeches and did interviews even before the visit. How satisfied are you with the results of the visit? Did your messages get across? Did people understand what you wanted to say?

A visit — especially a state visit — is always broader than just giving speeches and formal greetings here and there. I've always tried to bring along business leaders and people from the cultural sector as well. One of the key benefits is that these groups connect during the visit and often discover opportunities for cooperation while being abroad together and discussing ideas.

It has become my practice to assess the results of a visit no earlier than six months afterward. At that point, I bring together the business and cultural representatives who took part and ask what worked and what didn't. Ultimately, the evaluation should be based on how well those participants have done, not on how one president's or another's speeches seemed at the time. It's a broader picture and shouldn't be viewed too narrowly.

How do you think the visit was received in Estonia? Have you had a chance to read the papers or see what Estonian politicians have written or said on social media?

I haven't had the chance yet. I only got back early this morning (the interview was conducted on April 30 – ed.) — we traveled by ship, which is also a pleasant tradition when visiting across the gulf. Lately, I haven't gotten much beyond the headlines and headlines often don't reflect the actual content, so you have to take that into account.

Then this gives us a great opportunity to unpack some of those reactions — what Estonian politicians, ordinary people and newspaper editorials have been saying. If we take some of the key quotes that have taken on a life of their own, what did you mean by saying that Europe should prepare to engage with Russia after the war in Ukraine ends? As I understand it, many Estonian politicians don't quite understand what that sentence means.

It's a fairly simple sentence — there aren't even any commas in it. It should be understandable. At some point, the war will end, and all wars eventually do. I've repeated many times that even the Hundred Years' War came to an end eventually. That means we will then have to assess what kind of situation the world is in.

And that situation must also be assessed in relation to Russia. I've also said that we can begin engaging with Russia only once Russia changes. Under the current circumstances, that would likely be very difficult. And when I talk about engagement, people often assume — although I haven't said a word about Putin — that I'm referring to him. No, I'm talking about Russia as a country. I'm not talking about negotiations in the current context, but about a time after the war is over.

It's not very difficult to understand. But I realize that if people don't take the time to read a sentence through to the end and have already stigmatized it beforehand, they'll find whatever they want to find in it. Then they piece it together and it starts to spread, getting repeated — and, unfortunately, some of our own politicians are amplifying it beyond our borders. This is a moment where some restraint is needed. Criticism — even directed at the president — is fine, but if it starts to affect our country, then it's worth pausing to consider whether that's reasonable.

Do you feel that you've been stigmatized in foreign policy — that no matter what you say, it's misinterpreted and meanings are attributed to your words that you didn't actually intend?

We come back to the same point again. I could also choose to see the world that way — that everyone is trying to stigmatize me — but that wouldn't really be true. When I became president, there wasn't much in my CV for people to latch onto and so it was said that this president knows nothing about foreign policy. That narrative has been kept alive for quite a while. Engaging in a fight over it would just be a waste of time — better to focus on doing the work. In the end, actions speak for themselves.

But the alternative to engaging with a neighbor is always not engaging at all. It's the same in an ordinary apartment building or in your home area of Puhja — if a neighbor is unpleasant, you can ignore them, not communicate, not discuss, not meet. So the alternative to what you said is that we don't have to deal with Russia in any way even after the war — we don't have to engage with them at all.

Fortunately, I've had good neighbors everywhere and, really, you can't choose your neighbors. Of course, when buying a house or apartment, you might ask who the neighbors are and make your decision accordingly. But in politics or geopolitics, that's not really possible — your neighbors are simply who they are.

The only thing within our power is to influence them somehow and find a way to engage. Even with neighbors at home, at some point you may need to do something practical together — like building a fence. In the end, that fence has to be built, no matter how unpleasant the neighbor might be or whatever the situation.

In a sense, business is also a practical matter. Even today, many European companies haven't left Russia, not to mention others just waiting for the war to end so they can resume their activities.

One option is to take a more ethical stance than others — not to do any business with Russia, now or in the future and to build as high a fence as possible, so to speak, to avoid any contact with them.

Can you think of any example in history where that has actually worked? The Chinese spent a thousand years building their wall, but it didn't end up being all that effective.

So the key question is how we approach this and what kind of country we are dealing with. I've also brought up the example of World War II — after the war, the situation with Nazi Germany was similar. But Nazi Germany changed and that made it possible to engage with it. Today, 60 to 70 years later, our relations are very different from what they were immediately after the war.

Nazi Germany lost the war and there was a regime change. Its leadership was put on trial. Do you see something similar happening in Russia or how do you envision Russia's future — what kind of Russia would Estonia be ready to engage with?

We assume that at the very least, that aggressive impulse they have — something that resurfaces from time to time — would need to be suppressed and quieted down. But ultimately, Russia's fate will be determined by Russia itself. Whether it chooses isolation or not is up to them.

At the same time, I think it's difficult even for them to remain in complete isolation. We can look at countries like North Korea — they're not entirely isolated, even though they've chosen that path. So the world is, in a sense, almost round and we have to take that into account: if we don't engage, others will.

You have a lot of critics right now — many are speaking out actively on social media and there are passionate debates in traditional media as well. But those who understand your position say that, for example, Finland's president Stubb, Germany's chancellor and France's president have expressed similar views — Macron has even said he would speak with Putin. Estonia, on the other hand, has tried to convince leaders like Macron and earlier Merkel or Scholz not to hold such talks with Putin. Has Estonia made a mistake in trying to persuade others not to negotiate?

You always have to look at the timing of those statements. Right now, there's really nothing to discuss with Putin. We see that this is a war of attrition and he has no intention of coming to the table to address it. But when the war ends... This is not like it went with Nazi Germany, where you'd have the Ukrainian army parading in Red Square. It's a different situation — the priority is to drive the aggressor out of its territory.

Today, we talk a lot about the war and continuing the fight, but we're less willing to talk about the fact that, at some point, a solution will have to be found. It's easy to discuss things at the table, but at the same time, children, women and soldiers are dying in Ukraine — and this is happening every hour. I've also said that today's peace runs through the front line — there's no way around it — and we support Ukraine.

But we need to support it more through actions and less through words. There were moments in the past, even before the war, when opportunities existed. Jens Stoltenberg has said the same: those opportunities weren't used, largely because many didn't believe something like this could happen, so there was caution.

So the goal is to push Russia into a position where it is forced to negotiate and find a solution to this war — to pack up and return to where it came from.

One point you also made during your visit to Finland, in an interview with Yle, was that Europe made a mistake at the start of the war in Ukraine. You said: "When Russian forces were pushed back from Kyiv toward Russia's borders, Europe had an opportunity to bring the aggressor to the negotiating table. Now no one will come anymore." Could you expand on that?

It's essentially the same point I just made. If you look at the map and think about what was happening at that moment, then if we had supported Ukraine more — perhaps by providing weapons capable of striking deeper into Russian infrastructure — the situation might have been different. But we didn't do that.

Of course, there were many objective reasons why we didn't. I've even written about this in Politico, saying we should remove that wall of restrictions. That was directed primarily at Biden and the United States at the time, but Europe could also have done more — putting pressure on Biden to grant that permission. When we take individual steps, each of them may be correct, but taken separately they don't have the same impact as when pressure is applied collectively — political statements and military aid together, at maximum intensity.

This extends to Europe no longer buying Russian oil and gas, which, in reality, we still continue to do. If those restrictions had been lifted, I think the situation inside Russia might look different today.

Now we also clearly see that when missiles and drones start reaching areas near St. Petersburg and there's visible smoke, it undoubtedly affects how people there perceive what is actually happening. Because if the war doesn't reach major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg and people can sit comfortably in cafés, then I believe nothing will change.

Do you think that a lasting peace — one that would have been acceptable to the Ukrainian people — was achievable in the spring of 2022?

It's hard to say. I've expressed the view that we should have tried more, but we can never really know whether it would have succeeded. At least then we couldn't be blamed for not trying.

That's also why I take a somewhat more understanding view of those visits to Moscow — by leaders like Emmanuel Macron and Sauli Niinistö, among others. An attempt was made, even if it didn't succeed. If we hadn't tried, that same aggressor could have said: where were you, why didn't you come — maybe we could have had peace. But now we can say: it wasn't possible, because the problem lies with you.

Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee, has said outright that in Estonia's public debate it's important to clearly recognize that peace was not missed — there was no credible opportunity for it in the first place.

Well, then whoever makes that claim should also explain why that opportunity didn't exist — and do so not emotionally, but based on facts. Perhaps the time isn't yet ripe to say definitively; maybe more time is needed to assess the situation in hindsight.

But as president, what I can do is say that we may have missed an opportunity — so that people at least think about it. If a similar situation arises again, will we use those opportunities or not?

Marko Mihkelson has also said that Volodymyr Zelenskyy is echoing Kremlin talking points. We've reached a completely absurd situation where we're already accusing Zelenskyy of promoting so-called Russian narratives.

Are you referring to when Zelenskyy said that mobilized troops or additional conscripts could also potentially be used, for example, to attack the Baltic states?

Yes, he has expressed that before. When he said it the first time, I also paused and thought that perhaps someone should suggest to the president that he might want to tone it down a bit. But we often forget that his country is at war and at times even a president's statements are shaped largely by that pain.

Now it's been thrown into the fan again — everything is out in the open — and then people end up apologizing to each other afterward.

Right now, it seems that your opponents are preparing for Ukraine's victory and for Russia's leadership to be brought before a war crimes tribunal in The Hague. But you are also trying to talk about another scenario. How should an ordinary Estonian understand all of this?

What do you mean by the other scenario?

That there is some kind of alternative scenario. Because when I listen to people like Mihkelson or Eerik-Niiles Kross... he talked about how a special tribunal is being created to hold those responsible for the war of aggression against Ukraine accountable, discussions are underway about using Russia's frozen assets for reparations to Ukraine and institutions like the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have set out principles of international law that must be met for Russia to conclude a just peace. And this is described as Estonia's official position — we're trying to persuade our allies to support it, including initiatives like banning Russian soldiers from crossing into the European Union. And then it's said that the president is somehow undermining this. Do you see it that way?

I don't see any undermining here and everything you listed is correct. I haven't questioned those points we're currently dealing with. The issue is what happens afterward.

Even if all these tribunals take place... although I find it hard to believe that Vladimir Putin will end up behind bars somewhere in a Nuremberg-style scenario — it simply doesn't work that way.

How do you see Putin's end?

It's hard for me to say how that will happen. I don't wish death on anyone — not even the greatest aggressor. But the fact that we are talking today about tribunals and these kinds of measures is certainly a form of pressure on Russia.

It sends a message to those involved — including lower-level individuals who may be war criminals — that they should not feel they will go unpunished. I think that's important. It may even prevent some actions from happening in the first place.

If we sum up the political side of all this debate, people say that we have agreed on a unified foreign policy, yet messages coming from Kadriorg seem to be speaking a somewhat different language. Do you feel that you are breaking that agreement of having a unified foreign policy?

We do have a unified foreign policy. But as for any "agreement," nothing has been agreed with me. That may also be, to some extent, a weakness of our foreign policy. At the same time, it's built on a broader framework and doesn't depend very much on any particular president. Kadriorg Palace has never been deeply involved in shaping foreign policy, unlike in Finland, for example, where the president has a different level of authority than in Estonia. In that sense, Estonia is somewhat of an exception.

But within those limits, it's still possible to speak and debate these issues. We tend to want to see the world as we would like it to be, rather than as it actually is. We need to face reality and allow for open discussion. It may even be that some adjustments in foreign policy are necessary.

It's called a values-based foreign policy.

You could talk at length about what our so-called values-based foreign policy actually looks like across the Western world and how it functions. There's quite a lot that could be done better.

But I certainly don't agree with the idea that Kadriorg and foreign policy... especially since foreign policy is largely shaped also by the European Union. We do have a common foreign policy within the EU, yet you can clearly see how many differences exist even within the Union itself.

So it shouldn't be surprising that we might also have differing opinions because, in the end, we all want the best outcome for Estonia — that the country remains secure.

Social Democratic Party leader [Lauri] Läänemets said in a post that Karis' statements differ significantly from Estonia's and Europe's previous foreign and security policy, adding that parliament and the Estonian people need answers and greater clarity from the president. Hopefully, they'll get more clarity in today's program. At the same time, Läänemets and the Social Democrats have generally been among those politicians who have supported you?

It's hard to say. As president, I don't work here in Kadriorg Palace for the sake of whether someone supports me or not. The one thing that should "support" me is Estonia's constitution — that's what I follow and rely on. Decisions have to be made on that basis, even if emotionally one might sometimes feel like acting differently.

But in the end, I have no alternative but to rely on the constitution. There are also politicians who openly admit, "I haven't actually heard what Karis said, but still..." — and then comes the same kind of statement you mentioned from Läänemets. They themselves acknowledge they haven't read it, yet their position is already formed. Sometimes it's like I haven't even finished a sentence before a two-page response appears. Some politicians are simply more prepared in advance for how to react.

I understand that you're thinking more in the long term — that Estonia would have more allies in the future. One possible drawback of the current foreign policy is that while it is values-based, it may not work in the long run?

Yes, I've said before that perhaps we don't have sufficient capacity. I just came from Greece where there is a major European Union institution headed by an Estonian and even they said they lack enough people and sufficient expertise. So I don't think Estonia is some kind of exception where everything is perfectly concentrated and fully available. This should be seen as a concern, not as criticism.

The issue isn't about me personally — I would rather see this problem addressed and resolved. That's also why I've managed to remain somewhat calmer than might have been expected and not react too quickly. I believe those have been the right decisions.

Before your state visit to Finland, you had a state visit to Lithuania where you said in a speech that the only way to push Russia back within its borders is by supporting Ukraine, consistently enforcing sanctions and keeping Russia in international isolation. These remarks didn't really resonate in the Estonian media. Do you remember that?

Yes, of course. The goal is that these messages — no matter where you deliver them — remain the same in substance, even if they vary somewhat depending on the country. There isn't a big difference between Finland and Lithuania; we understand each other very well. What we need is to learn from each other's strengths and weaknesses.

That's also something we may be lacking a bit — we don't always fully recognize it or sometimes we don't really listen to our own ambassadors in more distant countries. We can't communicate in exactly the same way everywhere; we have to be sensitive to each country's context.

But at the beginning of February, you told Delfi: "Anyone with even a basic knowledge of history knows that isolation policies generally don't work; sanctions, for example, may work temporarily, but not for very long." Do you remember that as well?

Yes. The issue with sanctions is that as long as we are unable to stop buying oil and gas from Russia, they do have an effect, but it's a very slow one. If we want faster results, we need to think about how to deal with those countries that are still purchasing Russian oil and gas.

I remember very well what I've said — I'm not changing my position.

So what should be done? Are sanctions against the aggressor and its isolation necessary?

At the moment, definitely. As I said, isolation in itself doesn't really work. We can see that even North Korea is isolated, yet in reality it doesn't fully work. We see that Russia is buying various types of equipment from North Korea to use in Ukraine.

There are nearly 200 countries in the world and we see how different they all are. Trying to isolate a country completely... it's simply not feasible.

Do you believe that one day Russia will acknowledge its guilt — say that the war in Ukraine was a mistake, that people were killed without reason and that chaos was caused? Could that happen?

I tend to believe the opposite. No matter how the war in Ukraine ends — and we hope it ends the way Ukraine wants — Russia will likely stick to its narrative: that it did everything to eliminate "fascism" and other threats there and that many of its own citizens died as a result.

That, in turn, may create an even stronger sense of martyrdom within Russia itself. The narrative of World War II will continue because Russia doesn't currently have much else to point to beyond its victory in that war.

Today, hardly anyone talks much about Soviet-Afghan War where things did not go well. So they hold on to World War II and that victory — it's what feeds the Russian public, whether we like it or not.

How can the current world order be prevented from breaking down or disappearing?

We need to do everything we can to ensure that the rules-based world — so important to us — also functions within states themselves, so that rules aren't bent or undermined. We have to keep talking not only with our friends but also with those who are not such close partners.

It's easy and pleasant to engage with countries like Finland, Lithuania or Germany. But there are more distant countries that follow their own survival strategies, such as Kazakhstan. We need to engage with them as well and try to bring them closer to our side as much as possible.

But what role does the U.S. administration play in all of this? In your speech in Lithuania, you said that too often people have started to believe that power and force are the solutions and that this mindset is spreading and must be stopped. So how do you stop Donald Trump?

It may sound like a cliché, but there's truth in it. The reality is that today, Donald Trump is president. When he was elected, I was asked whether he is our friend. My answer was that he is certainly not our enemy — and I stand by that position.

Every country has different leaders at different times and we can't put everything on hold just because a particular country has a leader who may not be the most suitable from our perspective. We have to find a way forward — we have to find a way to engage with Trump, just as we do with other leaders.

If we put things on pause and wait for new, "better" leaders, then that lost time will come at a cost.

Can we trust Donald Trump?

Trust is a complicated thing... The greatest disappointment often comes — I've experienced this myself — when people close to you suddenly take a different position. That sense of disappointment in friends can sometimes be greater than disappointment in your own mistakes.

We'll see. Many heads of state are engaging with Trump and I'll say it again: we are dealing primarily with the United States as a partner. Our partner is not any one particular leader, but the country itself.

People in the U.S. administration are increasingly saying that keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is more of a European interest. What kind of argument is that?

I think it's in the interest of the entire world that ships can move freely. Another issue connected to this — and one that also relates to the Baltic Sea — is the so-called shadow fleet: very old, deteriorating vessels. I discussed this with Alexander Stubb; it's a shared and broader problem.

On my way to Finland, I saw them waiting out on the gulf — aging, worn-down ships. Neither of our countries has a particularly strong solution for dealing with the environmental consequences if an oil spill were to occur. The Baltic Sea is very shallow, so any environmental disaster there would be severe.

Why do I keep emphasizing the environmental aspect? Because it might encourage different countries — and especially younger generations — to think about this issue more broadly. It's not just about sanctions or the movement of ships; it's an environmental issue that goes far beyond one or two countries.

But what is currently holding back deeper European defense cooperation — why are we unable to cooperate effectively even in the defense industry?

There are differences, of course — between Finland and Estonia, Lithuania and Estonia — in how we build up our defense. In Lithuania, for example, Germany has forces stationed there, while in our case it's structured differently, with the United Kingdom and forces that would arrive when needed. There are quite a few differences and the question is whether that's good or bad.

Alexander Stubb said that this kind of variation can actually be beneficial and I tend to agree with him. It's always good if we procure similar equipment and can do so quickly, but at the same time — as Stubb put it, "when you look around the corner" — it may be better not to rely entirely on the same systems. Having some diversity in structure and equipment can be an advantage.

This is probably more a matter for military professionals. On both visits, I had the defense minister with me. One of the main purposes of such visits is precisely to have these discussions. These issues also come up in society more broadly and that's when you begin to think politically about what the right path forward is.

I don't know how much you were able to discuss NATO's future, but Trump has threatened to punish Spain for not opening its airspace and airports when the U.S. struck Iran and there have been claims that the U.S. may withdraw troops from Germany. What should our position be? Should we be telling Washington not to move troops from Germany closer to Russia's borders or the opposite — that the more U.S. troops there are defending the Suwalki Gap or stationed in Estonia, the better?

We need to persuade and engage with the Trump administration. There are very different views within it. In the United States, the president holds significant power, but there are also differing opinions among military leaders and within the administration itself.

For us, what matters is that they remain present in Europe and I believe that, in that sense, nothing fundamental will change. They may reposition some forces, but U.S. troops are already present here — there's nothing new about that.

We couldn't fit 100,000 troops here anyway, could we?

No, 100,000 wouldn't fit — we're a small country. We simply can't accommodate large-scale deployments like that. We already run into challenges when it comes to building defensive infrastructure, because people live everywhere and it's not always possible to carry out everything we might want.

Let me ask in the words of Indrek Neivelt: "The ideology we've lived under for 30 years is bankrupt. An era has failed. What happens to us now?"

I wouldn't approach it that dramatically — there have been much worse moments in our history. We need to find ways to strengthen our economy and our defense.

Returning briefly to NATO, we also need to look at ourselves and ask whether we've done everything we can. After World War II, we came to rely heavily on the United States — we essentially outsourced our defense to them. Today, most of the funding still comes from there.

If it were at least a 50–50 split, the pressure from the United States would certainly be less because we would be more capable of managing on our own.

Let's talk a bit about you as well. On Friday, there was news that you discussed the presidential election with Riigikogu Speaker Lauri Hussar (Eesti 200), but it wasn't clear whether you would be willing to run for a second term. Is that an accurate account?

I'm not sure, because as I understood it, the purpose of that meeting was not to discuss whether I would run.

As I understand it, the speaker of the Riigikogu came, on behalf of the Council of Elders, to ask whether you want a second term. Didn't Hussar ask that?

He certainly did — he asked it at the very end. But we actually discussed many different issues, so I don't really see what's supposed to be secret about it.

The main issue I raised was the upcoming Riigikogu elections. The gap that currently exists between society and politicians has grown very wide and the result may be that people no longer want to run for office. And then the outcome will keep getting worse because you won't have the best candidates stepping forward anymore.

Isn't the same true for presidential elections — that people don't really want to run? When Hussar asked whether you would seek a second term, what did you answer?

I also read about my body language and what it supposedly means in the media. One time it's interpreted one way, another time differently — it'll be interesting for historians to look back on.

I told Hussar very clearly that when I first took office as president, I was given only a couple of weeks from saying "yes" to the election itself. I even took leave at the time to focus on it. Now, there are several months. Candidates can only be formally nominated in early July and I said that by then I will give a clear answer.

And I will do exactly that. So there's no need to analyze my body language — I will state plainly and unambiguously whether it's a yes or a no.

/.../

During your meeting with Hussar, you also discussed changes to the presidential election procedure in the Riigikogu and whether it would make sense to involve citizens more within the current system. How would that greater public involvement work?

I think that was actually a major part of the discussion — what the current limitations and possibilities are for the president. I put forward an idea — though it's not originally mine — that, for example, 10,000 to 20,000 people could collect signatures, identify a suitable candidate and then present that candidate to parliament.

From there, perhaps at least 21 members of the Riigikogu would support putting that candidate forward. In that way, we would see that public opinion is at least somewhat taken into account.

If we don't want direct presidential elections at this point and members of the Riigikogu as a whole are not inclined to amend the constitution, then we need to look for other ways to ensure that people don't feel excluded from the process.

What difference would 10,000, 100,000 or a million signatures make — under the current system, pursuant to the constitution, 21 Riigikogu members and 21 members of the Electoral College can nominate a presidential candidate. Those signatures wouldn't really carry any weight.

I think politicians pay very close attention to public opinion and what people are thinking. We can clearly see that the situation has become somewhat tense, partly because support for the government — and for one of the parties in particular — is not very strong.

It may even be the case that, figuratively speaking, a party that is on its way out wants to take down as much as it can on its way, including potentially the president of the Republic of Estonia. In a way, that's understandable — you don't want to leave the stage alone.

One politician said that all signs point to Karis planning to run again. Do you know what their logic was? They even saw a photo of a black cat on your Facebook account and said it shows the president is trying to appeal to as many people as possible. How has it gotten this absurd?

About that black cat... if you remember — though probably no one does — a few years ago I visited a library that had a resident cat, and I picked it up. Back then, no one said, "Well, that settles it — he's planning to run for president again, he picked up a cat already in 2023."

So let's not overinterpret all manner of signs. That cat just happened to wander into the courtyard and it even had a tag around its neck that said, "I'm just walking" — in English as well — to reassure people not to worry about it. It was simply roaming around and we even called the owner.

The owner said, yes, the cat has been spending more time lately in Kadriorg's Rose Garden — apparently wanting to keep up with daily politics.

Interesting — why isn't it satisfied with life on Vesivärava tänav where it's from?

Hard to say — I don't know where it's from. You've clearly done your homework and know exactly where the cat comes from.

I like cats. They walk by themselves, and in that sense, I sometimes respect them more than dogs, which tend to be very loyal. A cat has its own mind and its own views — it goes wherever it wants. I suppose I try to be a bit like a cat in that way.

Given the president's role in foreign policy, you also have responsibilities in national defense. The Internal Security Service's latest annual report devoted several pages to China. From an ordinary person's perspective, it seems simple: we have diplomatic relations, we have an ambassador in Beijing and China has an ambassador in Tallinn. In your view, what makes China potentially dangerous?

I wouldn't necessarily use the word "dangerous" in a strictly military sense. Rather, China is a country that has been acting quietly but consistently. It pursues its interests very deliberately.

China has gradually been acquiring ports around the world, including some located near NATO bases. Similarly, in education policy, it has invested strategically — sending its most talented young people to study at top universities abroad. Many of them have since returned to China and they've also brought in Western professionals to work there.

We can see that a country once known for copying has evolved into one that develops its own innovations and ideas. In fact, there is already quite a lot we can learn from them. And all of this has taken place right before our eyes over the past 20 years.

But how does this work in our country? Who decides whether a country is our ally or whether it is considered a threat?

It largely depends on the behavior of that country itself. And I don't think anyone necessarily has to declare it outright. I assume that people in our country are capable of thinking for themselves — assessing situations, looking at the data and seeking out different perspectives in order to make informed decisions.

Historically, large countries have always posed some kind of risk to smaller ones — not necessarily through military force alone, but through influence in various forms. And if we become dependent on a single country for certain supplies, then that in itself becomes a risk. That kind of dependency can be very dangerous for us.

The Internal Security Service's annual report has also drawn criticism from Martin Herem, the former commander of the Defense Forces. He said the report suggests that moving into senior positions related to national defense could pose a corruption risk. He implied that while he's not labeled an enemy of the state, he is portrayed as a suspicious figure. Should decisions about what generals or senior Defense Ministry officials can do after leaving office be set by parliament through law or by security services?

A single statement — even if it doesn't mention a name — doesn't mean very much on its own. These narratives are often built up from earlier articles and various pieces of information. So in that sense, we shouldn't overinterpret it.

I was in Finland with Martin Herem, and on the ferry back I spoke with him. I told him that, judging by the headlines, I might end up in the Internal Security Service's annual report myself next year.

What have you done?

Well, I don't know — but the risk is there. The bigger question is what retired generals are actually supposed to do. They retire relatively young and don't have many clear opportunities afterward.

If we look at countries like the United States, they tend to find roles for them quite quickly — whether in missions or in positions where they can use their expertise. Here, the options are more limited: you can go into the private sector, retire fully and, say, take up beekeeping or start a business.

But when they move into roles within our own country's companies — companies that contribute to building up our national defense — it can sometimes be portrayed as if they've gone to work for the enemy. That's the impression it creates, even though these are Estonian companies.

So the first issue to address is how to make the best possible use of our retired generals. We see a similar situation in parliament — they may not always have enough to do, so they start looking for things to occupy themselves with, writing reports and so on. These are much broader questions than just the single case of Herem mentioned in the Internal Security Service's annual report.

Security expert Meelis Oidsalu has said that he asked the Ministry of Justice whether the Internal Security Service had raised the concern mentioned in its report — that potential conflicts of interest could be addressed through legislation, for example by imposing "golden handcuffs" or similar restrictions. Oidsalu claims the ministry said it had not received any such proposal from the Internal Security Service. What should be done to avoid tarnishing our generals? We may need them in the future.

Yes, but you can see how quickly a label can be attached to a person and how much harder it is to remove it afterward. And perhaps no one really knows the best way to do that.

Legislation is one possible tool — to ensure, for example, that they don't end up working for companies tied to other countries, but instead remain connected to Estonian enterprises. This is an issue that needs to be resolved because, as you said, we may need them again at some point.

But if, over time, they are effectively treated as if they were almost adversaries, then the question arises: will they still want to apply their knowledge for the benefit of our country?

That said, I believe that military professionals will ultimately act in Estonia's best interests, regardless of how much criticism or suspicion is directed at them.

Let's briefly return to domestic politics. Many people remember a line from your Independence Day speech where you said that we've overheated our beloved sauna and are dazed by the intense steam. But who exactly overheated the sauna? Be specific.

That sauna... This program has gone on for nearly an hour now. We can see for ourselves that all these questions are clear signs that the steam has become too intense and people haven't quite known how to handle it. In that speech, I also said that at some point it can lead to a situation where silence and indifference set in. I think that's the worst outcome.

That's exactly what I discussed with Lauri Hussar — that politicians should think very carefully about what this means for the Estonian state. It's very easy to post tweets or Facebook messages at two in the morning.

Do you mean politicians?

Yes — politicians.

[Urmas] Reinsalu? [Kristen] Michal?

I'm not going to start naming names. I want to address the issue itself, not focus on which specific name is behind it. This is a broader matter that concerns all politicians. It doesn't matter whether they're in the opposition or the coalition — they all share responsibility for the laws that are passed and for whether those laws are good or bad, not just whoever happened to introduce them.

And we should talk about tax increases before elections, not after — again, your words. Parties are already lining up for elections, drafting programs, publishing manifestos and many are promising tax cuts, even eliminating some taxes altogether. Are politicians preparing to mislead us again, since the country's financial situation doesn't actually allow for all this?

If I try to put on a "politician's hat," then this has always been the case. You can make promises for the simple reason that, in the end, all our governments have been coalition governments. That means you can promise a lot, but ultimately everything comes down to the coalition agreement, which isn't a legal document. What it is, however, is a convenient shield: "Look, we had to make concessions here, otherwise the others would have come to power." That's the kind of rhetoric that works and it's why politicians are often quite bold in making promises, even knowing they are not achievable.

But is it even realistic to talk about tax increases before elections — to do so honestly, by clearly stating what the rates will be?

It's always possible to talk about potential tax increases or about spending cuts. And with cuts, the situation is similar: you don't necessarily have to cut during difficult times; in some areas, you may actually need to increase funding.

But to say that there won't be any increases at all only to then introduce them anyway — that's probably not the most reasonable approach.

In education policy, an interesting experiment has come to an end. Sweden has decided to change its approach and bring paper textbooks and handwriting back into schools to improve declining reading skills among young people. The shift is summed up by the slogan "from screens back to books." What are your thoughts on this, given that we have currently chosen almost the exact opposite direction?

Education is an area where such sharp turns need to be thought through very carefully, so they don't become too abrupt. New technologies — whether screens or artificial intelligence — don't replace existing methods; they complement them. The key is to understand the possibilities each offers and use them wisely.

Newspapers didn't disappear when radio and television emerged. And now vinyl records have made a comeback. That's how cycles tend to work. We shouldn't throw something out of the mix without thinking it through. Education is too important for that — we need to make use of all available tools and ensure that both teachers and students have the knowledge to use them effectively.

It's potato-planting season. Last year, you ended up planting more potatoes than you harvested. Has that experience discouraged you this year — will you skip planting potatoes?

That's a good question. It shows how we tend to think that one year has a huge impact on our decisions — but it really doesn't. I've been planting potatoes my entire conscious life and every year is different.

If the harvest was poor due to climate or weather, it doesn't mean I'll stop planting potatoes. It's just one year. And the same applies to politics and foreign policy — one year, in itself, doesn't carry that much weight in the bigger picture.

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