In Väli's assessment, the ceasefire Putin wants is merely a short‑sighted attempt to save his major event and does not change the strategic course of the war.

Putin's desire to hold such a ceasefire on May 9 — is it a genuine wish, or in what sense could it be necessary or useful for him?

For Putin it is certainly necessary and useful, because he would like to hold the May 9 parade in some kind of ceremonial and uninterrupted manner. On the other hand, this one‑day or even two‑day ceasefire gives Ukraine practically nothing and does not help the Ukrainian side in any way. All the more so because, if we look at previous ceasefires, they didn't hold anyway — the Russian side has repeatedly violated them.

Has anything else happened here? This represents a certain paradigm shift. Putin genuinely fears that Ukraine could disrupt his parade, because we already know that military hardware will not be present there in any significant way. What could be a very tempting target, however, is the earlier concentration of military equipment toward Moscow or near Moscow for the parade, because that's where the newest weaponry has often been seen.

In my view, this paradigm shift is even somewhat broader. If we recall last year's jubilee parade on May 9, then the most effective and best air‑defense system on Red Square was Xi Jinping's broad shoulders, behind which it was very convenient for Putin to hide. At that time, everyone was waiting before May 9 for someone to give Putin a "gift," and there was a general expectation that some major action would now take place.

Today the situation is radically different — no one expects any major offensive anymore; people simply no longer believe in it. And second, Putin himself had to go knocking on doors, asking whether he might be allowed to hold a parade. So yes, this paradigm shift truly does exist.

According to some rumors, more than 200 different air‑defense systems or units have already been moved toward Moscow or into Moscow. This shows that the fear that Ukrainians could somehow disrupt the parade and strike it with their long‑range drones is very real.

That fear certainly exists, and Ukraine has proven that it has this capability. Distance is not a problem — drones have been flying toward Moscow for quite some time already. If a decision were made and it were deemed necessary to disrupt this parade or celebration in some way, it would indeed be possible. It is entirely plausible that Moscow will do everything possible to pull equipment together and leave some other areas undefended, as long as no one interferes with the parade. This is a completely valid point — the issue is not only the units that are on Red Square at the moment, but also their concentration areas before the parade, which are clearly vulnerable.

If we look at this for a moment from Zelenskyy's perspective — does Ukraine need one day of peace? 

That one day actually gives nothing. From Putin's side, this may also be an attempt to show the Americans that he is, in some way, ready to talk about peace. But this one day is so insignificant, and Zelenskyy has said that Ukraine does not need any kind of small ceasefire — they are talking about a sustained and real peace.

Could it be that the Americans begin to put some kind of pressure on the Ukrainians to accept this ceasefire and accommodate Putin's wish?

What is interesting is that, based on what is known about that phone call, Trump's comment was that it was very long and successful — as those phone calls usually are. Zelenskyy's comment, in turn, was that it was very interesting and that they are waiting for information from the Americans about what was discussed. But after that, I have not come across any concrete bits of information about what exactly was asked or what is being sought. It nevertheless seems that this was not something that gave President Trump new motivation to start dealing more actively with Ukraine again. It appears that attention today is primarily focused on the war involving Iran. 

If we look at the situation on the front — would this one day give Russia any opportunity to rotate troops somewhere, move something? Militarily, could one or two days provide an opportunity to reorganize, regroup, bring in or move supplies?

It would certainly provide some opportunities, because the current situation is such that a lot of information indicates that unit supply has become a very serious problem. Rotating units and bringing fresh manpower to the front has become a major problem — on both sides, actually, but especially on the Russian side this has been indicated over the past couple of weeks.

If drones truly do not fly for a day or two, there would be an opportunity to bring people to the front line or rotate them out, and likewise to replenish supplies — to bring in ammunition, food, and other necessities. It would provide some help, but it would be a short‑term effect and would not give a decisive advantage anywhere.

So there is unlikely to be any major strategic impact?

Yes, probably not.

If we now look at Ukrainian long‑range strikes, which have been very successful, especially against oil infrastructure — are we finally seeing their impact on the war in some way, such as Russia having less money or simply less fuel to keep its war machine running?

Yes, we are, because these specific attacks on energy infrastructure and export ports affect not only the conduct of the war, but Russia's entire economy. Every dollar or euro they fail to earn from oil or gas exports is beneficial, because it means less funding for the war. Ukrainians have indeed been successful here.

How does it look at the moment — is Ukraine in some sense starting to seize the initiative in this war, not only through long‑range strikes but also on the front line, or not yet?

In a certain sense, Ukraine has already regained a bit more initiative and freedom of action, but not yet on a scale that would be decisive.

When talking about the front line, it is not the case that Russia is constantly active and attacking—Ukraine is not sitting in static defense either, but is conducting counterattacks and has managed to retake areas. Ukrainians are active and do not sit passively in trenches.

Ukraine's problem today is still that manpower is unfortunately limited, and they try to compensate for gaps in defense with drones. Most of the time this works, but sometimes problems arise when the Russians manage to infiltrate farther through gaps between strongpoints, as happened, for example, east of Huliaipole over the past couple of days.

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