To begin with, it is important to note that the market is no longer simply in a phase of more expensive oil, but in a phase of a physical energy crisis. It would be a major mistake to look only at the Brent or WTI figure on a screen and conclude that today's energy crisis is "just" a story of $100 oil. The real crisis runs much deeper.

Right now, nearly $150 a barrel is being paid for physical North Sea oil available for immediate delivery, while June Brent futures stand at $100. That gap shows that the market is no longer paying simply for oil, but for immediate certainty of supply, and that comes at a far higher price. Put simply, physical oil costs much more than a paper claim on future oil.

It is important to explain that while the futures market reflects expectations, the physical market reflects the current panic, shortages and the reality of the global fuel market. Although Asian refineries were built to process Middle Eastern crude, there is still some room for substitution, meaning Asia must still be treated as a competitor for whatever oil is available on the market.

The price of physical oil for immediate delivery has been driven higher by the fact that European and Asian buyers have been searching for replacement barrels after the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In other words, this is a real fight over molecules. The head of Repsol put it very directly, saying that physical transactions are under intense pressure.

This is why the message from IEA chief Fatih Birol is much harsher than it may appear at first glance. The IEA's 32 member states decided to release 400 million barrels from their fuel reserves, the largest coordinated release in history, but even that is not enough to resolve the energy crisis.

The IEA is prepared to release additional strategic fuel reserves if necessary, but Birol described the use of reserves not as a solution, but merely as pain relief — like a painkiller that eases the symptoms without treating the cause of the problem.

That means we have reached a stage where governments are able to soften the effects of the energy crisis, but fall short when it comes to solving the root problem. Releasing reserves may buy time, but it does not restore lost production, reopen shipping routes or immediately bring refinery capacity back online.

It is important to note that when the very organization built around the use of emergency reserves says itself that using those reserves is not a solution, it clearly shows that the crisis runs deeper than the readily available tools being used to soften it.

The situation is made even more serious by the fact that the crisis is not limited to crude oil. The price of jet fuel in Europe has almost doubled since the start of the war. Diesel prices also at one point rose to more than twice their prewar level and are still about 65 percent higher than before the war. The problem therefore extends to transportation, aviation, logistics and ultimately inflation across the economy. People tend to look at Brent, but what truly breaks the economy are end products such as diesel and jet fuel.

As an additional blow, it must be taken into account that the margins of European refineries have fallen into negative territory. That means some plants may begin cutting production or temporarily scaling back at precisely the moment when the diesel and jet fuel market is already under strain. If refining volumes fall, the crisis will no longer remain merely a problem of imports and logistics, but will become a problem of Europe's own supply as well. That makes an already tense situation even more dangerous.

The energy crisis has brought to light a very uncomfortable truth: Europe's problem is also one of a flawed dependency structure. In 2025, 62 percent of jet fuel imports and 42 percent of diesel imports to the European Union and the United Kingdom came from the Middle East. That means Europe is extremely vulnerable from a logistical standpoint. If war breaks out in one region and shipping routes are cut off, the blow is felt at airports, gas stations, logistics companies and factories.

According to the IEA, the larger problem with diesel and jet fuel will reach Europe in April or May because the last fuel tankers have already arrived and no new shipments have come from the Middle East during March. That means the real effects of the fuel shortage have yet to reach Europe.

Given all of the above, the true state and impact of the energy crisis are not yet fully reflected in fuel prices. The physical market is already saying so loudly. The IEA is saying the same thing in more diplomatic language, but the substance is identical.

If the crisis continues, it is not logical to expect the physical market to calm down on its own and for physical market prices to fall to the level of the futures prices shown on screens. It is far more likely that futures prices will move upward or that high prices themselves will begin to crush demand and economic growth.

The real crisis, then, is not the $100 Brent price on a screen, but the $150 physical barrel at the port. And if the IEA says that even the use of strategic reserves only reduces the pain, then that means the market still faces a very painful adjustment.

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