Experts: Estonia's drone‑defense capability in peacetime is quite limited

An ERR broadcast scrutinized Estonia's ability to detect and intercept drones, questioning the nation's true readiness for both peacetime incursions and wartime threats.
On August 24, 2025, a stray Ukrainian military drone exploded in the village of Koruste, Elva Municipality. Authorities failed to detect the drone entering Estonian airspace, and its wreckage was later discovered in a field by a local farmer.
In March 2026, several Ukrainian war drones entered or passed through Estonian airspace. One struck the chimney of the Auvere power plant, another fell into a field in Kastre municipality in Tartu County. This time, the Estonian Defence Forces were aware of the drones entering Estonian airspace, and the Rescue Board issued a public safety alert.
According to ERR host Arp Müller, these events raised public questions about why the drone or drones were not shot down. "Does the state have the capability to counter drones, and under what circumstances, if similar incidents happen again? And what if a drone flies toward a residential area?"
Estonian capabilities are improving
Former commander of the Estonian Air Force, retired Brig. Gen. Jaak Tarien, believes that Estonia's drone‑detection capability seems sufficiently good and is constantly improving.

"We know that procurement is underway to acquire additional sensors, and the Defence Forces have clearly stated that these drones were seen on radar, and even NATO air‑policing aircraft flew close to visually identify them," Tarien noted.
According to him, the capability to shoot down drones has not been tested in Estonia. "In peacetime, we should not maintain wartime rapid‑reaction capability — it would be absurdly expensive. Let's say we simply don't know what that capability is or isn't."
Security expert and former deputy secretary general of the Ministry of Defence, Meelis Oidsalu, says that after the Koruste village drone incident last August, Estonia clearly shifted gears at the regulatory level. "A bill is now reaching the government that would give both the police and the Defence Forces the legal right to intervene during peacetime — something that previously did not exist."
Secondly, Oidsalu noted that even before the latest Auvere incident, the Defence Forces had already deployed additional short‑range sensors. "The Defence Forces talk less about that and do more. There may be reasons for that."
Oidsalu added that the challenge, as Tarien also said, is that in peacetime this is purely a cost‑benefit issue. "The threat is episodic, not predictable in volume, and so far all incidents in Estonia have been side effects of Ukrainian offensive operations. Statistically, the likelihood of dying in road traffic in Estonia is still far higher than from a stray drone. Even if a drone strays here, Estonia is so sparsely populated that the chance of something truly catastrophic happening is small."

However, the additional experience gained from stray drones helps us grow, Oidsalu said. "Both in detection and monitoring, and in decision‑making about whether to react or not. But clearly, this capability is quite limited — especially in peacetime."
He added that although it is impossible to guarantee 100 percent coverage and safety against stray drones in peacetime, Estonia should certainly think about northeastern Estonia, where Narva is a large city whose population needs protection. "The government and Defence Forces should consider whether, in the future, they can offer messages other than: 'We cannot shoot near the border and we lack the capability.'"
Jaak Tarien added that it may seem strange, but the drone problem would be easier to handle during wartime. "Then it is easier to open fire quickly. In peacetime, however, we have rules — we cannot fire at an object based solely on a radar track. If we see an unknown radar track, NATO air‑policing aircraft are sent to visually identify it."
Drone defense in Estonia's border areas is lacking
Host Arp Müller raised a question related to the recent comment by Commander of the Defence Forces, Lt. Gen. Andrus Merilo: the Auvere power plant is too close to the Russian border (about 2 kilometers - ed.) to effectively stop a stray drone.
Müller asked what the residents of Narva should think then, whose homes may be only a few hundred meters from the border? Is the state's message really that in peacetime, a stray war drone could hit an apartment building at any moment and the Estonian state cannot do anything?
Former Air Force commander Jaak Tarien explained that to protect buildings located a few kilometers from the border, weapon systems would need to be in constant readiness and pointed at the sky.
"The effectiveness of such an operation would be very low and would not justify itself," he said. Tarien added that within roughly a 20‑kilometer radius of the border, protecting objects is extremely difficult, whether the threat is drones or artillery fire.
Müller noted that in wartime people would likely be evacuated, but his question concerns peacetime risks.
Meelis Oidsalu replied that the state must actively seek solutions, pointing to countries that have already implemented drone defense in urban environments.
He also highlighted a more acute issue: Estonia currently lacks a concept, plan, and funding to protect specific areas from drones in wartime. He urged politicians to ask whether the upcoming national defense development plan and the 5.4 percent defense spending will address this issue at all.
Oidsalu warned that it is naive to assume that Estonia's capital would not be attacked in wartime. "If we use expensive ammunition against cheap drones, we will quickly exhaust our resources and be left defenseless against greater threats."
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Editor: Argo Ideon
Source: ERR Vikerraadio program, host Arp Müller









