Regardless of the timeline, the financial losses are significant, extending far beyond lost export revenue and reconstruction costs.

"From the perspective of political messaging, Putin started this war hoping it would be over in ten days. Now, Ukrainian drones have targeted the port of Ust-Luga for ten consecutive days, and the Russian military is unable to stop them," said Igor Gretskiy, a researcher at the Estonian think tank ICDS.

Gretskiy emphasized that Ust-Luga is critical infrastructure. "One would be hard-pressed to find a more important logistics hub in Russia. It is massive and vital. The Ukrainians have demonstrated that Putin cannot protect even his most strategically valuable locations."

This vulnerability sends a clear message to foreign investors: investments in these ports are no longer secure. In the long term, this will likely stifle Russia's future financial flows and port development. For instance, gas producer Novatek may have to write off its investment after pouring tens of billions of euros into a major LNG terminal in Ust-Luga, which was slated for completion by 2030.

Putin's strategic ambition

In the mid-1990s, Russia decided to build cargo ports along the Gulf of Finland to reduce its reliance on Baltic states' ports. These plans stalled until Vladimir Putin took office and demanded that cargo move exclusively through Russian ports.

According to Gretskiy, this project became a personal passion for Putin; he spoke about it frequently and visited the sites regularly to oversee progress.

"For Putin, this plan had two dimensions," Gretskiy explained. "First, to invest in infrastructure to diversify trade and boost the state budget. Second, to strengthen ties with the West that could later be used as foreign policy leverage. Russia habitually weaponizes trade, sport, culture, and language as tools of pressure."

Maritime expert Viktor Palmet, from the Estonian Logistics and Ports Union, noted that Russia's newer ports have inherent weaknesses. For example, the eastern side of the Gulf of Finland is the first to be covered by thick ice, necessitating expensive icebreaker operations to keep shipping lanes open.

"They also lacked adequate navigational conditions," Palmet noted. "Because Ust-Luga is located in relatively confined waters, it was impossible to establish sufficient anchorage areas there."

As a result, one of the largest anchorage areas emerged along the Loksa meridian (Estonia), with a smaller one near Kotka (Finland). While some anchorage areas were eventually opened near Ust-Luga, the Russian authorities initially considered them too dangerous for oil-heavy cargo and closed them.

Even now, tankers remain idle in these anchorage areas awaiting access to Russian ports. Palmet suggests monitoring vessel-tracking sites like MarineTraffic, where the real-time scale of the disruption caused by Ukrainian attacks is clearly visible.

Both Primorsk and Ust-Luga began operations in 2001, a time when Moscow was exerting significant political pressure on the Baltic states. Over the years, threats of severing trade relations intensified.

Initially, Ust-Luga operated only as a coal terminal, while Primorsk was designed specifically for large-scale oil exports, receiving crude from the Kirishi refinery via the first Baltic Pipeline System (BTS-1). Ust-Luga did not add an oil terminal until 2012, when "black gold" began flowing through the second Baltic Pipeline System (BTS-2), sourced from the Druzhba pipeline.

Like Muuga, yet different 

The Muuga cargo port in Estonia provides a useful point of reference for Ust-Luga; both feature liquid fuel storage tanks, terminals, pipelines, loading areas, quays, and rail links.

However, Ust-Luga is massive, covering 12 square kilometers—roughly double the size of Muuga. While Primorsk is smaller than Muuga in terms of total area, its quay depth is identical at 18 meters.

Raivo Vare, former head of the petroleum company Pakterminal, visited Ust-Luga in the late 2000s. Though the port was unfinished, its layout and scale were already staggering.

Russian fuel tanks are significantly larger than those at Muuga, supported by an immense network of pipelines for various fuel types. 

"At the time, Pakterminal had 42.5 kilometers of pipes, and that was considered a small terminal. This gives you an idea of how complex this machinery is," Vare explained. "It's not just a rail freight yard—it's a factory. That complexity also means the infrastructure is highly sensitive to damage."

Vare describes Ust-Luga as a universal port capable of handling diverse cargo types. It has reached an annual capacity of 100 million tons, making it a major player in the European maritime context.

While Vare has not visited Primorsk, he noted that its quay lines are shorter because it typically loads only two or three ships at a time. This is not due to a lack of space, but rather the sheer scale of the vessels it services. Primorsk was engineered to accommodate VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers)—the giants of the sea.

"What does a VLCC look like? The largest exceed 300,000 tons," Vare said. "They are several football fields long and as tall as a mid-rise residential building. It's hard to grasp the scale unless you've seen one in person."

Collateral damage across the oil sector

The impact of Ukrainian drone attacks extends far beyond the ports. Transit and economic expert Raivo Vare emphasizes that strikes on refineries across Russia are equally critical. According to Vare, these attacks have effectively knocked out 43 percent of Russia's total export capacity.

Refineries transport fuel via an extensive pipeline network, which has also sustained damage. Vare explained that "isolation sections" help mitigate the most catastrophic failures by closing automatically during fires or sudden pressure drops.

"These prevent a fire at one end from spreading through the entire line," Vare noted. However, even if a fire is contained, cleaning the affected pipelines remains a major hurdle. In cases of severe damage, the pipes may need to be dismantled—a task that is extensive, dangerous, and requires highly specialized labor.

Significant issues are emerging at Ust-Luga regarding the export of petroleum products, which arrive at the port primarily by rail. The loading racks—essential for transferring fuel from tank cars onto ships—have been destroyed. Without these racks, cargo cannot be unloaded or processed through the port. Vare pointed out that existing pipelines cannot bypass this issue, as they are specifically configured for different types of liquid fuels.

While the fires in the storage tanks at Ust-Luga and Primorsk are visible from great distances, Vare noted that these are the easiest components to address. If one tank is damaged, others can often be used as substitutes, and Russia possesses the resources and expertise to rebuild them.

However, there is one significant technical bottleneck: tank roofs. These specific components often require materials or engineering typically sourced from Western countries, making their replacement far more difficult under current sanctions.

Restoration timeline: months or years

Experts remain divided on how long it will take Russia to restore its ports to full capacity. According to Raivo Vare, a significant portion of loading capacity will remain offline for two to six months, primarily due to the need for specialized technologies that must be sourced from the West.

"This is not something that can be solved by political will; it requires physical replacement over a long period. That is a painful reality," Vare noted.

Viktor Palmet offers a more pessimistic assessment, suggesting it will take at least a year—if not longer—particularly if new loading frames are required. "Procuring these frames takes about a year to a year and a half. That is an optimistic estimate, as other global customers are already in line ahead of them," Palmet explained.

While a few months might seem like a short window, Igor Gretskiy emphasizes the massive financial impact.

"Every month, approximately 200 vessels arrive at Primorsk and Ust-Luga to load oil and LNG. If these ports are not fully functional, Russia loses between $2 billion and $2.5 billion per month," Gretskiy stated. "Given that Russia's war budget is roughly $150 billion, this is a highly sensitive loss. Putin is constantly expanding his military spending, and he desperately needs that revenue."

Gretskiy noted that Russia's state budget deficit last year reached approximately 5.4 trillion rubles—nearly one-third of the total military budget. This year, the deficit is projected to grow, leading ministries to cut both social spending and investments in critical infrastructure.

"For Putin, every billion counts," Gretskiy concluded. "In fact, I would say every million counts." 

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