Professor Biscop, Western media and politicians constantly talk about a "new world order" and the collapse of the rules-based system. You, however, call this analytical laziness — arguing that the world has simply returned to the "old normal," a multipolar great power competition that was the norm for centuries. If we accept that the post-Cold War Western hegemony was just a historical anomaly, what are the rules of the game in this new-old world that Europe must immediately adopt to survive?

The argument is twofold. On the one hand, we cannot forget, especially in Western Europe, that great powers always partner, compete and rival. This is normal; multipolarity is normal. However, to mitigate the tensions inherent in this world, we created a rules-based order — a multilateral, universal rules system. Although everybody likes to say it is gone or that we have a new system, for the moment, it actually holds. Russia, of course, operates outside it by having invaded Ukraine. But other states more or less hold to it. Now we have an odd situation where the U.S. is pulling out of it. We don't know how far this will go. As I said in the panel, imagine hypothetically that Trump says: "I have my peace board, which works really well since I'm the chair of it, so why do I need a UN Security Council?" So the U.S. ambassador doesn't show up — like the Soviets did in the 1950s? Then what happens to the system, which was built by and centered around the U.S.? And then, of course, what do the Chinese do? The Chinese very cleverly took more influence in the system. Will they then dominate it? Or will they say that a system without the U.S. is no system, pull out too and start different parallel order-building attempts? And where does that leave us? We are in a dangerous moment.

We are literally watching in real-time today as the U.S. and Israel have launched a massive military campaign against Iran aimed at regime change, leaving Europe completely on the sidelines. European leaders are scrambling to distance themselves from Washington's decision. Is this conflict of the past few days the final proof that a Trump-led U.S. is no longer looking for partners to consult, but expects us to be vassals who will simply pay for the consequences later — whether that's a new energy crisis or a wave of migration?

I think it is clear that this administration doesn't feel any need to consult with European allies. It assumes we will follow automatically. Take the war on Iran, for example; I am not saying everything Trump does is bad. In recent months, Trump met the presidents of all the regions republics — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Syria and so forth — making deals. Not all of those are necessarily bad for Europe, but clearly, his administration doesn't feel a need to inform us. We must take that as a given. The problem is also the fickleness, because this goes against their proclaimed strategy. The strategy says that they are not going to do regime change anymore. Now they start a war to do exactly that. What is the value in that and how do you deal with a great power that says one thing and then does another anyway?

This explosion in the Middle East brings us directly to values. You have noted that the EU's inconsistent and sometimes suffering-blind reaction to the war in Gaza destroyed our legitimacy in the eyes of the Global South. We preach human rights to Africa and Asia, but the rest of the world currently sees glaring hypocrisy. Is the era of a "values-based foreign policy" definitively over for Europe and do we have to swallow the bitter pill of pragmatic realpolitik to compete with China and Russia?

Realpolitik is the only possibility, but for me, it doesn't mean that the end justifies the means; rather, it means that every end requires means. If you do not have the resources to pursue them, it's pointless. There is a place for values in foreign policy, but it's more limited than we're told, because your leverage to export or impose them is limited. For me, the place of values is, number one, always respect your own values yourself and don't violate them. Even if your interests oblige you to cooperate with someone who doesn't respect them, make sure you don't become complicit. That is the place of values. Values also have a place in the sense that, of course, strategy is about interests. The point of strategy is to defend our way of life and maintain it. In addition to that, you can show solidarity based on our values. Even if they are not directly at stake, you can decide to show solidarity with the weak and the oppressed where you have the leverage to do so. In that way, values can complement the cold-blooded calculus of realpolitik, which must be the basis of strategy.

Coming back to our own borders — until 2022, Ukraine was seen as a buffer state by the EU; today, it is the bleeding border state of the West. Now, a peace plan has been put on the table by the new US administration, demanding drastic cuts to the Ukrainian army, the exclusion of NATO membership and the concession of territories, completely bypassing EU decision-making. Does Europe actually have the political will and military muscle today to step into the game itself (for example, by sending its own peacekeeping forces) or are we forced to silently accept a new geopolitical Yalta dictated by Trump and Putin?

Not quite. We have leverage and we have our own sanctions. We control all these frozen assets and we have our own support for Ukraine. There is quite a determined coalition of the willing with the Baltic and Nordic states, Poland, France, Germany, the UK and the Benelux countries. That is sufficient critical mass to keep it going. Perhaps not every European country is principally convinced that we need to stick with Ukraine, but they're not going to stop their support as long as this coalition remains determined. We can be optimistic in the sense that we will not abandon Ukraine. Unfortunately, it's difficult to be optimistic and see a speedy end to the war. It's possible that the opposite is also possible. I don't think that European support will quickly falter, but we just have to be prepared for a long war.

In addition to external pressure, Ukraine also faces a legitimacy deficit, as free elections cannot be held under martial law. How can the EU, on the one hand, support Ukraine in its existential war, while on the other hand, prevent the excessive centralization of power and demand the functioning of democratic institutions?

The greatest threat to every country is not external, but internal. It's the anti-democrats, clearly. The EU has shown that when it felt certain Ukrainian decisions went against democratic principles or preconditions for membership, it spoke out and some measures were retracted. So, one can be quite optimistic. If elections cannot be held, you can only blame that on Russia; you cannot hold that against Ukraine. I am quite confident about the democratic prospects of Ukraine.

In your essays, you have called Europeans' decades-long blind reliance on Americans a "malady of the mind" that prevents us from trusting each other. How can Europe psychologically and institutionally emancipate itself from this vassal status?

In a way, Trump creates danger for us because he indirectly undermines deterrence, increasing the threat, especially from Russia. However, he also makes it easier to conclude that we must stick together, as this U.S. administration may not support us. I hope the Greenland crisis was the tipping point when we realized that if one NATO ally asks other NATO allies to stop recognition and you get punished for it, that is going too far. We prepared countermeasures, and then Trump retracted his claim, at least for now. I hope that was the tipping point that convinced us that you have to show strength and impose your red lines, even towards your friends.

The media often paints a terrifying picture of the "no-limits partnership" between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. You, however, see it as a pragmatic marriage of convenience, functioning mostly on China's terms, where Russia has been reduced to a raw-materials appendage. How should the EU calibrate its China strategy so that we "de-risk," while simultaneously resisting U.S. pressure to completely "de-couple" the Western economy from China, which would simply make us poor?

China's not our friend, but they're also not our enemy. My motto remains: "cooperate when you can, but you must push back when you must and retaliate when you must." We tend to overstate the autocratic axis; it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Chinese, of course, don't want Russia to be completely defeated, because they see it as a vital counterbalance to the U.S. They will also never let Russia determine their own choices. It's a truly multipolar world. For Europe, the fact that China is a great power is not in and of itself problematic. It depends on what they do with that power. As long as we think some accommodation can be found and we stay in a common set of rules, that must be tried. There's no reason to slam the door shut preemptively. If they slam the door shut, so be it. That just requires a bit more on our part. If you cooperate with China and they feel you don't have the guts to push back when you must, then cooperation will become domination. We have economic leverage. China has economic difficulties. They need us and they need to export to Europe; therefore, we have more leverage than we think and we should use it a little bit more assertively to get to a more equitable economic position. For the moment, the relationship is not good because China, which used to be very pragmatic, has become much more ideological in its policy and much more focused on regime security. The Chinese have left very little space for compromise.

Adam Tooze has recently argued that a new Cold War is emerging between "Electrostates" like China and "Petrostates" (a potential alliance of the U.S., Russia and Saudi Arabia). If the U.S. under Trump pivots back to fossil fuels while China dominates green tech, where does that leave the EU's "Green Deal"? Are we at risk of becoming a strategic irrelevance — neither a petro-power nor a green industrial leader?

You see that in a way, but I do not overstate this bifurcation. It is one element, but it will not determine who allies with whom. If the U.S. completely renegotiates the green transition, that is short-termism and will create long-term difficulties. We should be smarter, diversify and transition. However, diversifying probably still involves nuclear energy.

Professor, You argue that the grand strategy of the EU, which is globally dependent on exports, must primarily aim at "keeping the world together" to avoid the formation of closed economic blocs. Is this realistically possible in a world where the economy of nations has been weaponized and where great powers increasingly prefer autarky and protectionism over open markets?

This has definitely become more difficult and it is a cyclical or pendular movement. However, we still have partners who want to keep this open world more than we think, because nobody wants to be dominated by a single great power. But are we attractive to these powers? Since Trump 2 started, the impression we created is surrender. If we surrender to the U.S. ourselves, we're not going to stand up for everybody else. Now that we are hopefully turning this around and writing a new European security strategy, this should be a rallying point, enabling us to mobilize others who still share that view.

Looking ahead, you note with great concern that the biggest threat to our entire strategy and the Western way of life isn't Russian tanks or the Chinese economy, but our own internal, polarized and anti-democratic forces. Professor, what must fundamentally change in our social and economic policies to halt the rise of extremism and restore citizens' faith in democracy, without which any grand strategy is merely an illusion?

I wish I had an answer, but I agree that this is the main challenge. If Macron is succeeded by the extreme right, what happens to the European project and what happens to the coalition of the willing? Everything that happens in the U.S. and Hungary can happen in any European country. Almost everywhere, the extreme right is the largest or the second-largest party.  It's a dangerous moment. 

Thus, we should get used to thinking about security in much broader terms — social cohesion and resilience might be even more important than tanks and missiles?

Part of the process of stabilizing Europe is to build a welfare state and social security, which maintains internal stability. European integration and a military alliance maintain external stability and the two must go hand in hand so that everybody feels ownership of the society where he or she lives. It's perhaps almost a cliché, but I strongly believe in it.

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