ICDS chair: US actions show Russia can't come to all its allies' aid

Recent U.S. activity in Venezuela and threats toward Iran are ample demonstration that Russia cannot aid all of its allies while being tied up in Ukraine, ICDS director Kristi Raik said.
It has now been 1,418 days since the start of a war which was meant to be a three-day "special military operation" and which has now lasted longer than the infamous Soviet Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Is Russia marking this "milestone" in any way?
There is certainly no marking of this on Russia's part. That said, it is indeed a symbolic date, and it is interesting to compare what Russia — at the time the Soviet Union — achieved with its last major war. Back then, control was established over almost half of Europe, but what has been achieved now in the full-scale war against Ukraine? Russia holds less than 20 percent of Ukraine's territory.
If we are talking about the current international situation, the U.S. has in recent days really started to act forcefully: be it with the arrest of the Venezuelan leader [Nicolas Maduro], the seizure of shadow fleet and Russian oil tankers, and so on. Does this mean that Russia has been left in a "weaker" position and the U.S. has taken the reins into its own hands? Trump is also currently talking in rather Ukraine-friendly terms.
The U.S. has demonstrated that it is prepared to use force unexpectedly and highly effectively, at least from the perspective of achieving short-term impact. Naturally, this will serve to draw attention to the fact that Russia is still relatively weak and is in no way capable of carrying out operations like those the U.S. conducted in Venezuela.
From the Kremlin's viewpoint, it is certainly also alarming that several of Russia's allies are now under pressure, while it is highly visible to all that Russia is unable to support them. Russia has been forced to concentrate its resources on Ukraine. What has been happening in Venezuela and Iran demonstrates that the authoritarian regimes there are under strong pressure and that the U.S. is acting according to its own interests and discretion, while Russia has been left in the role of a bystander.
In the U.S., the possibility of delivering a military strike against Iran has also been discussed. Is this once again a rather forceful message to a regime supportive of Putin?
Time will tell if things will go that far, but it cannot be ruled out that the U.S. may undertake some type of military strike. A separate question is what the long-term results of U.S. actions will be, be it in Venezuela or in Iran. There is no reason to believe that the U.S. can actually influence these countries in a way that long-term stability could emerge there. In any case, Russia is unable to support important allied states and regimes friendly to it, which is perhaps the most important outcome at present.

How does the meeting of the coalition of the willing, which took place in Paris, fit into the bigger picture? It comprised mainly European countries, where some quite forceful positions also emerged that some states are ready to deploy their troops to Ukraine, though admittedly only once a peace has been concluded.
Negotiations and preparations on this have been going on in Europe for months already, so in that sense, this was not major news. What has now been confirmed even more clearly is that, under the leadership of the U.K. and France, Europe is ready to deploy its troops to Ukraine. However, here there is one big "but." This can only happen once a ceasefire has been established in Ukraine. In that sense, this is more of a theoretical exercise, but as a message, I still consider it very important. Europe once again confirmed its view that support for Ukraine is long-term and serious. On the other hand, Ukraine's own military capability will in the future be the most important factor in ensuring Ukraine's security.
Another important conclusion from the Paris meeting was that the U.S. is still involved in these discussions. It is not yet entirely clear whether and how the U.S. will participate in providing security guarantees to Ukraine, but there was very concrete discussion about what the U.S. role could be: carrying out monitoring and surveillance and checking whether the ceasefire is holding or whether there are violations. In that sense, this is no longer a matter of principle, but very concrete.
We are not talking about peacekeeping forces, but about some Western countries deploying their soldiers to Ukraine, which could function as a kind of deterrent?
Exactly so. Naturally, Russia has already expressed a position that it does not intend to go along with anything like this, so there is nothing new in that either. The most important challenge facing Europe and the U.S. in the near future is to force Russia into a situation where it actually wants a ceasefire. This week's negotiations do not really contribute to that. The biggest question still hanging in the air is: How do you up the pressure on Russia in order to force it into any substantive peace talks?
Positive signals have also come from the U.S. Lindsey Graham has finalized a sanctions package and got the go-ahead from Donald Trump. What does this actually contain, and what is its impact?
These sanctions have also been under discussion for months, and without a doubt, they would bring very important additional pressure on Russia. These are secondary sanctions which would make it possible to penalize those countries – including China and India – that buy oil from Russia, and which in recent years have become Russia's largest buyers of its oil. Imposing sanctions on these, or even seriously threatening to do so, would also create the effect of rendering it more difficult for Russia to sell oil. As this is Russia's most important source of revenue, it would of course be a very strong step if such sanctions were to be brought in now, but I would not dare to be certain until that decision is actually made.
In coming back once again to the Europeans' decision to deploy their troops to Ukraine once peace or at least a ceasefire has been concluded – this also has to be sold to the European domestic audience. Germans have to agree to their soldiers being in Ukraine, likewise the French, the Spanish, and others. Is it realistic that the public will allow this and that there will not be a major political storm in those countries as a result?
Yes, political consent is really necessary. In general, parliamentary approval is required too. The same applies, by the way, to Estonia. If Estonia intends to take part – and Estonia has expressed this intention – then at the moment when it becomes a concrete decision, that must also be approved by the Riigikogu. Could obstacles arise? One cannot, of course, be certain about anything, given the current rather fragmented and polarized European political landscape.
On the other hand, important commitments have been given by the U.K. and France, Europe's two leading military powers. Their strategic culture is a strong one and they have a great deal of experience in taking part in various operations. If political leaders take a firm stance that an operation like that is needed and the required capabilities are also found, then there is hope that it will also receive approval in legislatures.
Britain's defense secretary has announced that additional funding is being allocated to make troops ready for deployment to Ukraine. Is Putin willing to negotiate with Europe or not? The Europeans, for example, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, have expressed a view that talks with Putin should be resumed. Does Putin himself currently have any reason at all to talk to Europe, or is he in fact only talking to Trump?
In Europe, there is indeed this debate going on about whether direct talks with Russia should be started. At present, this is honestly difficult to understand. We should reach a situation where Russia wants to negotiate peace seriously. At present, Russia has no such desire. Russia wants to maintain political dialogue with the U.S. simply because it gives it the opportunity to position itself as a leading great power and offers hope of influencing the U.S. position in a direction favorable to itself.
We in Europe are inevitably in a phase where the question of resuming direct dialogue with Russia is getting brought up more and more. I think it is very important here to discuss above all else what Europe would like to achieve in such negotiations, and what the positions are. What is that so-called leverage Europe has that can be used in negotiations? Just restoring dialogue would instead leave an impression of weakness on the part of Europe.
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Editor: Andrew Whyte, Johanna Alvin
Source: "Ukraina Stuudio"








