Igor Gretskiy: Coercion to Capitulation: The Trump–Putin Playbook on Ukraine

A leaked U.S.-Russia 28-point "peace plan for Ukraine" effectively functions as a tool designed to coerce Ukraine into capitulation, writes International Centre for Defense and Security Research Fellow Igor Gretskiy.
Washington's Push for a Quick Deal
Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has consistently promised to quickly bring an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine. It seems that the fastest way for him to do it is to pressure the side he considers weaker — which, for Trump, is Ukraine. Yet much to his frustration, Ukraine is not behaving as a weak side should. Despite what he sees as Ukraine having no cards to play, the country continues to fight desperately for its survival against a militarily and economically stronger aggressor. Trump's strategy is further complicated by the fact that many European nations support Ukraine, viewing Russia's aggression as a direct threat to their own security.
What Donald Trump cares about above all is getting a deal — any deal — regardless of its consequences for Ukraine. This goal largely shapes the strategic behaviour of his administration. As soon as Washington senses any sign of Ukrainian weakness, it immediately attempts to rush in and impose 'peace' on Russia's terms. When confronted with firm resistance, Trump steps back, as if giving the parties a little more time to "fight it out" in order to become more accommodating — clearly assuming that Ukraine's capacity to defend itself will be exhausted sooner than Russia's resources to attack.
At the same time, Trump laments Putin's lack of flexibility, yet remains reluctant to impose severe sanctions on Russia or provide more weapons to the Ukrainian Armed Forces — apparently unwilling either to become entangled in a long confrontation with Moscow or to prolong Ukraine's efforts to defend itself.
Trump's Pendulum Tactic
This cycle has already repeated several times over the year. After the infamous spat between Trump and Zelenskyy at the White House, the April Putin–Witkoff "peace plan" was published, essentially presenting an undisguised proposal for Ukraine to surrender. It gained no support in Europe, and the Ukrainian president rejected it firmly, accusing Witkoff of adopting "Russia's strategic line" and spreading Putin's delusions. Realising that this attempt to break Kyiv had failed, Trump temporarily backed off, remarking that "sometimes it's better to let [the kids] fight a little longer and then break it up."
In July, Russia sharply intensified its airstrikes on Ukrainian cities, and the UN reported record-high civilian casualties. Zelensky called for the resumption of negotiations with Russia, after which Witkoff once again became active and began preparing a US–Russia summit in Anchorage. After having not that productive talks with Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump met with his Ukrainian counterpart — but this time in the presence of European leaders, who made clear that they consider pressure on Kyiv unacceptable. After that, Trump again let the issue drift, arguing that Russia and Ukraine needed more time to fight to change their mind about his efforts to broker a peace deal.
The next attempt to push Ukraine toward capitulation came on October 17, when Trump, in heated talks, pressured Zelenskyy to accept Moscow's terms or face the prospect of being "destroyed." Encountering firm resistance yet again, he pretended to step back from mediating between the warring parties, giving them the chance to fight a little longer before reminding them of his presence after some time.
That moment came this week, when yet another Witkoff peace plan emerged — one discussed only by Washington and Moscow, while Ukraine, Europe, and even many US politicians learned of it after the fact. This document goes even further than its April predecessor: it rests entirely on Russian ultimatums and contains even more humiliating provisions for Ukraine. For example, Ukraine is encouraged to abandon any future claims regarding atrocities committed by Russian forces and to accept caps on the size of its armed forces — a measure that would leave the country nearly defenceless against a renewed Russian invasion.
Putin's Play to Corner Ukraine
The appearance of the new Witkoff plan is clearly linked to the recent developments that, in Trump's and Putin's eyes, have weakened Ukraine's position and created favourable conditions for heightened pressure. First, after months of negotiations, Europe failed to reach a common decision on frozen Russian assets, complicating efforts to secure the funds Ukraine urgently needs next year. Second, the corruption scandal in the energy sector — Mindich-gate — will make it harder for European politicians to explain to their voters why support for Ukraine must continue. Third, public concerns voiced by some Ukrainian politicians about shortages of manpower in the armed forces have raised questions about Ukraine's ability to hold the front line.
Meanwhile, after Anchorage, Putin intensified efforts to insert the Russian-Ukrainian war into the broader context of US–Russian dialogue on global security and strategic stability. As part of this effort, he proposed informally extending the New START treaty — due to expire on February 5, 2026 — by one year, while Foreign Minister Lavrov argued that preventing nuclear war is more important than the fate of Ukraine.
Such an approach would allow Russia to effectively sideline European countries from full-scale negotiations over Ukraine's future. Trump would also stand to benefit: he would have the chance to claim the laurels of a peacemaker and assert that, although Ukraine had ceded territory and sovereignty, first, it survived in some form as a state; second, the fighting had stopped; and third, the world had been pulled back from the brink of nuclear war. Besides, against the backdrop of the unfolding Epstein files scandal and a murky outlook for the U.S. economy, a deal with Russia at Ukraine's expense could earn Trump political points he may need ahead of next year's midterm elections to preserve control over Congress
To sum up, the U.S. president continues to pursue a quick deal at any price, and Putin hopes to use this to seize Ukraine through Trump's hands. Whether their strategies succeed will depend, in part, on how effectively Ukraine and Europe counter these efforts. The EU must urgently find a way to mobilise the resources needed to sustain support for Ukraine, lift all restrictions on military supplies to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and strengthen sanctions pressure on the Russian economy. Meanwhile, Ukraine, for its part, must decisively address the corruption scandal by bringing everyone involved — regardless of rank — to justice, and adopt politically difficult measures needed to replenish its armed forces. Without these steps, resisting renewed pressure from the Trump–Putin tandem will be extremely difficult.
This article was first published on the ICDS website.
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