This May, the European Union Institute for Security Studies published a report on how the EU could undermine Russia's malign capabilities. This type of analysis isn't new — representatives of the Russian liberal opposition, for example, have previously suggested that supporting corruption, budgetary theft and elite infighting within Russia could help destabilize the regime.

This report, however, takes a more politically correct approach, although it seems thinking is moving in a more practical direction. If only actions would follow... The authors argue that the European Union must adopt a firmer stance against Russian subversion and information operations. The best defense is credible deterrence, combined with a believable threat of asymmetric countermeasures.

The report rests on three pillars: greater resilience, enhanced deterrence and a collective effort to weaken Russia's capacity to inflict harm. The goal isn't to disarm Russia, but to limit its disruptive abilities and blunt the tools it uses against the EU. This process should begin with continuing and increasing support for Ukraine.

Although the report discusses eight regions and sectors where Russian capabilities could be curtailed, this article will focus on a select few. A general observation is that Moscow is adept at exploiting tensions and weaknesses among others.

When it suffers a setback in one area, it compensates with activity in another. For instance, Moscow offsets restrictions on its economic footprint with subversion and manipulation. It is active in the information space and many of its narratives have penetrated the global information mainstream. One example is the attempt to shift blame for the full-scale invasion onto Ukraine and the West.

Russia also uses diplomatic capital to avoid isolation. Since 2022, Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have jointly conducted ten bilateral visits to the Middle East and North Africa, ten to Central Asia and six to Latin America. Yet, a Pew Research Center survey showed that in 2023, 65 percent of respondents across 35 countries viewed Russia in a negative light. Russia is sensitive to public opinion and the EU would do well to exploit the contradictions behind Russia's self-image.

In the case of China, decoupling it from Russia is not feasible, as the current arrangement benefits Beijing. However, two strategies could be pursued. First, consistently remind international audiences of China's official and unwavering support for territorial integrity. Second, work with the Global South, which China cares deeply about and where Europe has significant opportunities in the wake of U.S. retrenchment.

In the Mediterranean region, Russia has achieved notable success with its information warfare, thanks to agreements with local media outlets that provide channels like RT and Sputnik with direct access to local audiences. This makes countering them more difficult.

Much attention has been given to hybrid warfare, in which Russia trades in fear and hypocrisy. In Europe, this largely takes the form of diversions, sabotage and other operations that are calibrated to remain below the threshold of military conflict and to complicate attribution.

A core element of Russian rhetoric is its self-portrayal as a leader of the global majority, challenging Western dominance while denying its own colonial past. Similarly, when it violates international law, Russia blames its adversaries.

The contradiction between Russia's words and actions should be exploited — emphasizing that its operations range from information warfare to political assassinations. The situation in Europe isn't dire: in surveys conducted in 11 countries, 58 percent of respondents believed that Russia was to blame for the aggression against Ukraine, while 19 percent thought the blame should be shared equally.

What should be done about Russia's so-called red lines, which are constantly being drawn and redrawn? Moscow issues threats of economic, military and even nuclear retaliation — but these are mostly rhetorical.

Between 2021 and 2024, Russian representatives threatened retaliation for crossing red lines more than 350 times. Therefore, European support for Ukraine must be made immune to these red lines. It would be beneficial not to announce arms deliveries to Ukraine through the media — instead, such transfers should be done quietly and without fanfare. This limits the Kremlin's ability to influence decisions. It is also useful to expand weapons production within Ukraine and to ensure coordinated responses from EU member states to demonstrate that Kremlin threats are nothing but bluster.

One area of particular interest is Russia's shadow fleet, which has been clearly identified as an environmental threat. Many of these vessels are involved not in civilian activities but in intelligence gathering or military operations — not to mention the threat they pose to underwater infrastructure. A consistent behavioral framework is needed for all maritime zones, especially the Baltic and North Seas.

If a shadow tanker is involved in an accident, the coastal states bear the costs. For example, cleaning up the damage from two Russian tankers that sank in the Sea of Azov is estimated to cost around $14 billion.

Seaborne oil exports are vital for Russia. The EU should exploit this vulnerability. The first priority should be active monitoring of waters within the EU's economic zone, to deter and limit the shadow fleet. The EU needs to develop the currently absent capability to deal with such ships: secure anchor zones for detained vessels, procedures for offloading cargo and ship dismantling when owners do not reclaim them. And it must be the shipowner's responsibility — not the coastal state's — to prove that a vessel is not acting against that state's interests.

A broader international coalition is needed to ensure military and logistical support for member states, to prevent Russian coercion. One example is a joint expeditionary force in the Baltic Sea, which should be extended to the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

In conclusion, the report proposes increasing the cost of damaging the EU's interests and stepping up economic pressure. Second, winning the narrative battle by aligning information strategies. And third, reducing Russia's global influence — from the Indo-Pacific and Africa to the southern Mediterranean and the Balkans. The EU has simply failed to make use of the tools already at its disposal to disable Russia's power — and it doesn't need anyone's permission to start doing so.

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