Former EDF commander Gen. Martin Herem is among those critical of Estonia's drone defense capabilities as they stand. Ilmar Raag, a reservist officer, filmmaker and former media executive, who has coordinated drone donations to Ukraine, has echoed these criticisms.

"The honest answer is that it is enough in the current context, but not quite enough with the future in mind," Arbo Probal, head of the EDF's unmanned systems field, said in response to ERR's question about whether the current anti-drone training offered is adequate.

"We are not pretending to be fully ready for every situation – that would be irresponsible. Instead, we approach the topic honestly and methodically: We are continuously developing anti-drone training, striving to keep it up-to-date in light of both technical and tactical developments. Our focus is on systematic improvement – every new experience and piece of information must reach the methodology and every instructor," he added.

Probal explained that the EDF's training process begins with the soldier's basic course, where from the very first stages actions are covered that help reduce vulnerability to drones – hiding, concealed movement, and camouflage.

"These passive actions are integrated into broader tactical training and help the soldier stay out of the line of sight of enemy reconnaissance drones," he noted.

"As the course progresses, a more active element is added: simulation of drone threats. We use scenarios mimicking enemy drone activity, so that soldiers gain not only a theoretical understanding but also firsthand experience of what a reconnaissance or attack drone's impact is on the battlefield. In addition, anti-drone situations are integrated into shooting drills."

Herem: We don't seem to believe in simpler and cheaper solutions

Herem, told ERR that having recently spoken with the head of EDF training, he is reassured that counter-drone training is being addressed, and his main criticism is that progress in this area is too slow.

"There are many things we could do immediately – things requiring very little resource or preparation. But for some reason we don't do them, likely because we don't believe in them," Herem, who is currently in Ukraine, said. Herem said he is also working on bringing the lessons of the war in Ukraine more credibly to Estonia.

"A simple example: Here in Ukraine, smooth-bore firearms have been put into use and [drones] are successfully being shot down with automatic weapons too. For instance, in the area of responsibility of a certain brigade, they down about 50 percent in a week, and that is not just electronic warfare equipment. This is done with small arms as well, including shotguns," he described.

"But in Estonia, we don't really believe in this – not only in the EDF, but also within society: people think that electronic measures are a must. But in reality, everything is needed," Herem stressed.

Smooth-bore weapons, including shotguns, are used in drone defense as the shot they fire can be effective in downing them.

"There are loads of hunting rifles in Estonia. You can buy them, and smooth-bores don't even cost much – let's start with that. And let's start with people looking up at the sky during exercises," said Herem.

"But we say some kind of electronic gadget has to tell us where the threat is coming from. These electronic gizmos often don't work here in Ukraine and [as a result] people look to the skies and listen. And that way they realize something is coming," he added.

"I don't want to be too harshly critical. I'm just saying there are options we could implement much faster than we are now. It probably comes from not knowing exactly, or even if we do know that something is used in Ukraine, we don't believe it works," the general noted.

When asked what other methods could be used to prevent drone damage, Herem said: "For example, fishing nets – no joke. If you ask someone in Kherson today – which is talked about a lot, how [Russian] drone hunters are killing elderly people and children there – ask them what they want. If you ask whether they'd want fishing nets, they'd say, send them and we'll kiss you. Just nets everywhere – on the streets, elsewhere, and this is about 10 kilometers from the front line. Simple things, all of which saves lives."

In conclusion, the general stressed that drone countermeasures must be comprehensive and encompass a wide range of activities and measures: To achieve situational awareness, both electronic tools and human hearing and sight must be used; as a defensive measure, movement should be conducted in smaller and concealed groups; positions should be covered so drones can't make direct hits; as active countermeasures, both electronic warfare tools and guns can be applied.

The main anti-drone devices could be procured in Estonia within weeks or, at most, months, Herem emphasized.

"Electronic jamming devices are ready to be manufactured and developed. Nets can be produced. Smooth-bore guns should be acquired – for example, take everything stored by the police and slated for destruction. Smooth-bore ammunition, including extra rounds for drones, we can produce. If we start today, we're ready by Christmas," he explained.

"I'm not claiming that none of this is being done in the EDF. Certainly it is – I just don't know anymore in what scope and pace. My goal is to explain to outsiders that the situation is not hopeless or impossible due to lack of resources or knowledge," the general said.

Herem also stressed the continuing importance of infantry training. A return to the 1990s is needed, he said. At that time, all infantry soldiers were trained for one member of every squad to watch the skies, in cases of helicopters or planes.

"However in the meantime, that air threat has somehow disappeared – we've lost it. But in fact, all the old practices still work," he noted.

"While everyone talks about drones-drones-drones, this is what the artillerymen, air defenders, even drone operators and everyone else in [Ukraine] tell me: Prepare the infantry, lots and lots of infantry, who can always conduct drone defense.

When the weather is bad and electronic countermeasures are really strong, drones cannot fly; it's still the infantryman who has to handle things with a rifle or see with his eyes and say, look, the enemy is coming from there, fire the artillery," Herem said.

"At night, a drone crew that has reached its position a few kilometers behind the infantry may use up all ten of their drones within two hours, then they have nothing to do but wait in the dark and sleep. But the infantryman is still in position, up front, carrying out their task. It's good if an unmanned air or ground robot reaches them in the meantime, to deliver supplies or evacuate them if needed. But if those aren't present or don't arrive, then the infantryman still holds the position without them," Herem outlined.

Raag: Estonia lacks a counter-drone doctrine

Raag has repeatedly spoken out on Estonia's drone capabilities, and similarly sees shortcomings in the EDF's anti-drone efforts.

On Wednesday Raag told ERR that adequate defense against either large strike drones used against Ukraine, such as the Shahed and Geran types, and also against short-range drones with a range of up to 20km, seems to be lacking.

"There does not seem to be a systematic approach to either. There are some individual [Defense League] units working on this topic, but a systematic, doctrinal approach to the problem is lacking," Raag said.

Raag pointed out that the EDF is only now recruiting people to deal with this area, which he says indicates that the start has been put off too much.

While EDF training includes rehearsing how to hide from drones, that hasn't yet become a reflex: Where troops constantly look up during exercises, since they have not had to regularly deal with drone threats, Raag noted.

He too stressed the use of simple weaponry such as shotguns alongside electronic countermeasures. But firing at them also needs to be practised, he recalled.

Raag has previously noted on social media that the whole drone issue is closely tied to the development of electronic warfare (EW), and that anti-drone systems are often more expensive than the drones themselves – meaning Estonia likely won't have the resources to fully develop this area in any case.

"It is very unlikely that Estonia would hike its defense spending above 5 percent of GDP without a direct threat. Today, there is indeed no such direct threat, and so 5 percent is the ceiling for peacetime defense spending. There will be no more money. At the same time, Estonia's primary plans up to the year 2030 are already in place and the funds are largely allocated," he wrote on his social media account.

"Very rightly, air defense is a priority there, as both the Israeli and Ukrainian experiences show that in war, not every Estonian may see Russian soldiers, yet many more people may witness missiles in flight."

Raag added in his post that since one of the threat assessments' priorities would be countering strike drones, then due to lack of personnel, either all Defense League units in Tallinn should be assigned a secondary role in short-range air defense and EW, or air defense, should be automated.

"The good thing is that there are people who understand the problem and are working on plans, but I'm not satisfied that it's all so slow and lacking ambition," said Raag.

He also emphasized that drones are one type of tool that can be used in the so-called gray zone, when actual war has not yet begun.

EDF: We are mainstreaming the drone topic

Probal said that not every EDF unit has instructors specialized in anti-drone tactics, nor is that necessarily a goal.

"Instead, we have prioritized every instructor being involved in general battlefield training is also aware of and able to address the drone topic as part of everyday tactical exercises," he outlined.

"We are not only planning improvements – we are already implementing them. We are gradually integrating new teaching methods and technical solutions into training – first testing them, then scaling up. We are also seeking and growing competence with the support of our allies," Probal continued.

On the question of whether there are enough resources, Probal's answer was that the number of tools in itself is not the ultimate goal. Rather, it is about them being purposefully and thoughtfully deployed.

"Right now we are using a variety of tools to simulate enemy activity – drones, situational descriptions, visual simulations and training scenarios. The goal is for every squad and larger unit to encounter a realistic threat picture during training," he said.

"At the same time, we are aware that technological development requires our constant adaptation. Yes, the situation is changing and improving – but not by itself, rather through our deliberate efforts and investments."

"I would venture to say that we have a clear goal: To provide our soldiers with up-to-date, meaningful and realistic training in the context of any drone threat. We are already on that path, but we also know that that path has no end. The enemy's capabilities will evolve too. Our readiness just has to evolve even faster," Probal stressed in conclusion.

Ukrainian experience being adapted to Estonian conditions

Commenting on the utility of lessons from the war in Ukraine, Probal noted that while these are wholly invaluable, they cannot always be transposed on a like-for-like basis.

"Estonia's geography, climate, space and maneuvrability, as well as tactics, differ in many ways. Therefore our approach is this: We take Ukraine's experiences, identify the effective patterns and adapt them to suit our environment. We do not copy – our goal is to reinterpret and refine these lessons for Estonian conditions," he said.

Herem too noted that Estonia's context differs from Ukraine's, where – unlike Estonia's heavily forested landscape – there are vast open fields, which drones have more freedom to range round over.

"There are various assessments, but the fact is our terrain is more covered with trees, so here all this droning would be much less effective. The Russians, of course, would level everything in days or weeks, and then drones fly better – but that would take time. One brigade commander here (in Ukraine – ed.) told me very directly: Listen, you have a lot of forest, drones won't work as well for you," Herem commented.

Overview of issues with drones

Herem also presented ERR with a summary he had compiled of the issues relating to drones and their use.

The first set of problems arises from the fact that with reconnaissance drones, the enemy can locate Estonian units more easily and attack either with indirect fire or drones – or use the information to shore up their defenses.

Camouflage is needed as a counter-measure; movement in smaller groups; using topographical cover during movement; moving rapidly; observing the airspace both by eyeballing it and using dedicated equipment; deploying various active countermeasures such as electronic jamming, firearms and interceptor drones; and finally organize a threat notification system within the unit, for civilians, and with institutions.

As a second group of issues, Herem highlighted drone attacks.

"Basically, it's a mixture of airstrikes and indirect fire which is more accurate and more massive than before," he noted.

The same countermeasures used for reconnaissance drones also help here. In addition, it is worth placing nets around positions or actions – depending on the type of drone, various nets help to some extent.

It is also worthwhile to get acquainted with downing drones and stocking the requisite ammunition, Herem said. "The effectiveness of firearms ranges between 10 and 50 percent, but that's a whole lot more than doing nothing," the general noted.

He also recommends acquiring EW tools – detectors and jammers. "According to the Ukrainians, electronic tools help in roughly half the cases. [In the other] half, it's all about drones guided by fiber optic cables, drones using alternative frequencies, or problems with the electronic devices themselves," Herem explained.

While the enemy looks for shade and silence, our FPV pilots find targets.

: Signum Unit pic.twitter.com/VKGMVdrbxi

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) July 21, 2025

Drone damage has become predominant feature in Ukraine

According to many experts, the use of drones in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has brought significant changes to modern warfare – one that armies around the world have been endeavoring to keep abreast of.

According to some commentators, on both sides of the front line there is a type of no-man's land about 10km in width, where any movement is severely hindered thanks to reconnaissance drones – enemies located there are attacked both by loitering munitions and precise artillery fire, ordered based on data from drones.

At the start of the war in Ukraine, most soldier casualties and injuries were caused by artillery or missiles, meaning mostly lower body injuries; today, both sides are estimated to be losing up to 80 percent of their personnel as a result of drone warfare, and consequently upper body injuries.

This was also noted at a Ministry of Defense briefing last Friday, when military police (Sõjaväepolitsei) commander Col. Toomas Väli said that, whereas during the early phase of the war, the main kinetic tools killing people on the battlefield were artillery and rocket launchers, now these have been replaced by small suicide drones that are used to hunt down even individual soldiers. "Anyone can go watch those videos on YouTube – they are truly terrifying," Väli pointed out.

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