The top news on 7 August was a claim published via the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that U.S. intelligence believes Russia could hit NATO with a smaller‑scale military attack already this decade.

U.S. intelligence has not suddenly begun to consider a Russian attack on NATO likely; what has changed is the assessment of when Vladimir Putin might consider a limited provocation. Previously it was thought he would not do so during the war in Ukraine; now it is considered possible between 2026 and 2029, although the likelihood of a limited ground incursion remains low. Thus, it appears that U.S. intelligence has undergone a significant but not particularly frightening shift.

There is nothing new in the idea that Russia could attack NATO. That Russia's full‑scale assault on Ukraine itself signaled a growing possibility of an attack on NATO is confirmed in the memoir "My Watch: Leading NATO in Wartime" by former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who writes that the day after the full‑scale invasion began, following an emergency online summit of NATO and Ukraine, he said that "one cannot rule out the possibility that Putin might in the future try to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of NATO member states."

The former secretary general also describes his nightmare scenario: "We had to avoid a situation where we would have to choose between responding to a Russian attack with a massive counterattack or witnessing an attack on a NATO country without being able to respond militarily, because that would lead to a devastating major war" (p. 307).

This alarmingly conditional description of an Article 5 situation is not the only questionable statement in Stoltenberg's hastily published memoir. But it shows that he already considered a Russia‑NATO war a real possibility, as he also considered it possible that if Russia achieved a quick fait accompli against a member state — for example, seizing some territory — then the alliance might hesitate to respond militarily, because that would mean starting a "major war."

Critics of the U.S. intelligence speculation published in the Wall Street Journal have said that Russia lacks the resources to start a major war with NATO. Therefore, the scenario discussed is the previously mentioned rapid Russian surprise attack on the eastern flank with limited escalation potential — which in turn should undermine the logic of such a limited initial strike. That seems entirely reasonable.

The location of a limited Russian territorial seizure does not have to be Narva or the Suwałki Gap. In a February 2026 report by the U.S. think tank Atlantic Council (which examined post‑Ukraine‑war scenarios), the most likely escalation point against NATO was considered to be the seizure of Norway's Svalbard archipelago. For Russia, the risks there would be lowest due to Svalbard's special treaty status — Russia has its own settlement there — and the question of whether all NATO allies would be ready to escalate militarily over a distant Arctic archipelago.

Typically, such a scenario includes the next Russian step: nuclear threats. Their credibility has significantly decreased during the war in Ukraine. But Russia has an effective substitute in the coming years: the threat of massive waves of air attacks against one or more NATO member states, including swarms of cheap drones, for which the West currently has no adequate response.

The targets of such a threat could be precisely those infrastructure objects needed for rapid military reinforcement in NATO's border states to deter Russia from further escalation.

Critics of this scenario have rightly asked what Russia's goal and benefit would be from such a risky operation.

Those who consider a limited surprise attack possible argue that Russia's success might not depend on how long it holds the seized territory. It could withdraw its proxy or regular forces after some time (before NATO regroups) and hope that the precedent itself creates enough uncertainty in NATO border states to change political calculations among their populations.

If supporting Ukraine increases the chance of becoming part of some bizarre raiding episode, is it still sensible to continue as before? Especially if the attacker presents concrete demands that Ukraine could fulfill — for example, ending long‑range bombing strikes deep inside Russia against various infrastructure targets.

Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service, which recently scored highly in a comparison of European intelligence agencies, has previously considered this Russian "two‑front" scenario likely in its annual reports. The 2016 and 2020 public threat assessments describe essentially the same strategic problem from two slightly different angles.

The 2016 report considered the possibility that if Russia found itself in conflict with NATO elsewhere and could not respond adequately there, it might open a new conflict in the Baltics to improve its position in post‑conflict negotiations.

The 2020 threat assessment stated the same risk even more directly: although the likelihood of a Russian attack on Estonia was considered small, Moscow could decide on a preemptive military strike in the Baltic states if it feared escalation with the United States in another region of the world.

The Foreign Intelligence Service emphasized that such a decision might not stem from a rational plan to conquer the Baltics, but could arise from Russia's distorted threat perception and political miscalculation, meaning Russia might try to seize a border town or region instead of the entire country.

The conclusion of both assessments is remarkably similar to the current U.S. intelligence view: attacking the Baltic states need not be an independent goal for Moscow, but could be a tool of horizontal escalation — a way to create a new military problem for NATO and use it either to influence the opponent's actions or as bargaining leverage in later negotiations.

What the WSJ‑published U.S. intelligence opinions and recent Polish‑Lithuanian public warnings ignore is the question of whether Russia still has escalation options before attacking NATO. Hard‑to‑attribute hybrid escalation is already a reality, but an openly attributable military attack does not seem likely until the Kremlin has exhausted escalation options against Ukraine.

One of the most obvious has already been discussed in light of the West's shortage of air‑defense missiles. This winter's air war could be exceptionally difficult for Ukraine, especially if Russia's friends help Moscow replenish its missile stockpiles.

The well‑informed journalist Michael Weiss wrote on 7 August on X, commenting on the WSJ article, that the United States passed the intelligence described in the article to the Nordics, the Baltics, and Poland already a couple of months ago. Polish media have confirmed this via the president's office.

If this intelligence has also been shared with Estonia, it could be stated publicly. So far, only skepticism has been expressed — which Weiss claims is exactly how the U.S. assessment was received in most of NATO's northeastern region.

It is entirely possible that by announcing a substantive but overall marginal shift in its threat assessment, the United States wants to influence Europe's war‑policy decisions, and at the same time is presenting an honest and sincere intelligence estimate. One does not exclude the other.

There is no point in panicking over scenarios considered unlikely; rather, this is a signal that preparations must be adjusted for developments previously considered impossible. Increase the pace and build capabilities.

The remedy for such risks is quite prosaic: the West must significantly accelerate drone defense and critical infrastructure protection, ensure large and rapid allied reinforcements, ammunition stockpiles, and a defense industry capable of replenishing losses even during a prolonged defensive war.

Internal security, including civil protection, must not be delayed. Eliminating these vulnerabilities makes us less insecure in the face of any military threat.

Deterrence is not a parade or a political pose, and threats cannot be managed by expressing skepticism alone. Deterrence is above all arithmetic. Not only Moscow, but we ourselves must know with certainty that an aggressor cannot quickly win a small war, and that even a large war.

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