From our perspective: if Iceland and Norway, for example, wanted to join the European Union, would we simply say welcome? We wouldn't have anything against it?

I would certainly like to hope that would be the case, if we were to reach such a situation. In Iceland's case, the question may arise sooner, because Iceland is heading toward a referendum on joining the European Union. Iceland has not held such a referendum so far; Norway has done so twice in its history, so the Norwegian people have already had their say. In Norway's case, one might expect that the process could be more complex than simply reaching a decision.

These discussions have existed before in both countries. Is there something more realistic in the air now than there was, say, 15 years ago?

The doors of the European Union have always been open; it's just that the process has been comparatively fair‑weather politics, where everyone has plenty of time. Major changes, geopolitical shifts, and wars have sharpened these choices both within countries and within the European Union. That is why this process has started moving again, and I think a unique window of opportunity has opened that may not be repeated. We have been waiting for such an opportunity, and from Estonia's point of view it is now important to make use of this window.

But what is our overall view on enlargement? Are we among those countries that would like to see countries such as Norway, Iceland, and — if it so wishes — the United Kingdom join, but also Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkan states?

So far, in enlargement policy we have naturally focused on our closest interests and our neighbors, but in enlargement policy as such Estonia has always been one of the strongest supporters. The group of enlargement‑minded friends even still carries Tallinn's name and continues to meet. There are already 13 member states; apparently everyone would like to be part of it, because no one wants to be labeled anti‑enlargement.

I believe that through our own experience we have seen the transformative power of this process. Of course, we probably wouldn't talk about this in the context of Norway, Iceland, the United Kingdom, or Switzerland. But coming from a similar background system, we have seen — and perhaps now represent in the best possible way — what can happen to a country if it makes the most of this opportunity.

Yet after we joined, a few more countries joined and then that window closed. Why has the European Union become somewhat stuck in this process?

I don't think it's only the European Union getting stuck. First of all, there has been the question of how much this process itself has changed. The European Union has changed enormously — even during our own period of membership.

Someone recalled that we had to adopt about 20,000 pages of EU law. Today, Ukraine has to adopt 40,000 — twice as much.

Certain areas — security, Schengen, the European Monetary Union — have come through crises, and EU law has constantly expanded. This process is not directly comparable to any previous accession. We can say we did unique things, but those joining now will also have to do unique things.

Second, as mentioned, this has been fair‑weather politics. Some cynics have even compared it to Soviet labor law: some pretend to work and others pretend to pay, and that's how the process went for some time.

Now momentum has emerged in this process, and after the Hungarian election results — where a new government is still being formed — there is hope that the process can be accelerated.

Do you think that if Péter Magyar becomes Hungary's prime minister on Saturday, there will then be hope that some negotiations will actually be opened, when we talk about Ukraine and Moldova, for example?

I would like to hope not only Ukraine and Moldova. Hungary itself is very interested in the Western Balkan countries because they are immediate neighbors. Every country is deeply interested in its surroundings and their security, and broader ideals are also at play.

I think a Hungarian government that has promised change also has, in a sense, a burden or obligation to show that these changes are actually happening. I believe — and would hope — that smoothing relations with Ukraine is among those changes.

Magyar has said he plans to go to Ukraine soon, and hopefully such bilateral issues will recede into the background, making room for discussions on European matters as well.

But at the same time, we've seen in history that when one country's veto disappears, someone else suddenly shows up with a new veto—think of North Macedonia.

In North Macedonia's case, it has more or less always been a tandem problem, and unfortunately that has indeed been the case. One would hope that we now find a way and the will to unite the entire continent. Bulgaria recently held elections—what will the outcome be? I think we have perhaps paid too little attention to what may be coming from there.

Still, I would like to hope that this will now move firmly in that direction and that the European choice remains on the table among all options.

Returning specifically to Iceland and now also the United Kingdom: I've read in the press that one reason they might want to move closer to the EU again is security considerations. Over the time that we've been in the EU, has it to some extent become a mini‑NATO?

If we rewind a bit, security considerations were also central to Estonia's accession. It was also known that rapid NATO enlargement was not on the table at the time.

Some Western Balkan countries are already NATO members. I think Iceland certainly has similar considerations. Today, this is the best option on the table, and as a regional, continental organization, Europeans are sticking together regardless of where the world seems to be heading.

You also deal at the Foreign Ministry with the new long‑term EU budget; a new period begins in 2028. A few years ago in Brussels it was said that this budget period should certainly take into account that one or more countries might join the EU during those seven years. Has that been taken into account?

In truth, you never really plan for any specific country. Incidentally, during our own accession negotiations, budget negotiations were also beginning and to some extent followed a similar path.

If we're talking, for example, about agricultural subsidies, even in our case we only reached about 80 percent during that period — and we've been members for nearly 22 years now.

Ultimately, it's a question of choices, national interests, what a country wants to achieve, and whether that is the most important issue. Eventually, we reach negotiations on the accession treaty itself.

At that point, the entire balance sheet is on the table: what to do and where to invest. I wouldn't be surprised at all if agricultural subsidies turn out not to be as sharp an issue as people think. Ukraine itself has said that it is more interested in access to the EU's internal market and participation in institutions.

Ukrainian agriculture is already competitive even without subsidies, and I would certainly remind people that Estonia once had similar talking points.

Could the problem instead be that Ukrainian agriculture is already too competitive?

That's definitely a matter of perspective, and I believe all these issues will come up in negotiations — for example, the free movement of people. There is no reason to doubt that; it's simply a matter of preparing how to reach an agreement. I think these issues are manageable, and money should not be the main issue. It seems to me that today the most urgent issue is Ukraine itself.

Now that €90 billion in loans has been provided to Ukraine, the question is what happens after 2027. At the moment, the pressing question is how to continue financing and how to involve third parties in supporting Ukraine. This will certainly be one of our priorities in the budget negotiations as well.

It's probably also important for us how much money goes to defense. From Estonia's perspective, what is the hope that this share will increase in the EU's long‑term budget? Do you currently have any idea how much money will go there?

In the EU budget, the defense‑industry sector is very prominent. Direct defense spending, as we think of it at the national level, has never really been part of the EU budget. We should remember that the EU budget is roughly about one percent of GDP. That has to cover cohesion policy, agricultural policy, and so on.

The small amount that can be done from the EU budget has mostly gone toward certain military operations or to supporting the defense industry. Everything related to Europe's defense capacity and defense innovation has been the main focus. The rest is still financed by the member states, and then it becomes a question of joint decisions — whether we want to do more.

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