Margo Palloson: A state weakened from within is easier to break

The overall threat picture has not changed. Estonia's principal adversary remains the same – it was, is, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be Russia with its imperialist mindset, writes Margo Palloson, director general of the Internal Security Service (ISS/KAPO), in the agency's new annual report.
This year marks the 35th anniversary of Estonia's restored independence and the re-establishment of the Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO). From a security perspective, the Estonian state and society have faced a range of evolving threats during this time. We have confronted these challenges together, learned from them and grown stronger. These decades of addressing diverse security challenges have provided us with invaluable experience, shaping KAPO into a capable institution prepared to meet today's demands. We recognize that security is complex and interconnected. In addition to a strong military defense, Estonia requires effective internal security, functional institutions, the rule of law and an informed society. In a country that values freedom, all of this is built on trust.
The overall threat picture has not changed. Estonia's principal adversary remains the same – it was, is, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be Russia with its imperialist mindset.
Authoritarian states seek to influence and divide democratic societies, undermine trust in public institutions and weaken countries' resilience and decision-making capacity. A state weakened from within is easier to break. Estonia's experience and historical memory help us understand these dangers. Our society knows and remembers what it means to lose one's freedom.
KAPO's mission is to protect Estonia's constitutional order and internal security. But we do not live or operate in isolation – developments in the world affect us and our sense of security. Threats to Estonia's internal security largely stem from a volatile external environment. This makes today's threat landscape diverse and multilayered. Alongside Russia's continued aggression against Ukraine and other military conflicts, non-military threats are increasingly prominent.
Actors pursuing hostile objectives typically operate covertly. Countering external influence operations is one of the primary battlefields for Estonia and its allies. The adversary seeks to undermine social cohesion and alliances and to erode trust in the state. Sanctions have curtailed Russia's hostile activities, including its propaganda efforts. Much of this activity has shifted to social media, where it is amplified by artificial intelligence and algorithm-driven information flows. Efforts focus on persuading individuals to present hostile narratives as their own, because propaganda is more effective when disseminated by local voices. Last year, we repeatedly saw attempts to destabilize Estonia's internal stability through simple and inexpensive social media campaigns – from bomb threats to attacks targeting the local community in Narva, both on Telegram. For the adversary, having such campaigns amplified by mainstream media is considered a success, as it enhances the credibility and reach of hostile messages. Similar attacks are likely to continue.
We continue to regard the active operations of Russian intelligence services across various environments as a major threat to Estonia's security. We see attempts to recruit individuals at the Estonian–Russian border, campaigns on social media to enlist so-called one-off collaborators, and sophisticated cyber intrusion attempts targeting public- and private-sector systems. Last year, we detected a record number of individuals acting on behalf of Russian intelligence services and expelled foreign nationals who posed a security threat. This does not indicate an increase in the threat level; rather, it reflects the preventive effectiveness of Estonia's internal security efforts.
As a result of KAPO's consistent countermeasures, Estonia does not provide fertile ground for violent ideological or religious extremism or terrorism. The threat posed by far-right and Islamist extremism remains low.
Nevertheless, we must remain vigilant to prevent conflicts in the Middle East, ideological extremism and a broader culture of violence in our interconnected world from spilling over into Estonia. There are no terrorist organizations operating here, but we must be vigilant in preventing attacks by individuals who have become radicalised or influenced by extremist views online. Social media serves as a catalyst in normalizing violence, particularly attracting and influencing young people. Major social media platforms could take meaningful steps to limit harmful content, yet short-term commercial logic often leads them to do the opposite.
Ensuring economic security and preventing corruption are becoming ever more important. The state is investing increasing resources in defense and energy, which heightens the need for effective risk mitigation in these sectors. Together, we must ensure that society receives the best value from these investments.
KAPO works every day to make Estonia a difficult target and to make sure people feel safe in the country. In collaboration with domestic and international partners, we maintain a sufficiently strong protective framework to address these threats and challenges. We also provide support to our allies whenever our expertise, capabilities and resources allow. The restrictive and isolating countermeasures and sanctions applied by KAPO, the Estonian state and Europe more broadly against Russia are effective and help safeguard Estonia's internal security. I want to emphasise that sanctions – a means of compelling an end to the war – work. The war in Ukraine has not ended, but we have slowed the momentum of Russia's war machine.
We greatly value and appreciate the contributions of the people of Estonia, citizens of other countries, partner institutions and allies. A secure state relies on an informed and resilient society. Individuals who notice suspicious activities, critically assess information, avoid spreading hostile narratives and report potential threats make a vital contribution to Estonia's security.
Trust within the state and society is one of the most effective protective layers against potential threats. This annual review provides an overview of the threat landscape and the most effective ways to mitigate it.
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Editor: Helen Wright









