Isamaa leader: Orban's defeat would diminish Russia's influence in Europe

Urmas Reinsalu, head of the opposition Isamaa party, told ERR that Donald Trump's positions are becoming increasingly transactional, but it is in Estonia's interest that dialogue between the United States and Europe not break down. Reinsalu also described the sharing of information with the Kremlin by Péter Szijjártó as treacherous.
Do Donald Trump's statements about the United States potentially leaving NATO worry you? Especially considering that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has been seen as the most pro-European member of the Trump administration, has now taken similar positions?
Yes, I believe we must take these signals extremely seriously. One issue is the confrontation between Europe and the United States and more broadly the risks if that confrontation deepens. Another issue is our particular geopolitical position as we are at the tip of NATO's "peninsula." There is certainly a growing risk that Russia may draw conclusions in the future — possibly incorrect ones — that could lead to provocations directed at the Baltic states or NATO's eastern border.
Taking into account the recent drone incidents on Estonia's territory, countries on the eastern flank and Estonia in particular have reason in the current situation to seek balancing deterrence measures.
The range of deterrence measures varies. I believe it would be reasonable for us, also at the NATO level, to request additional air surveillance and air defense capabilities to be temporarily deployed on Estonian territory. This is because a real drone provocation by Russia cannot be ruled out as we recall from the incident over Poland's territory in the fall of 2025.
Secondly, of course, there is high-level political communication, which also means maintaining high-level political engagement with the United States.
Do you think those European countries — led by Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy — that did not assist the United States in the Middle East and also refused the use of military bases and overflights did the right thing or not?
From the perspective of those European countries, this is certainly part of the growing distrust toward the United States. That cannot be separated from the situation. As this distrust grows, it in turn triggers a reaction, which we see reflected in the positions of Donald Trump. Communication is becoming increasingly transactional.
Without calling into question autonomous decisions of any country regarding granting access to their bases or airspace or their own involvement in addressing the war with Iran, it is in our vital security interests that a point of dialogue and cooperation be found again.
Yesterday, the president of Finland and the president of the United States spoke and it would certainly be in our interest to have a high-level meeting between European leaders and Trump as we recall from previous visits to the White House. A balance point needs to be rediscovered as it has repeatedly begun to slip away. It is in our interest that this balance be restored.
But how easy is it to maintain that dialogue in a situation where Donald Trump says that NATO is merely a paper tiger — something that, according to him, Vladimir Putin also knows? Why is there a need to humiliate allies in this way and reinforce rhetoric that Putin has used for years?
No one should allow themselves to be humiliated — that is self-evident. The strategic posture of European leaders is certainly also shaped by earlier positions, which cannot be separated from the current situation.
Despite the fact that European countries were not involved in the war with Iran, the current reluctance to offer bases or military capabilities stems from a broader downturn in relations. The issue is not about humiliation or the lack of it, but about recognizing one's vital security interests.
Within this logic, we must understand that for us, the key signals concern the functioning of NATO and its eastern flank. These additional deterrence signals need to be generated quickly in the current acute security environment. Secondly, it is in our interest to see the emergence of a new balance point, rather than an escalating spiral leading to further conflict.

Estonia's foreign minister, Margus Tsahkna, has somewhat differed from his European counterparts. For example, he has said that "we cannot say that the war with Iran has nothing to do with us" and that "Estonia is ready to discuss sending troops to the Strait of Hormuz." Do you stand in solidarity with the Estonian foreign minister on these issues?
I believe that a position in which one is prepared to seriously discuss specific requests from the United States to its allies, including Estonia, is a rational approach in the current context. We must understand our own position and what constitutes the backbone of our collective defense. Anything that weakens that backbone is, for us, existentially dangerous.
Parliamentary elections will take place in Hungary on April 12 and according to polls, the opposition Tisza Party is currently in the lead, with a real chance of removing Viktor Orbán's Fidesz from power. Orbán has slowed support for Ukraine as well as sanctions against Russia and it has now emerged that Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó shared sensitive information with the Kremlin. What are your thoughts on this?
Condemnation. This is treacherous behavior.
I hope that the Tisza Party, led by Péter Magyar, wins the next elections in Hungary. Magyar's party is also affiliated with the European People's Party. I recently had contact with their representatives. This is a very dramatic confrontation. And we in Estonia must clearly define this confrontation — every Estonian patriot should proceed from the logic that Orbán's defeat would also mean a reduction of Russia's strategic influence in Europe.
However, Eerik-Niiles Kross, a member of the Reform Party, recently recalled that when you were foreign minister in Jüri Ratas's government, you supported Fidesz and that in 2020 the same Péter Szijjártó said after a phone call with you that he thanked Estonia for supporting Hungary. He also claimed that you "refused to yield to any pressure and did not criticize Hungary despite the risk of being stigmatized by the liberal press" and that you promised Szijjártó Hungary could rely on you in the future. Has your attitude toward Fidesz and Szijjártó changed?
What Kross is referring to — and I understand the line of argument about trying to use it to scare people about Isamaa — is taken completely out of context. Isamaa is a member of the European People's Party and the current Hungarian opposition force — the only one expected to remove Orbán's party from power — is also a member of the European People's Party. The reference Kross cited stems from a specific case some time before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

I recall that when I returned to the post of foreign minister in 2022 after the war began, my actual interaction with Hungary reflected the reality that even then they were firmly opposed to additional sanctions, including those proposed by Estonia. My position was to pressure them to abandon that stance, which they generally did not do. On such fundamental issues, a state, its people and its politicians must define the essence of the matter.
Naturally, our perspective on what is happening in Hungary is framed by the question of Russia and setting that aside would be entirely inconceivable.
Let's talk about the recent drone incidents in Estonia, which have divided Estonian politicians and to some extent the public into two camps. Some say Estonia is protected and that Ukraine must be able to strike Russia's energy infrastructure so that it cannot fuel the war machine that also threatens us. Others — most prominently EKRE — argue that by allowing Ukraine to operate drones near our border and with those drones reaching Estonia, we are provoking Russia and effectively inviting war onto our own territory. Which view do you support more?
My position is principled. First, it would be wrong to direct criticism at Ukraine in a situation where it is conducting offensive operations in war against strategic targets, including in Moscow. We should not be prescribing limits to them. I fully understand that representatives of the Estonian government have emphasized risk mitigation as our responsibility is, of course, to ensure the security of our airspace and the country.
This is a technological issue: whether we are capable of preventing these drones from entering Estonian territory if they are diverted here due to Russian electronic interference. The possibilities are likely limited. I am unequivocally of the view that if we were to redirect current public concern and anxiety about security toward Ukraine, we would be making a strategic mistake.
Second, you outlined two positions: on the one hand, the claim that Estonia is protected and, on the other, the narrative that Ukraine should be pressured to refrain from striking strategic targets because it may create risks for us.
As for the claim that Estonia is protected, we need to make significantly greater efforts here. In recent days, I have examined the situation in more detail with the help of private-sector specialists and other military experts and I must acknowledge that development in drone defense and surveillance capabilities has been too slow, especially considering that the war has already been ongoing for five years. This must be recognized honestly and objectively.
A certain dissonance has also emerged: on the one hand, we hear statements from politicians and police leadership that we have the military capability to shoot down these drones, yet for various reasons this capability is not being used. At the same time, it is said that if drones enter our airspace, they will be shot down. Such conflicting assertions, carrying different weight, understandably create confusion among the public.

But what, specifically, should be done differently or better than is being done now, especially when you yourself emphasize that this is already the fifth year of the war?
First, using these drone incidents as the basis, we need to objectively create additional air defense and air surveillance capabilities as a deterrent measure. Second, this concerns critical infrastructure and the ability to monitor drones over the country's territory, including with acoustic devices and to establish local counter-drone nodes. These different technologies do in fact already exist, including from Estonian companies that supply them, among others, to Ukraine. Procurement and placing orders have recently begun, but unfortunately this has not happened fast enough.
We need to understand that in the philosophy of war, one thing is provocations and the collateral consequences of war that end up on our territory and we must mitigate that threat. But in the logic of a war of aggression and in preparing for future threats, the significance of drones in warfare and in organizing defense has fundamentally changed.
Mr. Kook, did you notice that in the fifth year of the war, the Government Office is sending out legal rules of conduct for unmanned aircraft that define the powers of the Defense Forces and the Police and Border Guard Board? To me, that is stalling behavior.
Naturally, these delays must be eliminated. I would also like to see a role for the Defense League in civilian protection related to counter-drone efforts, but that was not set out in the Government Office document in any way. The Defense League should already be conducting drone training, but in this framework it is underfunded. We need a more forceful approach.
I would also draw attention to the drafting of the 10-year national defense development plan. I consider it important that it take into account precisely territorial civilian protection and counter-drone capability.
I also consider one fundamental premise important: if unmanned aircraft enter the country's territory, we must achieve the capability and capacity to bring those drones down or destroy them. But by sending out contradictory messages, we are giving the adversary the wrong signal about what our exact response protocol is.
Finally, Mr. Reinsalu, I noticed that Isamaa recently once again pledged its support for the continuation in office of the current president, Alar Karis. At the same time, Toomas Hendrik Ilves has put forward several other distinguished candidates, including Jüri Luik. Luik has been a member of Isamaa since around 1992, I believe. Why do you not support him or have you at least discussed the presidential election with him?
Yes, I have spoken with him. I believe that Jüri Luik is currently making a very significant contribution as Estonia's permanent representative to NATO. I have spoken with him, but as for Alar Karis...
...let's finish the topic of Luik before moving on to Karis — what did he tell you?
I don't think it is my place to comment on Jüri Luik's views. The question was whether I have spoken with him, including about the presidential election. My answer to you is yes.
It is clear that Jüri Luik is capable of fulfilling virtually any role in our diplomacy, foreign relations and public service. There is no question about that.
However, we are currently in a situation where Isamaa has expressed its support for Alar Karis and we have presented our arguments as to why this is a reasonable course of action in the current circumstances. It is also fair to say that, in order to find common ground — considering both our position in terms of public trust and the external environment — all parties must set aside their partisan egoism. This may be more difficult for some political forces than others, but I believe it aligns with the needs and expectations of society.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski








