Looking at the airstrike statistics from Ukraine in 2025, we can draw conclusions about how Russia might attack us from the air and what kind of air defense we need.

First, we must recognize that the air threat in Ukraine differs significantly from how we've generally imagined air attacks. Second, Ukraine's air defense has evolved alongside the threat. Broadly speaking, all airstrikes can be divided into four categories: (1) ballistic missiles, (2) cruise missiles, (3) long-range attack drones (Geran, Gerber, Shahed) and (4) glide bombs (simplified as KABs).

Excluding glide bombs, attacks using aircraft or helicopters are rare. An estimated 20 percent of ballistic missile (Iskander-M) and 95 percent of glide bomb strikes rely on unmanned reconnaissance drones, which have essentially become as important targets as long-range attack drones or cruise missiles.

KABs are typically dropped from aircraft about 60 kilometers from the target, remaining ten or more kilometers from the front line — relatively safe territory within their own airspace.

In 2025, a total of 44,782 bombs were dropped — an average of 123 per day — carried out via approximately 26,000 sorties using Sukhoi-type aircraft. Air defense systems managed to intercept only 22 of them. The primary targets are military, including civilian infrastructure. Fewer strikes are aimed at military support structures (command centers, supplies).

It's worth noting that KABs accounted for 44 percent of all four categories of airstrikes. Their small size (about 3 meters by 0.5 meters), high speed (600–1,000 km/h) and minimal heat signature make them essentially untouchable by conventional air defense weapons.

There has been talk of electronic interference, but its effectiveness remains unclear. Thus, from an air defense standpoint, the only realistic way to counter this threat is by destroying the Sukhoi-type aircraft that drop the bombs. Since these bombs are released at least ten kilometers deep into enemy-controlled airspace, countering them requires long-range air defense (LRAD), whether ground- or air-based. Deploying such systems close to the front line entails high risk, which Ukraine generally avoids.

As a result, KABs have become one of the main airstrike tools in frontline areas. In Estonia's case, we would have to rely on allied aircraft and deep strikes — 250 to 500 kilometers from the front line — to counter KABs. Destroying the reconnaissance drones that identify targets for these glide bombs also reduces their effectiveness.

Ballistic missiles (Iskander-M, Kinzhal, S-300) are generally launched from 60 to 300 kilometers behind the front line. Kinzhals are fired from MiG-31K aircraft. In 2025, ballistic missiles were launched 979 times and air defenses intercepted 180 of them, or 18 percent. Combining all ballistic and cruise missiles and long-range attack drones used by Russia in 2025, ballistic missiles accounted for less than 2 percent of all airstrikes.

Ballistic missiles are typically used against military targets, including high-value equipment (HIMARS, air defense systems), but are also used against concentrated ground forces, supporting infrastructure and industry. In such cases, Iskander-M missiles are often paired with Orlan reconnaissance drones.

Among Ukraine's air defense systems, LRADs (Patriot, SAMP) are suitable for countering this threat. The low interception rate of ballistic missiles does not indicate ineffective weaponry, but rather a shortage of such systems.

One LRAD launcher generally covers a range of 10 to 20 kilometers against ballistic missiles. For example, defending a Kyiv-sized area like Hiiumaa would theoretically require one or two launchers, though in practice more are needed. Each launcher group must also include a radar and command center. A ballistic missile could fly over LRAD positions and strike a target without any nearby air defense system.

In addition to the number of launchers, the availability of ammunition also matters. But that's not the whole picture. Since 2025, Russia has increasingly used so-called combined strikes involving simultaneous launches of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside long-range attack drones. In such cases, air defense radar may display dozens of targets at once, increasing the likelihood of decision-making errors. In other words, ballistic and cruise missiles are masked by waves of attack drones, overloading fire control systems.

As in Ukraine, Estonia will need LRADs to counter ballistic missiles. We certainly do not have enough systems to defend the entire country. It can be said that to protect an area with a 20-kilometer diameter, at least two launchers are needed (likely more), along with a radar and fire control center. LRADs will likely be used to defend static and strategic "targets," while high-value military assets must rely on concealment and deception for protection.

Although statistics are lacking, information from Ukraine suggests that decoys have often absorbed strikes, preserving real assets. Ballistic missile launches in Ukraine have varied widely, from 0 to 25 per day. Given this and Russia's capabilities, it's reasonable to expect that, in the event of an attack on the three Baltic states, Russia could launch up to 15 ballistic missiles per day at targets in Estonia during the first days or week.

It's important to emphasize the coordination between ballistic missiles and reconnaissance drones and the rapid response in targeting detected assets. In Ukraine, unmanned reconnaissance drones often reach 50 to 100 kilometers deep, identifying not only air defense systems, HIMARS and troop concentrations, but also drone crews — especially long-range drone operators and their launch sites.

Therefore, in addition to air defense, deception and camouflage, it's essential to locate and destroy ballistic missile units (launchers, command centers, ammunition). Estonia can use HIMARS for this purpose and in certain cases, long-range attack drones. In addition to existing systems, these must be further developed and acquired.

Cruise missiles are launched from land, sea and air at ranges of 500 to 5,000 kilometers. In 2025, Russia used various cruise missiles against Ukraine 1,315 times, of which 949 (72 percent) were intercepted. Among all ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and long-range drones used by Russia in 2025, cruise missiles accounted for just over 2 percent. Depending on the type, they are used against various infrastructure targets.

Although detailed statistics are not public, it is known that Ukraine uses both medium-range air defense (IRIS-T, NASAMS) and short-range systems (Igla, Piorun, Stinger, Mistral) against cruise missiles. F-16 aircraft also take part in cruise missile interception. The proportional use of these systems is not publicly known.

Short-range air defense is made viable by relatively good air surveillance and the positioning of air defense systems along likely cruise missile corridors. Naturally, destroying the platforms that launch these missiles is also possible. However, it's unclear whether Operation Spiderweb — conducted in 2025 against strategic bombers — had any noticeable statistical impact.

Estonia already has VSHORAD systems like Mistral and Piorun. In 2026, we will acquire the MRAD IRIS-T. We can also count on allied aircraft. All of this requires strong air surveillance and fire control, which needs further development in Estonia and is currently underway.

In 2025, cruise missile launches in Ukraine ranged from 0 to 100 per day. Considering this and Russia's capabilities, it's likely that in an attack on the Baltic states, Russia could launch up to 50 cruise missiles per day at Estonian targets during the first few days.

Estonia also has an additional capability that supports defense against cruise missiles — anti-ship missiles. Of those 50 cruise missiles, about 10 would likely be launched from Baltic Fleet ships. Thanks to the Blue Spear anti-ship missile and allied support, we can cover the entire Baltic Sea, making cruise missile launches from ships relatively risky. That's why Russia began developing a flotilla of Buyan-M and Karakurt-class ships on Lake Ladoga several years ago from where it could more safely launch Kalibr-type missiles.

Long-range attack drones (Shahed, Geran and Gerber) are arguably the most widely used airstrike tool in the war on Ukraine. In 2025, Russia used them 54,593 times, of which 47,052, or 86 percent, were intercepted. Still, over 7,500 reached their targets. Compared to ballistic and cruise missiles, these drones accounted for 96 percent of all long-range aerial attack platforms. They are launched from 50 to 300 kilometers behind the front line and have a range of up to 1,300 kilometers.

According to unofficial sources, Gerbers make up as much as 40 percent of these drones. Gerbers were initially developed as decoys to accompany Gerans and overload Ukrainian air defense, but in 2025, they were often found to contain small warheads. They are also used as reconnaissance or communications relays between other drones and ground operators.

From an air defense perspective, it makes no real difference whether it's a Geran or Gerber — they both must be destroyed. Their usual targets are civilian infrastructure, but in the second half of 2025, cases increased where Gerans were essentially used as "large FPVs," attacking air defense positions.

There were even cases in 2025 where Gerans attacked the helicopters hunting them. Toward the end of the year, some Gerans appeared equipped with VSHORAD air defense missiles.

Despite their relatively low cost, they are highly capable attack tools. When flying in swarms or sequences, they can form communication networks and transmit air defense data to operators hundreds of kilometers away. In addition to inertial navigation, GPS and radio, this type of drone can reportedly use local mobile networks. As their altitude varies, they may be radar-invisible at low altitude and unreachable by short-range systems at high altitude.

In 2025, more than half of these drones were reportedly destroyed by aircraft, including helicopters and planes using machine guns. Nearly 30 percent were taken out by mobile ground-based gun and machine gun crews, including Gepard and Skynet systems. While in earlier years about 50 percent were intercepted using missiles, this figure dropped significantly in 2025 due to rising missile costs and limited availability. As a result, more missiles became available for use against cruise missiles.

By the end of 2025, public data suggests that intercept drones took over much of the task. Although electronic warfare tools have been widely discussed, their statistical effectiveness is not publicly known and Ukrainian assessments vary greatly. It's also unclear how successful Ukraine has been in attacking drone launch sites, depots and production facilities, though several strikes have occurred.

Estonia would have several tools to counter these drones. First, the country has hundreds of 12.7 mm heavy machine guns — also used by Ukraine — which could be modified and upgraded for air defense use. Estonia also has 23 mm anti-aircraft cannons and man-portable air defense missiles (Piorun and Mistral). Clearly, our arsenal must be expanded, including the procurement and development of intercept drones and improved surveillance, particularly acoustic surveillance, which has proven effective in Ukraine.

While Russia launches these drones from up to 300 kilometers away in Ukraine, they could do so from even farther in Estonia. With a range of 1,300 kilometers, launch sites could be as far as 1,000 kilometers from the Estonian border.

Based on Ukrainian experience, Estonia could expect Russia to use up to 160 Gerans/Gerbers per day in the early days of an attack and to launch them alongside cruise and ballistic missiles.

Before drawing final conclusions from these four types of air threats, we must also examine the role of unmanned reconnaissance drones. Depending on the model, they operate at different altitudes and ranges and work in conjunction with various weapon systems.

It is estimated that nearly 20 percent of all Iskander-M missile strikes and more than 90 percent of glide bombs, loitering munitions and FPVs rely on intelligence from these drones — either previously collected or relayed in real time. Their footage is also used to assess strike effectiveness. Much of the video we see of Ukrainian or Russian drone and missile strikes is filmed by these surveillance tools.

It's unclear how many of them Russia used in 2025. But we do know Ukrainian forces destroyed about 2,000 reconnaissance drones. According to unofficial sources, most of them were taken out by intercept drones, but systems used against Gerans and Gerbers were also effective and in some cases even medium-range air defense was used.

In Estonia's case, reconnaissance drones may be the least "covered" threat — assuming we acquire long-range air defense in the near future and allies assist with ballistic missile defense. Estonia has a relatively advanced drone industry and is developing a short-range air defense missile. Based on Ukraine's example, our short-range systems are not entirely helpless against this threat. Still, our ability to detect reconnaissance drones needs further development and Estonia's defense industry may well have the potential to contribute.

In summary

Based on Ukraine's experience, the most substantial aerial threats come from glide bombs and long-range attack drones. These two systems have caused more damage there than either cruise or ballistic missiles.

Geran- and Gerber-type drones have accounted for over 90 percent of the burden on air defenses. Aircraft, short-range air defense systems and interceptor drones are primarily used to neutralize them. With the current level of technology and resources, Estonia could achieve a defense capability similar to Ukraine's, but we must be prepared for a threat volume far greater than past theories and assessments have led us to expect.

The main question is how we plan to counter this threat. To mitigate the strikes that do get through, critical sites must be fortified with engineering solutions, rapid restoration capabilities must be ensured and alternative functions identified for destroyed assets.

Only long-range air defense (LRAD) is suitable for intercepting ballistic missiles. Given the limited number of these systems, decisions must be made about which targets are to be protected with the available resources. To defend power generation, 330 kV substations, ports, warehouses, headquarters and other facilities across Estonia, dozens of launchers, radars, command centers and a significant quantity of missiles would be needed — just for the first week of war.

Based on the expected volume of ballistic missiles threatening us, Estonia would need 105 LRAD missiles for the first week alone. We must also decide what portion of this threat and which protected targets we assign to our allies. The efficiency and limitations of air defense suggest that in order to reduce this threat, we must strike its sources — launchers, storage sites and possibly even production facilities. Estonia must absolutely apply aggressive air defense strategies as part of its ballistic missile defense.

In terms of cruise missiles, both Ukraine's experience and Estonia's own armament suggest we are relatively well prepared. But again, the key question remains: how exactly will we defend against them? What share of the potential threat will we handle with medium- or short-range air defense systems and what share will be delegated to our allies, including those using aircraft-based defense?

As of now, Estonia has only two options for countering glide bombs: allied aircraft-based air defense and deep strikes on enemy airfields and aircraft. Although this threat is primarily at the tactical level, Ukraine's example shows that it has been one of the main tools used to break Ukrainian defenses and pave the way for territorial advances. In any case, the critical question here is: with what assets will we destroy the sources of this threat?

To destroy reconnaissance drones, in addition to our existing tools, we will need interceptor drones deployed along the entire defensive line and to a depth of 100 kilometers at a scale that allows for the destruction of dozens of drones per day. The primary question is where we will acquire these systems and how we will integrate them into our defense forces.

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