Friday's Russian violation of Estonia's national airspace was undoubtedly an unfriendly and provocative move. I understand those asking why the aircraft weren't shot down. Warplanes from an aggressor country in our skies is something we, as a state, cannot and will not tolerate.

That said, the Russians made a much louder entrance in both domestic and international media than they did in our airspace — and that is unfortunate. The coverage created the impression that Estonia was brazenly invaded and we stood by helplessly. While the global mood is tense and it's tempting to publish alarming headlines, I would urge Estonian media to exercise more situational awareness and less panic-driven enthusiasm.

We live in a time when Estonians must not only have completed basic military training, know their wartime role and be confident that the Russians will be beaten — but also understand NATO air policing protocols and trust, at least a little, in what our Defense Forces and allies are doing.

Since 1991, the Russians have flown regularly between bases in the Leningrad Military District and Kaliningrad (Königsberg). Especially in recent years, these flights have often included trolling the airspace of Estonia, Finland, Sweden or other countries.

They fly close to the borders, approach the edge of Swedish airspace and then turn sharply back, fly in hazardous ways. Almost always without transponders or flight plans. Since 2014, Russian aircraft have violated Estonia's airspace more than 40 times. Almost all of these cases have been brief "corner cuts" near the island of Vaindloo, where the Russian and Estonian airspace control zones do not precisely align with the state border.

The last significant period of violations was in 2016, when there were ten incidents. By the way, in July 2018, when Vladimir Putin flew from Moscow to Helsinki to meet with Donald Trump, his plane also violated Estonian airspace near Vaindloo, remaining inside it for 50 seconds. In contrast, no violations were reported in 2023 or 2024.

This latest incident was markedly more serious for four reasons.

First, the duration. Russian aircraft likely haven't spent this long in our airspace since 2004, right before Estonia joined NATO, when they flew over Tallinn.

Second, the geography of the violation was different. While it's almost believable that incursions near Vaindloo might occasionally be accidental, this time the maneuver was far more brazen. The planes entered near Loksa and exited — or were forced out — near Hiiumaa.

Third, the aircraft type. Typically, it's a single, relatively old plane that crosses the border. This time it was three heavy fighter jets — a much more serious matter.

Fourth, the broader international context and how clearly this incident fits into a wider pattern of similar provocations. Nineteen Russian drones over Poland, airspace violations in Romania, intense airstrikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, cyberattacks at Heathrow and so on.

Russia is escalating aggressively across Europe. There is, however, a silver lining: their belligerence elsewhere usually means they are losing ground in Ukraine. On Friday, Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated at least 160 square kilometers, and Russian offensive capability has significantly diminished in recent weeks.

Naturally, Estonia and NATO will now plan how to call Russia to account and hopefully there will be enough backbone to assert sufficient justification. But there's no reason to panic. Despite the impression — undoubtedly one of Russia's aims — that they can do whatever they want, the incident was in reality a fairly cautious border incursion. The flight path deviated slightly south of their usual route, leaving room to claim a navigational error. The aircraft were reportedly unarmed (i.e., no visible missiles under the wings) and the Russians complied with NATO fighter jets' escort maneuvers that forced them out. (Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said, when addressing the UN Security Council on Monday, that the Russian jets were carrying missiles under their wings – ed.)

Before that, a fairly standard air policing operation took place in and near our airspace. Naturally, the exact details haven't been made public and NATO's rules of engagement (ROE) in such situations are classified, but the core principles are easy to find for anyone interested. The Russians certainly know them and clearly took care not to trigger a shootdown.

It may be helpful to understand how Estonia/NATO responds (and responded on Friday) to a Russian airspace violation. First, the Baltic Air Policing mission is a NATO peacetime quick reaction alert (QRA) mission covering Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Allied fighter units rotate between Šiauliai in Lithuania and Ämari in Estonia and maintain 24/7 readiness. At present, there are four Italian F-35s stationed in Estonia.

The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) responsible for directing Baltic QRA units is CAOC Uedem, located in Germany. CAOCs plan, assign and manage air assets in coordination with national control centers (Control and Reporting Centers), including Estonia's, and with the QRA units themselves. Friday's air policing operation was directed from Uedem in cooperation with our Air Force command center.

It's very likely everything proceeded as usual. We've read that Finnish aircraft, already in the air, first tracked the Russian planes. Near Vaindloo, the Finns "handed them off" to us.

At that point, the Russian MiGs had already been "detected and assessed," which is typically the first step. This is done using Estonian and NATO sensors (radar network, command center inputs, AWACS, liaison officers, etc.). These systems detect incoming targets approaching or entering NATO sovereign airspace. CAOC/CRC evaluates the transponder, flight plan and behavior. NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (NATINADS), which includes Estonia, provides a unified picture. In short, we know exactly who is flying near and far from our borders.

If the identity or intent of the tracked aircraft is unclear or if the aircraft violates or threatens sovereign airspace, CAOC/CRC issues a scramble order to the QRA unit — in this case, based at Ämari — for immediate launch and interception. Fighters can be airborne in minutes. On Friday, Italian F-35s based at Ämari responded. It's possible they were already airborne at the time of the violation or they scrambled immediately after — but in any case, it's clear they were in the air within 12 minutes, reached the Russian planes and escorted them out of Estonian airspace.

The F-35s' task was first to identify the Russian aircraft — initially via long-range radar and IFF datalinks (F-35s have unmatched capabilities here) and then, if needed, visually (VID). They would then attempt radio contact on emergency and air traffic control frequencies and monitor the aircraft's transponder/squawk code. All contact attempts and images/video are recorded for evidence.

The Russians reportedly did not respond to radio calls (they almost never do). Next come internationally recognized visual signals (wing rocking, control surface movements, hand signals from the cockpit, specific maneuvers), instructing the intruder to follow or land. The interceptors then escort the plane out of our airspace (as happened Friday) or direct it to a designated airfield.

NATO follows a graduated response, or "ladder of escalation": radio calls, visual signals/escort, more aggressive maneuvers (e.g., flying between the intruder and sensitive sites).

The use of armed force (i.e., shooting down) is a last resort and typically requires national political and military authorization. This depends on an unmistakably hostile act or clear intent to commit one — e.g., a MiG heading toward a critical site and ignoring orders. In short, force is used only if the threat demands it and the response is proportionate to prevent greater harm.

NATO ROE allows for national action in self-defense. This also applies to pilots. If a NATO F-35 pilot had been locked onto by Russian radar (though F-35s are notoriously hard to target) or had detected a direct threat to their aircraft, they would have had the right to shoot down the Russian plane. Generally, fighters are assumed to be potentially armed even if no weapons are visible. Threat assessments depend on behavior, location, transponder status, ICAO compliance and many other factors.

The final decision to use deadly force lies with national command. Interceptors operate under national ROEs and NATO directives. As mentioned, immediate self-defense is permitted for pilots under attack, but kinetic action otherwise requires higher-level approval.

One point to consider is that while CAOC Uedem issues the tasking, the aircraft's home country (in this case, Italy) retains final decision-making authority over use of force. In theory, the Estonian government could have decided to shoot down the Russian planes, but it's unlikely that could have been coordinated with the Italians in time. Perhaps our attitudes and procedures need to be clarified and pre-agreed.

I still recommend that Estonia start a fighter jet program and integrate the Estonian Air Force into the Scandinavian air forces. Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have unified their air force command structures and together they now have more aircraft than Russia. Sweden's Gripen program is excellent and, today, completely within Estonia's reach if the political will exists. We could begin by leasing a dozen fighters and gradually building a capable national air force. The benefit and protection we'd gain from participating in the Scandinavian joint air force would far outweigh the cost of operating our own jets.

One more thing. The Estonian government has decided to initiate NATO Article 4 consultations, which seems reasonable and proportionate. Given the overall security environment, the Russians' increasing brazenness and the clear need to strengthen deterrence, this is the right move.

Quick notes for newfound air warfare experts

Since 2004, the security of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian airspace has been ensured by allied fighter jets stationed at Ämari Air Base in Estonia and Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania. This is part of the Baltic Air Policing mission, a peacetime NATO air surveillance operation.

A peacetime mission

The Baltic Air Policing mission is not a combat readiness operation but a peacetime air policing task. Its purpose is to monitor the airspace, identify any violations and ensure the integrity of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian airspace. The legal basis for the mission lies in the NATO founding treaty, international law and the national laws of each member state.

How it works

Airspace monitoring is carried out through NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (NATINAMDS), which includes radar systems, command centers and AWACS aircraft. If an airspace violation or a non-compliant aircraft is detected, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Uedem, Germany, issues a scramble order to the QRA (quick reaction alert) fighter jets.

Allied fighters stationed at Ämari and Šiauliai are on 24/7 alert and can be airborne within minutes.

Ladder of escalation

Interception follows a defined ladder of escalation, aimed at keeping the situation under control and avoiding unnecessary risks:

1. First, an attempt is made to establish radio contact on international frequencies.
2. If unsuccessful, fighters move to visual identification.
3. Internationally recognized visual signals are then used — for example, wing rocking or hand signals instructing the intruder to follow the fighter jet.
4. The intruding aircraft is either escorted out of the airspace or, if necessary, directed to the nearest airfield.

Use of armed force

The use of armed force is an extreme and rare measure.

• A pilot may open fire only if under direct attack (self-defense).
• In all other cases, national or higher NATO authorization is required.
• Any such decision must be based on a clearly hostile act or intent and follow the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Evidence collection

All radar tracks, radio communications and weapon system camera footage are recorded. These may be used in subsequent diplomatic protests, NATO Article 4 or 5 consultations or legal proceedings.

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