In addition to Estonia's loud diplomatic air raid siren over the past weekend — which has prompted the United Nations Security Council to meet for the first time on Monday to discuss Estonia's security — another important security-related statement also resonated.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb told The Guardian that "security guarantees for Ukraine must include the willingness of European countries to go to war with Russia if Moscow attacks Ukraine again," and that "deterrence must be credible, and for it to be credible, it must be strong."

Across the Gulf of Finland, it's encouraging to see continued alignment between security language and real actions that enhance security. Within NATO as a whole, the word "deterrence" has become a catchphrase — uttered far too often and clearly in contexts where it's ill-suited, such as during small-scale, tactically insignificant exercises, or when launching operations that lack sufficient capability or substance to be considered militarily effective. This has also been claimed by members of Estonia's security elite in regard to the NATO operation Eastern Sentry, which was initiated after the Polish drone incident.

In the context of Ukraine, the concept of "deterrence" has been watered down, especially when speaking of a potential "deterrence force" formed by a coalition of the willing (Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur has used the term, for example). If we're not willing to clearly say that deterrence means being prepared to defend Ukraine and (as Stubb puts it) go to war with Russia in Ukraine, then we should refrain from using the word. Instead, we should say we're sending Estonian Defense Forces personnel to assist in Ukraine's rear as instructors, as we did up until the end of 2021 as part of a standard bilateral military cooperation project.

Alternatively, we could send military capabilities to Ukraine that do not directly engage with Russian troops but still participate in combat — such as air defense units that shoot down Russian-launched drones or missiles (in place of sending an infantry company).

NATO could already be doing all this to defend Polish airspace over Western Ukraine. These discussions have been ongoing for three years, but instead of moving forward with Western Ukraine's air defense, we're now seeing the emergence of a post-ceasefire peacekeeping mission idea with an unclear mandate — something we occasionally call a "deterrence force."

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a country under attack has the right to call for allies to assist, and if Ukraine makes that call, no further legal basis is needed for engaging Russia in Ukraine. A "peacekeeping" operation, however, would require a UN mandate and is something entirely different from a "deterrence force," which is, in essence, a pledge to participate in the war on Ukraine's side.

"Deterrence," like "love," is in its truest and most effective form an action, not a buzzword. Information operations intended to reassure allies and unsettle adversaries are common in the field of security, but they should be the exception rather than the rule in the broader "deterrence posture" that consists of both words and deeds.

Over time, the exception of talking about deterrence has become the rule in NATO, while deterrent actions have become exceptional. Even in discussions about the red lines of collective defense, deterrence is too often treated as a semiotic phenomenon — something with symbolic meaning — rather than a military concept with a concrete, preventative effect. One need only look at the fact that the "forward deterrence" plan announced alongside NATO's new Baltic defense plans a few years ago still lacks sufficient forward-deployed forces in the Baltic states.

I'm referring here to narrow but urgent threat segments such as combat drones and missile defense, where deterrence might be most immediately needed. Ground force deterrence will inevitably rely heavily on rapidly deployable reinforcements. There, one might reasonably expect more preparation time, since enemy ground forces would also need time to mobilize and concentrate.

The other side of deterrence is our own action. If, during Article 4 consultations and at the UN Security Council, we demand that more be done to defend us — such as deploying additional air defense systems here that are in fact desperately needed in Ukraine — but we ourselves do nothing, then our own deterrence posture is incomplete and unconvincing.

Estonia currently doesn't have many options — our IRIS-T medium-range air defense system ordered from Germany is set to arrive next year with a slight delay — but there are still things we can already do in the realm of air defense. Short-range air defense is already a crucial factor in protecting Tallinn and other populated areas.

During the recent Okas snap readiness exercise, air defense personnel assigned to the division were also called up. Perhaps it's possible to initiate a small-scale, rotating domestic air defense mission in Estonia that relies partially on reservists, even during peacetime? Even if it isn't fully militarily effective and can only provide protection in limited segments, it would still serve as a warm-up in case a future escalation suddenly requires heightened air defense readiness.

I would argue that many Baltic politicians, diplomats, officials and commentators often don't fully grasp what exactly they mean when they talk about "deterrence." I encourage journalists to ask clarifying questions about this and to critically analyze statements made by officials during and after crises.

One politician aptly summarized the recent triple incursion by Russian fighter jets into Estonian airspace and the subsequent explanations with the following joke: "We have excellent air defense that works flawlessly, and that's why it urgently needs to be significantly strengthened — because it's not sufficient."

Part of deterrence is inevitably about posture — there's no need to broadcast all your weaknesses to the adversary. But the issue lies in proportionality and in how the meaning of the word is diluted when that proportionality is skewed in favor of posturing over action. President Stubb's comment thus carries a much deeper and broader meaning than just securing future peace for Ukraine.

Deterrence messaging should, first of all, be generally achievable (otherwise the adversary won't believe it); second, be rare rather than frequent (otherwise it loses its value); and third, be expressed through specific changes in the defense landscape (especially if those messages include promises to boost readiness in the near future).

The adversary likely monitors our deterrence behavior more scientifically and systematically than we do ourselves. Within NATO and among our own leaders, there's too much at stake personally — reputation, status — for there to be a truly objective assessment of our deterrence posture. That's why it's all the more welcome that Finland's brilliant new president, a fresh face in NATO, reminded us of what the word "deterrence" really means.

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