Fifteen years ago, most people knew little about drones. Today, they are shaping both battlefields and everyday life, as seen when an attack drone exploded over a field near the village of Koruste on August 24, undetected by Estonian surveillance.

Andrus padar, an expert at the Estonian Academy of Security Services' Remote Sensing Research and Development Center, said the problem was that sensors weren't in place along the Estonian–Latvian border, as it wasn't considered dangerous.

"It's still an internal EU border," Padar said. "And we didn't have sensors there."

Although Ukraine's war has highlighted drone threats, the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) first encountered unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Iraq in 2004, and later in Afghanistan.

An early effort to collaborate with Estonian company ELI failed because the drones were never operational, reserve Maj. Sten Reimann said.

"Estonia didn't use UAVs at the time," he said, recalling that the ELI drones rusted before being put to use.

Now Estonia is looking to Ukraine for guidance. Reimann, with close ties to Ukrainian forces, explained that air defense relies on three components: detection, classification and reporting to a command center. Ukraine's commander center, largely aided by the U.S., sets the benchmark.

"The U.S. helped Ukraine develop a unique air defense center," he explained, stressing how crucial it has been. "When many targets appear at once and fire tasks must be split among dozens of units, that requires excellent command."

'Could be a Coke can, could be supplies'

Even with good command systems, however, units often lack sufficient tools.

Estonian volunteer Raivo Olev said his friends send Kherson's air defenders targeting and detection devices, communications gear, power banks, vehicles for mobile units and interceptor drones. He showed trophies destroyed with volunteer-built interceptors.

Olev said their contacts in Kherson built effective interceptors from equipment they delivered this spring. "Over the summer, they shot down four Supercam 3500 drones," he noted.

Stockpiling similar gear in Estonia is difficult, he added, since all proven tools are already in use.

Padar, also a member of the EDL's Cyberdefense Unit, explained how to assess a drone's threat: anything attached underneath raises suspicion, and observing a drone from 100 meters requires binoculars.

"It could be harmless, like a Coke can, or something sharper," he said. "Easy — you could just release it. But it could also be carrying medicine or water."

Cameras for aerial filming, meanwhile, must face their target to pose a threat. "You can tell what a drone is doing through binoculars," Padar said. "Here, it wasn't looking at us at all. You can recognize a face but can't read a name at 100 meters."

A "drone wall" proposed by politicians would be expensive, Padar said. A single surveillance defense complex costs about €5 million, while covering an entire border could run upwards of €500 million.

He emphasized that action should begin where threats are greatest, warning against buying equipment before analyzing risk scenarios.

"It's a huge mistake to start by buying equipment, then figuring out how to use it," the expert noted. "Everything must be based on risk analysis."

'War doesn't end on schedule'

In Ukraine, drone defense is partly a local government responsibility, but most units and gear are on the front line, Reimann acknowledged.

"Right now, in order to survive and protect critical infrastructure, regions have no choice but to form new teams and acquire tools from the budget," he said. "It's not a matter of some ideal system — it's a matter of survival."

Some preparations can still be done locally. Padar recommended passive defense measures, like adding protective layers around critical infrastructure or relocating vulnerable sites.

Olev said that beyond drone flight training, building, designing and 3D printing drones should receive more national support, noting that operating interceptor drones also requires trained pilots.

Ultimately, drone defense is a high-speed technological race — and the Ukrainians have proven it possible. Reimann said Estonia must be ready for ongoing adaptation as well.

"War doesn't end at 5 p.m. on a Friday," he said, referring to scheduled defense exercises. "We must be able to modify our equipment at a reasonable cost. Expensive missiles can only defend the air for a few weeks — not years."

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