Relations between Russia and Western countries began moving toward confrontation with Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" and Georgia's "Rose Revolution" in 2003–2004, which Russia interpreted as the penetration of Western liberal values into its sphere of influence. Russia has actively spread the strategic narrative that NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe is aimed against Russia's security, while preserving the myth of the Baltic states as an anti-Russian outpost of the West (Winnerstig, 2014).

Stanford University professor and former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul has argued that Vladimir Putin was at the time open to free trade and developing cooperation with the West, but sharply opposed to the democratization of society (McFaul, 2022). In Estonian-Russian bilateral relations, these tensions came to the surface more strongly in 2005, when Estonia added a preamble to the ratification act of a bilaterally signed border treaty. The preamble referred to the Tartu Peace Treaty and Article 122 of the Estonian Constitution, which sets out a partially altered border. This triggered a counterreaction from Russia, which is why the signed treaty remains unratified to this day.

The tensions between Estonia and Russia in 2005 can be seen as one of the early warning signs of the escalation of the status conflict¹ between Russia and the West. This was followed by Putin's accusatory speech against Western states at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, the Russia-supported Bronze Night riots in Estonia later that year and the Russo-Georgian war in 2008.

Therefore, we should evaluate tensions in Estonian-Russian bilateral relations within a broader strategic context, since this is not only a matter between two countries but part of a wider confrontation with the post-Cold War liberal, rules-based international order and its institutions, such as NATO and the European Union.

Estonia's accession to NATO and the European Union in 2004 created opportunities for Russia to use Estonia as a platform for influence activities directed against Western states and their institutions. For this, Russia has exploited economic, political and social tensions and problems within Estonian society, as well as specific target groups such as Estonia's Russian-speaking community or alternative political movements.

In 2021, Russian authorities compiled a list of "unfriendly states," which included the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Hankewitz, 2021).

In an interview with U.S. conservative journalist Tucker Carlson in February 2024, Vladimir Putin denied any intention of attacking the Baltic states (Putin, 2024). However, the interview allowed the Kremlin to present its propagandistic narratives to a Western audience — including manipulation of historical facts — while also convincing the domestic audience in Russia that Western countries are still willing to engage with his regime.

Russian strategic thinking defines Estonia as a "vulnerable part" of NATO and the European Union, where domestic instability, conflicts arising along ethnic and cultural lines and the spread of a culture of fear could become key outlets for escalation (Mölder, 2011, 2021). Similar strategic ambitions have driven Russia's hostile actions against Ukraine, as even shortly before the escalation of the war in February 2022, the Kremlin denied any intention of attacking Ukraine (Isachenkov, 2021). The status conflict between Russia and Western institutions (the EU and NATO) gained momentum with the planned EU–Ukraine Association Agreement in 2013, which the Russian Federation actively opposed.

Russia's strategic ambitions since early 2014 — following the ousting of pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the start of fighting in Donbas — point to a shift toward a new, more polarized world order. In this order, the influence of international organizations (the UN, EU, NATO) decreases, while great powers divide their influence into spheres, resembling the multipolar world that functioned at the height of colonialism in the 19th century (Mölder, Sazonov & Värk, 2014, 2015).

Kremlin influence activity in Estonia

The Kremlin's influence operations target Estonia's political and economic power, with particular focus on the problems of the local Russian-speaking community, which for decades has been under the sway of media discourses and narratives spread by Russian media channels. Russian television and online outlets were banned in Estonia after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but before the ban, Russian media was widely consumed in Estonia.

Pro-Kremlin media channels dominated especially among Russian-speaking television audiences, for whom TV has long been the main source of information, particularly for the older generation. For many years, authorities tried to convince the public that Estonian channels could not compete with Russian ones and that there was no need to allocate resources to Russian-language public broadcasting.

After more than two decades of political debate over the need for a Russian-language television channel, the first public Russian-language channel was launched in 2015. But this landmark decision was not driven by recognition of the minority community's information needs. Rather, it was prompted by events in Ukraine and the growing wave of Russian propaganda (Jõesaar, 2015: 45–51).

Since February 2022, ETV+ viewership has grown. In February 2022, Russian TV channels RTR Planeta (4.3 percent), PBK (3.1 percent) and NTV Mir (2.8 percent) were watched more than the local Russian-language channel ETV+ (1.4 percent). By February 2024, ETV+'s daily share had risen to 1.9 percent (Kantar Emor, 2022, 2024).

The closure of Russian information channels should not be seen as a guarantee that their content — whether delivered directly or indirectly through social media, internet sources, satellite television or interpersonal contacts — no longer reaches potential consumers. Information influence campaigns can easily take on far more covert forms.

Estonian media and communication expert Ilmar Raag (2022) warns that blocking Russian media accounts for only about 20 percent of the effort required to combat Russia's influence operations and does not reduce the amount of disinformation reaching audiences. The availability of accurate information does not prevent it from being misinterpreted. Still, Estonian government measures put pressure on the spread of Russia-originating content, signaling that justifying the war in Ukraine will not be tolerated in Estonia.

A vivid example of Russia as a source of fear culture dates back to 2010, when a so-called "buckwheat panic" began in Russia. People rushed to stockpile buckwheat based on rumors and the news of looming price hikes and shortages quickly spread to Estonia as well (Lamp, 2010).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, anti-vaccine sentiment that gained mass support in Russia also reached Estonia. The risks can come from Russia-based social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, which are often used to spread fears and conspiracy theories that then quickly reach Estonian audiences. But major international networks such as Facebook, X (Twitter), Telegram, Instagram and TikTok also play a key role (Fredheim & Gallacher, 2018). According to a NATO StratCom COE report, VKontakte has about 327,000 users in Estonia, while Odnoklassniki has around 250,000 (Dek, 2018).

Russia's influence operations fuel fear of migrants and refugees, of the foundations and institutions of the Euro-Atlantic political and security order (NATO, the EU) and of Western identity, liberal ideas and values. At the same time, they promote the image of a "decadent West" (Mölder, 2021). These narratives depict the West as "immoral," supposedly controlled by sexual minorities (the so-called Gayropa narrative) or accuse NATO of "misdeeds" and "aggression" (Eslas, 2017).

Russia constantly accuses Estonia of stoking anti-Russian sentiments and emotions, while simultaneously seeking to instill patriotic feelings in its Russian-speaking audience and to fuel fears of losing their ethnic identity (Lucas & Pomerantsev, 2016).

Popular narratives emphasize alleged violations of Russian speakers' rights in education, culture, society and political life — for instance, government decisions to restrict Russian-language media and schooling. Russian speakers are depicted as a "hated minority" deprived of many basic rights because of their national identity (Mölder & Sazonov, 2020: 87).

Russian authorities have actively supported hostile attitudes toward vulnerable NATO countries in its neighborhood, including Estonia, and there are signs of increased activity by Russian intelligence services in Estonia. In 2024, a scandal erupted around University of Tartu Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies professor of international political theory, Vyacheslav Morozov, who turned out to be a spy for Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU (Einmann, 2024; Espak, 2024; Hosaka, 2024). In June 2024, Harju County Court convicted Morozov of actions against the Republic of Estonia (Internal Security Service, 2024). Russian propaganda, however, sought to portray him as a victim of Estonian authorities (Baltnews, 2024).

In 2022, Sergei Seredenko, a member of the Estonian United Left Party (EÜVP) and an activist with the pro-Kremlin group "Immortal Regiment," was detained on suspicion of anti-Estonian activity and convicted of treason for actions directed against Estonia. According to the charges, between November 2009 and March 2021, he cooperated with individuals working for Russian government agencies, assisting them in non-violent activities against Estonia's constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity. He also supported their intelligence operations against Estonia, transmitted information to them, wrote and published articles under their direction and took part in events organized by them and their organizations (Einmann, 2022).

Balint et al. (2022) analyzed the effect of access restrictions on the Kremlin propaganda channel RT (Russia Today). The findings show that due to restrictions, internet traffic to RT's websites from the EU dropped by up to 75 percent.

Yet a study commissioned by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation shows that many people in Estonia still share values and attitudes shaped by Russia's information space. According to the study, Estonian Russians are generally critical of media coverage of the war in Ukraine. Their confusion and fragmentation is evident in the fact that 54 percent of them do not consider Russia a threat to European security, while only 40 percent do. More than a third of Estonia's Russian speakers do not trust Estonian media. Even fewer trust Russia's official media or its independent or opposition media — but they also do not trust Western media outlets (Altosaar, 2023).

Pro-Kremlin political discourses during the Ukraine war

The 2023 Riigikogu elections showed that support for pro-Kremlin forces in Estonia has not yet reached a significant level, but it has grown. The Estonian United Left Party (EÜVP), a successor to the Estonian Communist Party, was for a long time mainly a pro-Russian organization led by pro-Kremlin Maardu Mayor Georgi Bõstrov (1944–2015).

Some party members have been part of Russia's Coordination Council of Compatriots. The EÜVP formed a coalition with the pro-Kremlin movement Koos/Vmeste, led by cryptocurrency entrepreneur Oleg Ivanov and former state official Aivo Peterson. Peterson worked in the Estonian Border Guard from 1992–2004, was a member of the Center Party from 2002–2008 and the Social Democratic Party from 2008–2011, but in more recent years has stood out for echoing pro-Kremlin positions on the war in Ukraine.

Ivanov has called the Bucha massacre staged and compared the situation of Russians in Estonia to that of Jews in Nazi Germany (Oskolkov, 2023). In 2023, Ivanov moved to Russia and in December 2024 announced that he was leaving the party (Solts, 2023). According to former EÜVP leader Igor Rosenfeld, this was a pragmatic move to get onto the ballot (Levtšenko, 2023). The Koos/Vmeste movement was established on May 19, 2022, after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In the 2023 Riigikogu elections, the EÜVP won 2.39 percent of the vote (a total of 14,605 ballots), below the 5 percent threshold needed for parliamentary representation. Still, this was a sharp increase compared to the 2019 election, when the party received only 0.1 percent (510 votes). In electoral district No. 7 (Ida-Viru County), the EÜVP received 14.9 percent of the vote, the second-highest result after the Center Party, and increased its vote share in two Tallinn districts (No. 2 and No. 1) to 4.9 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively. This shows the party has gained popularity particularly in Russian-speaking areas, with much of its vote share coming from candidates linked to the pro-Kremlin Koos movement. In November 2023, the EÜVP elected new leadership and rebranded itself as a new left-wing organization under the name Vasakpoolsed ("The Leftists").

The majority of the EÜVP's votes in Ida-Viru County went to its lead candidate Aivo Peterson, who won 3,968 votes — the second-highest individual result in the district after independent candidate and former MP Mihhail Stalnuhhin.

Stalnuhhin, too, has often publicly voiced pro-Kremlin positions. For example, on February 11, 2022, he told Germany's Taz news outlet that he did not believe Russia would launch military aggression against Ukraine but did believe in Ukrainian provocations. He said, "Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a clown who is leading his country to destruction" (Kask, 2022; Petrosyan, 2022).

Peterson, who benefitted from his ethnic Estonian background and previous political experience, described his success in the elections by saying: "The votes were lying on the ground and someone had to pick them up" (Oskolkov, 2023). In the 2024 European Parliament elections in Estonia, Peterson ran as the sole candidate on the Koos list, winning 11,503 votes nationwide but failing to be elected. The elections suggest that direct political support for pro-Kremlin forces in Estonia remains in the range of 2–3 percent.

In 2023, Peterson traveled to Moscow and Russian-occupied Donetsk. In public appearances, he accused Estonian media of biased coverage of the war in Ukraine and endorsed several conspiracy theories circulated by Russian media (Voomets & Lind, 2023). In Moscow, Peterson and Ivanov appeared on the popular program Solovjov Live, one of Russia's best-known YouTube channels for disseminating Kremlin propaganda.

Peterson began the interview by saying: "It feels like all the pro-Western Estonian parties are fighting against us. You can't imagine the pressure we're under" (Voomets & Lind, 2023). He went on to argue that to change the situation in Estonia, an uprising or guerrilla war would be necessary (Hussar, 2023).

On March 10, 2023, Peterson was arrested along with another pro-Kremlin Koos/Vmeste activist, Dmitri Rusti, and Russian citizen Andrei Andronov. According to the charges, Peterson and Rusti, from October 2022 until March 10, 2023, carried out non-violent activities against Estonia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity under instructions from Russia. On September 7, 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor General sent the criminal case to court (ERR, 2023a; ERR, 2023b).

At the time, Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets (SDE) said Peterson's actions may have posed a threat to Estonia's security and that he must have cooperated with Russian special services to reach the Donetsk front line (Landeiro, 2023). The case is still ongoing. In October, the court set bail for Peterson at €150,000, which, if paid, could allow for his release (ERR, 2024).

Some politicians have also spread pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives on social media. Among them was former Võru City Council member Kertu Luisk, who claimed, among other things, that NATO, with the support of what she called Kyiv's "illegal occupation government," had built nine illegal military bases in Ukraine in violation of peace treaties, and that this dragged Ukraine into war without public consent (Võsoberg, 2022).

In 2023, Luisk joined a new pro-Russian party called the Estonian People's Party (ERE), which includes individuals with pro-Kremlin views, among them some former members of EKRE and the Koos movement. The party has a conservative worldview and its platform states that Estonia should remain neutral in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

One of ERE's leaders, businessman Harry Raudvere (owner of the radio station Nõmme Raadio, popular among alternative politicians), said at the party's founding meeting that Russia has done nothing bad to Estonia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has helped the Estonian economy, "synchronized electricity" and provided cheap fuel and gas. For these reasons, he argued, relations with Russia should be improved (Voomets, 2023).

Based on conflicting statements by some EKRE politicians about the war in Ukraine, it cannot be concluded that the party as a whole supports the Russian Federation's strategic goals and political objectives. However, at times they have expressed sympathy for conservative aspects of Kremlin ideology.

In April 2023, Andres Raid, a former journalist and EKRE Riigikogu candidate, said in an interview with Kuku radio that he had visited Russian-occupied Donetsk, including Mariupol, to investigate whether rumors of Ukrainian child abductions were true. He said the situation was not as bad as portrayed in Estonia, that the city was being rebuilt with Russia's help, that many Mariupol schools were well organized and that there were no reports of child abductions (Raid, 2023).

In January 2023, Eesti Ekspress reported that Vsevolod Jürgenson, then a member of EKRE, had posted in Estonia's largest Russian-speaking Facebook group Tallintsõ ("Tallinners") that the Ukrainian president was a drug addict. According to Jürgenson, helping Ukraine was pointless because it is "the most corrupt country in the world" (Eesti Ekspress, 2023).

Shortly thereafter, EKRE expelled Jürgenson from the party and declared: "EKRE unequivocally supports Ukraine's fight for its country, people and independence. We have voted for all Riigikogu resolutions supporting Ukraine. Many of our members have made personal efforts to support Ukraine, collecting donations and delivering them themselves" (Pulk, 2023).

Kremlin political discourses to split Western democratic principles

During the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous conspiracy theories spread from Russia into Estonia. These claimed that pandemic response measures were being used to impose authoritarian control over populations in EU countries, alleging that the pandemic was deliberately organized, that medical treatment was intentionally interrupted and that vaccines not only failed to protect people but caused serious side effects and health damage. As mentioned earlier, Kertu Luisk argued that "the coronavirus vaccination is dangerous to health or even life" (Võsoberg, 2022).

The "Big Pharma" conspiracy theory — which claims that global pandemics are either fabricated or orchestrated in the interests of major Western pharmaceutical companies — predates the COVID-19 crisis.

The term "Big Pharma" is used as shorthand for an abstract entity said to encompass pharmaceutical corporations, government institutions, NGOs, politicians and often doctors. These actors are alleged to be complicit in the nearly $3 trillion prescription drug industry and to secretly collaborate against the public interest (Blaskiewicz, 2013).

According to Robert Blaskiewicz, associate professor of critical thinking at Stockton University, Big Pharma conspiracies share four classic features:

1. The assumption that a conspiracy is carried out by a small, malicious and devious group.
2. The belief that the general public does not know the truth and that it is being concealed.
3. Treating the lack of evidence as proof.
4. Using irrational, misunderstood or otherwise flawed arguments to support the theory.

For example, in February 1998 the medical journal The Lancet published a study by British anti-vaccine activist Andrew Wakefield, who claimed there was a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. This fueled a conspiracy theory that vaccines cause autism, a theory supported by, among others, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., now the U.S. secretary of health and human services in the Donald Trump administration (Smith, 2021).

Kremlin narratives and those of Western far-right politicians often overlap when it comes to their views of the global political landscape. Conservative U.S. economist and author Paul Craig Roberts has repeatedly published in pro-Kremlin outlets such as Geopolitica.ru.

Among other things, he has criticized the policies of past U.S. administrations and described the 2013–2014 Maidan events as a deliberate U.S. operation against Russia (Dontsova, 2014). Writing on vaccination programs, Roberts (2021) claimed:

"We know the vaccine does not protect. Dr. Fauci, the leading advocate of vaccination programs and head of Big Pharma, admits this. That is why he says the double-vaccinated should wear masks and get boosters. … Now we have thousands of cases where pregnant women are losing babies because of the vaccine. … Klaus Schwab, the creator of the [Davos] World Economic Forum … has for decades organized, nurtured and instilled Western elites with the idea that the new world order should consist of rule by elites, not democracy or constitutions …" (Roberts, 2021).

There are numerous similar Western "independent thinkers" and authors whose ideas align with Russia's strategic narratives and whose statements Russia actively amplifies in its influence campaigns. Many extremist politicians have criticized their governments for supporting Ukraine, arguing that such support comes at the expense of their own citizens' well-being.

In the European Parliament, members of Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Austria's Freedom Party systematically voted against support for Ukraine. Both parties have extensive contacts with the Kremlin. Last year, the European Parliament expressed concern that Russia has systematically maintained ties with far-right and far-left parties as well as other extremist actors to build support for its strategic objectives in the European Union (European Parliament, 2024).

Anton Shekhovtsov (2018) examined the rhetoric of various far-right politicians in Europe in his doctoral thesis. He argued: "There has been growing concern in the West about the rapprochement — or at least a marriage of convenience — between Vladimir Putin's Russia and Europe's far right. Indeed, we have witnessed an increasing number of statements by far-right politicians praising Putin's Russia, as well as references to contacts between European far-right actors and Russian officials and other stakeholders" (Shekhovtsov, 2018: 12). An AfD politician was accused of accepting money from a pro-Kremlin strategist, while another was found to have ties to a Russian intelligence officer (van Rij, 2024; Rankin, 2024).

Pro-Kremlin media outlets have heavily exploited fear-based narratives about Ukrainian refugees' negative impact on European societies, attempting to tap into skepticism about refugee integration that grew during the EU migration crisis. These narratives often resonate in political circles with extremist leanings.

In early April 2022, Mart Helme (EKRE) said in a Riigikogu speech that Ukrainian war refugees would bring infectious diseases to Estonia and might become involved in prostitution:

"I have a son who is a doctor, I talk to doctors. Doctors say the health picture is terrible. HIV is coming back. Infectious diseases are being brought in from Ukraine that we thought we'd never see in Estonia again. No, they are coming back to us because tens of thousands of people are coming and bringing them here" (Delfi, 2022).

AfD politician Alice Weidel claimed that Germany's coalition government has "not only created a huge asylum industry, but completely overwhelmed municipalities with housing immigrants and German taxpayers are suffering as a result" (Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group, 2023). Russian propaganda had been pushing similar narratives for years (Euromaidan Press, 2014).

Russia's influence operations display recognizable patterns, including both covert and visible activities ranging from smear campaigns to information manipulation aimed at undermining trust in Estonian authorities. Support for the Russian Federation has not grown significantly as a result, since it is difficult for Moscow to appear attractive to the majority of the Estonian public, which has been very active in supporting Ukraine.

Influence efforts have been more successful at fueling anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiment, especially as economic conditions have worsened. Russia does not offer credible alternatives to the Western-led democratic order. Instead, it focuses on fostering distrust, insecurity and fear in order to weaken the internal stability of Western societies.

Alternative movements — whether knowingly or not supporting Russia — can serve as useful tools for obscuring the origins of manipulated information, so that potential audiences may not associate it with Moscow. Information influence operations may target those who pose a threat to Russia's strategic goals: Western institutions, liberal democratic values, politicians mediating them, organizations providing aid to Ukraine and many others.

For example, attacks on former Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and her government intensified after she spoke forcefully in support of Ukraine and condemned Russia's actions. In February 2023, the names of Kallas and State Secretary Taimar Peterkop were added to Russia's Interior Ministry's wanted list. The reasons for their inclusion are unclear but may be linked to the removal of Soviet-era monuments in Estonia after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Kook, 2024).

Similarly, Sweden and Finland have faced campaign-style criticism in connection with their NATO accession. Liberal Western leaders such as Joe Biden, Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron have been attacked following their pro-Ukraine decisions. These attacks may not always stem directly from Russia-related activities, but they aim to portray such leaders as weak, selfish and indecisive.

If influence operations can be detected at a very early stage, they can be prevented or at least their harmful effects minimized. The process of crisis escalation may initially unfold covertly, but its intensity can shift over time. An effective system of strategic communication — one that includes all segments of society, including various communities and target groups such as the Russian-speaking community — would help Estonia counter Russian information influence and strengthen society's resilience.

Estonia's response must be de-escalatory, not escalatory. Under certain conditions, fear can promote social cohesion, but only in the short term. A cohesive and functional society is more sustainable, while escalating tensions only plays into the other side's hands.

Countermeasures should rely more on facts and less on judgmental "grand narratives," which the adversary can effectively exploit to sow division and destabilize society. For example, in the debate over churches, it would be more effective not to focus on institutional judgments about the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, but instead to highlight specific actions by church representatives where they have, in words or deeds, acted in line with the interests of the Russian Federation.

In summary

Until 2022, Russia's influence operations in Estonia were greatly aided by the dominance of Russian Federation media channels — particularly television — in the Russian-language media space. Even now, there are many avenues through which Russian influence can spread. Social media platforms, online channels and satellite connections are highly effective in ensuring that Russian narratives reach potential consumers in Estonia.

The main goal of Russia's influence operations in Europe and Estonia is to promote the image of "Western decline" and to deepen distrust of the liberal democratic value system by fueling polarization within society. Digitalization has opened various doors to information manipulation, allowing disinformation to reach target groups in covert ways, without clearly identifiable links to the original source.

Estonia's worsened economic situation following the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine may facilitate the spread of fear-inducing narratives and provoke social unrest. At the same time, it could also increase support for alternative movements that may become less critical of Russia's activities.

Public support for Russia in Estonia mainly comes from smaller political movements (Koos/Vmeste, ERE), whose influence on society is limited. Nevertheless, the most recent parliamentary elections showed that support for pro-Kremlin politicians has grown somewhat and pro-Kremlin figures and their activities have received more media attention in Estonia.

In the face of disinformation campaigns originating from Russia, it is essential for Estonia to provide reliable sources of information that offer comprehensive facts. Otherwise, influence operations can quickly undermine societal resilience and push political decisions toward irrational solutions.

Alternative movements that skillfully exploit new media formats may become direct or indirect partners in hostile influence campaigns, since they — like Russia — are dissatisfied with Western liberal democracy. We should recognize that a polarized society becomes weaker and more vulnerable to those who may harbor unfriendly intentions.

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* This article was prepared with the support of the PROF4 project "Russia's Historical and Political Narratives in the Kremlin's Influence Operations Targeting Western (Including Estonian) and Ukrainian Audiences in the Context of the Russia-Ukraine War."

¹ In international relations, a status conflict reflects disagreements over countries' relative standing and influence within the global hierarchy. Russia's status conflict with the West is rooted in its great power ambitions and its hostility toward Europe's liberal democratic values.

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