The Poles have a website of Polish authors' works on Russia, most of it historical writing. I found Polish Sovietologist Wlodzimierz Baczkowski's piece from 1938 titled "Remarks on the Essence of Russian Power." The reason I'm bringing it up is that it includes several observations that continue to be relevant to this day.

But down to business. The current regime likes to say that Russia has never fought wars of conquest, and that it's not fighting one in Ukraine right now. But Baczkowski references General Aleksei Kuropatkin, Russia's minister of war in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, who has provided an overview of wars Russia has fought. I found online a piece of a report by Kuropatkin to Tzar Nicholas I from the year 1900.

The general writes that in the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia fought for a total of 128 years. Only five wars during that period were defensive — the rest conquests. In the 19th century, Russia fought 15 foreign wars and three domestic ones. Wars lasted for a total of 67 years, with only two years and one month spent fighting defensively. Russia organized 121 military operations beyond its borders in the 19th century.

To sum up this statistical overview, it pays to quote Tzar Alexander III, according to whom, Russia is not a commercial or agricultural entity, it is a country of war the calling of which is to be a threat to the whole world. So much for Russia's constant defensive stance. Let us also not forget that this dataset is from the beginning of the previous century, when the Bolsheviks were yet to undertake their conquests.

Coming back to Baczkowski, he notes that Russia usually conquered nations that were either on the verge of domestic collapse or simply unable to resist. For example, the Khanate of Kazan fell in 1551 because it was internally weak, diplomatically isolated and incapable of fighting back. Siberia was conquered by 1558 by gangs of volunteers led by Yermak, with the same fate befalling Bashkiria five years later, as well as the territories of the Samoyeds, Tungusians and Yakuts.

In 1667, Ukrainian territories were seized with the Truce of Andrusovo. Kamchatka and the Koryak territories in Finland were annexed in 1703. In 1772, the first part of Poland was conquered as the territory was weak, riddled by anarchy and its elite was simply bought. Georgia fell in 1801 to internal division and pressure from Islamic territories. Next came Bessarabia, Wallachia and, in 1812, Moldova. Meanwhile, Chinese colonies fell to Russian conquest in the east.

But there were examples of resistance. The tiny Khanate of Crimea managed, in the 14th to 17th centuries, to pose a threat to a country 20-30 times its size for 200 years. In the North Caucasus, the Russian Empire's 150,000–200,000-strong army spent 25 years battling the locals whose armed forces consisted of 8,000–10,000 men. Another example of the Russian state's ineptitude was its war with Japan, which it lost in 1905.

Baczkowski considers it a miracle that the Russian Bolsheviks managed to maintain the unity of the empire in 1917–1921. Apparently, the army played a marginal role, as victories were scored mainly by timely elections and developing the right kind of relationships.

According to the Polish author, the Russian state's culture hails from the east and it is, by nature, an Asian country. The Russian mentality is said to boil down to this Asianness as a mix of peculiar materialism and mysticism. Political struggle boils down to irregular war, with one always prepared for mass acts of violence. Moscow's cultural ties, through Mongolia, to China and India support this irregular state of war, alongside an extensive occidental legacy.

Insofar as it ties into the modern state of affairs, it is worth noting Baczkowski's point that following the example of Chinese authors, Moscow sees the need to upend everything good the opposing side has. Governments need to be shaken, confusion and dissatisfaction sowed among the people. Advice, gifts, deception and money are all good tools. And there must be spies everywhere. In other words, what we nowadays call hybrid warfare.

Russia acquired the roots of this culture during the Mongol era, even though additional layers were added as time went on, if only from Byzantium. However, in the broad strokes, Russia adhered to the culture of Genghis Khan's hyper empire. Baczkowski also finds Russia's military methods follow the Mongolian-Tatar example.

Genghis Khan hardly ever met defeat. One of the reasons for this was that his army was always used in the late stage for taking control of enemy territories that had previously been softened through other means. Battles were always preceded by a long and thorough intelligence-gathering period, complete with sabotage and efforts to sow confusion. The similarity between the military strategy of the Mongols and Russia goes back to Russian guardsmen in Kublai Khan's court, Russian khans' units in the Golden Horde and Muscovite units in the Tokhtamysh army.

Adoption of Mongol behavior and strategy has been confirmed by numerous Russian historians, such as Pavel Milyukov. He writes that had Russian princes been asked what they would do if they could be rid of the Mongols, they would likely have been able to come up with little other than recent experience — conquering new territories, deception and use of force in the name of amassing as much wealth and power as possible.

The preference for espionage was also reflected in domestic politics, where secret services have often been beyond government control. Historically, the role of internal special services spans from the time of Ivan the Terrible to this day. Russia diplomacy, too, is riddled with subterfuge. It was Ivan the Terrible who told his emissaries to lie about the tzar's power and property, just as kidnapping and killing people beyond Russia's borders has always been in the playbook, starting in the 17th century. In 1709, there was even an attempt on the life of King Karl XII of Sweden. During the reign of Nicholas I, agents carrying Russian diplomatic passports killed Russian revolutionaries, among them General Kotzebue, who was murdered while in Paris.

Baczkowski concludes that in order to overcome Russia's destructive influence it needs to be rendered wholly powerless. Every peace agreement signed with Russia and aimed at that goal will only spur Moscow onto even more heinous crimes. The only way to resist Russian-Soviet methods is to marry the idea of the freedom of people Russia has enslaved with that of the political dissolution of the country. There...

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